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EUROPE

FROM 800 TO 1789

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EUROPE

FROM 800 TO 1789

BY

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WITH 13 MAPS

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PREFACE

ONLY a few days before his sudden and lamented death, the author of this book spoke to some of his friends about his intention of publishing it. From what he then said, and from some expressions in his other works, we are able to know what were the hopes and purposes with which he had formed that plan. Except for the period of the War, which he spent in the public service, the work of his life had been the study, writing and teaching of history. As a teacher he worked mainly in Oxford, first for more than twenty years as a Lecturer, Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, then, after a short interval when he was a Professor in the University of Manchester, as Regius Professor of Modern History. He took little part in lecturing or teaching outside the University; but his books were widely read both in universities and schools, and by readers whose interest was in history for its own sake and not as a subject prescribed for examinations. He always believed that, even for learned specialists like himself, it was right to produce books suitable for this wider world of readers. It was characteristic of him that when he became, as professor, one of the heads of the historical school of his old university, he thought that this, instead of setting him free to devote himself entirely to his own researches, actually increased his responsibility for doing what he could to ensure that the history taught and read outside should be of the soundest quality.

He did not merely think that true and accurate history was needed; besides that he had a definite view as to the

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kind of historical subject that was most wanted for this purpose. He thought that educationally the most important thing for historians was to provide students with the outlines of history on sound lines. He knew, what all experienced historical writers know and few other people suspect, that the writing of such outlines is very difficult. It was partly because he knew how difficult it is, and how few of those who attempt it are really qualified to do so, that he felt it to be his duty to take a share in the work.

The interest in outlines of history, as contrasted with shorter 'periods', has been growing in recent years. A number of distinguished historians have urged that it is of little use to study a limited historical subject without having at least some idea of its place in the general course of events before and after, while if a choice has to be made between a long period and a short one, the longer, even if treated only in its main lines, has more educational value than the shorter, teaches more about the world we live in. But it is not only a matter which concerns education; it is, I believe, part of a change of attitude which has become very widespread as a result of the great events of our time. In the nineteenth century a simple belief in progress was generally accepted, and the prevalent ethical standards were firmly fixed in men's minds. Consequently those who read history, confident that they knew the outlines well enough, liked best those historians who gave them a full and pictorial narrative of a few exciting years. In our time, and especially since the War, there has been a change. The old assurance is shaken; the belief in progress and the accompanying standards are undergoing revision; and therefore there is a lively curiosity about the general outlines of the history of the world, a desire to know in terms of centuries and millennia whence we have come and whither we may be going. Books on these subjects have been widely demanded and supplied.

When Davis returned to Oxford as Regius Professor, he found that this modern tendency had found expression in a change of the examination system there. For the History Preliminary examination there had been prescribed the study of European history from A.D. 800 to 1789. That is not such

a long stretch of time as some books of outlines treat; but It is much longer than was customary in Oxford examinations. it begins with the reconstruction after the fall of the Roman Empire, that is after the last great interruption of barbarism in the development of our civilization. It stops short of the French Revolution: in other words it keeps away from what may be called the beginning of our contemporary world. By so doing it omits the most recent period, that which the majority of people now probably find the most interesting; but it is not for that reason less important to those whose point of view is essentially modern. Davis himself had become, largely because of the War, devoted primarily to the study of very recent history and had passed over to that from the Middle Ages, on which he had formerly concentrated most of his attention; but when he found this experiment beginning in Oxford, he threw himself into it, and began to lecture on this period of European history, as an introduction to the closer study of any shorter part of it and not less as an introduction to the more recent period which follows.

That was the origin of this book. The course of lectures was given three times, in three successive academic years, each time after the most thorough and minute preparation, a preparation so conscientious that it cannot be appreciated except by those who have seen the careful manuscripts of the lectures. At last he felt that he had brought the work to a point when it was suitable for printing and publication, and in the summer of 1928 he was saying that he hoped to publish the lectures shortly.

It was in that summer that he died, in the middle of this and, alas, of many other tasks. His friends thought it their duty to complete such of his work as could be completed, and Mr. J. R. H. Weaver, who took the lead in this and arranged the mass of Davis's papers, handed over to me a number of note-books connected with the lectures. These existed in three different versions, and the present volume contains passages from each of the three. Down to page 102 it follows the latest, which was begun not earlier than the summer of 1927. At that point the latest version stops short

and the book combines portions of the other two. My own work has been purely editorial. I have made the few changes which were necessary to convert the lecture into the text-book. I have added the genealogical tables, the maps, the list of sovereigns and some of the short lists of cardinal dates. I am partly responsible for the division into chapters, but not for the headings; and to the text itself I have added nothing except a few connecting links, and here and there an explanation which, no doubt, in lecturing the author would have added to fill an obvious omission in his notes. 'Notes', however, is hardly the right name for the manuscripts of these lectures, since they were fully written out in continuous prose with few abbreviations of any kind.

It is not for me to praise this book: it is not for a pupil to praise his master. But I may be permitted to say that there is much in it that is characteristically his, and that it puts me at least under one more obligation of gratitude to the man who did so much for me during the twenty years in which he was my friend.

G. N. CLARK

OXFORD, 1930

INTRODUCTION[1]

THIS short book is to deal with a period of nearly a thousand years. How is it possible in so little compass to take a bird's-eye view of so long a time? Certainly there will be no room for dwelling on incidents; or for tracing carefully the development of great revolutions; or for dealing at any length even with the most important individuals that come into the story. One thing that I can do and hope to do is to draw attention to some events which may be called epoch-making, and to point out some of their consequences. A good number of these are political events which leave their mark on the political map of Europe, or which lead to a transformation in the character of some particular state. A good example of the former class is the southward movement of the Scandinavian peoples in the ninth and tenth centuries. A good example of the latter class is the coronation of Hugh Capet as King of the French, 987. I name these events, not because they are more important than many others, but because they lie near the beginning of the period.[2]

[1] Three books may be mentioned which treat the whole period in different ways. Ernest Lavisse's *Vue générale de l'histoire politique de l'Europe* traces the history of the state-system of Europe. Lord Bryce's *Holy Roman Empire* gives the history and constitution of the Empire. Guizot's *History of Civilization in Europe*, specially concerned with political ideas and institutions, formed one of the earliest attempts to appreciate sympathetically the main stages in the development of European civilization.

[2] The best short repertory of these cardinal events is Freeman's *General Sketch of European History*. For events of class (*a*), 'map-making events', there is also his *Historical Geography of Europe* (with atlas), an invaluable book of reference.

But we cannot be content, in any survey of European History, however brief, with noting political events. We cannot help asking ourselves, when we survey so immense a tract of time, with so many changes and so many movements in which the driving force is the desire to improve society—we cannot help asking what it all comes to? In what respects has Europe become more civilized? To what extent are we wiser, happier, better than our remote forefathers of the Dark Ages? That question is asked by Gibbon in his *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, a book finished in 1787, i.e. at the end of our period.[1] He answers it by dwelling mainly on three points:

(*a*) The growth of the conception of political freedom (liberties of the individual), for which in the last resort, he thinks, we have to thank the Germanic peoples who overthrew the Roman Empire.

(*b*) The greater security of modern Europe against the incursions of barbarism. This was due to the reorganization of Europe as a group of nation states.

(*c*) The development of the arts and sciences.

In other respects he does not think that the boasted achievements of the Middle Ages and more recent centuries amount to more than a partial recovery of what was lost in the fall of the Roman Empire, and a more general diffusion of wealth and knowledge.

We need not pause here to consider Gibbon's estimate of Roman civilization. He thought that the Romans and the Greeks were incomparable as law-makers, and as students of metaphysical and moral science. But he was biased by his classical studies; even in these three branches of knowledge there was appreciable progress between A.D. 700 and A.D. 1789. The Dark Ages had Christianity; but a great part of the moral teaching of Christianity had to be rediscovered in the Middle Ages and in the period of the Reformation. As to economic development Gibbon is silent—we must remember that by 1789 the effects of the Industrial and Agricultural Revolutions were only perceptible in England.

[1] This should be studied in Professor Bury's edition in seven volumes.

Still there can be no doubt that, between 800 and 1789, the increase of wealth in Europe was far more rapid than the increase of population. One proof of this is the development, in almost every country of Europe, of a prosperous middle-class. Another proof is the development of great commercial emporia (Bruges, Venice, &c.) and of great manufacturing centres (Netherlands, Milan, Florence) even in the Middle Ages. But the most marked development in these thousand years is the development of the nation state—a form of state in which individual liberty was better secured than in Athens, which was better organized for defence than the Roman Empire, and which provided a reasonable protection of life and property.

This question of the nature of progress is not one to be settled offhand by a few general statements. I mention it chiefly to suggest that in this book and elsewhere the reader should look out for any information about improvements which affect the well-being of society as a whole, under the following heads :

(1) *Economic.*—Such are the opening of new markets for foreign trade ; the rise of new manufacturing industries ; improvements in agriculture, and the colonization of waste lands.

(2) *Political.*—Such are new experiments in legislation ; constitutional changes such as the introduction of representative assemblies, standing armies, police, direct taxation, the rise of new theories of the nature and aim of the state (e.g. Machiavelli's).

(3) *Intellectual.*—Such are the growth of educational institutions (schools, universities) ; the rise of new schools of thought (e.g. Scholasticism, Humanism, the Cartesian philosophy).

(4) *Moral and Religious.*—This is the most difficult field of inquiry, and to measure general progress of this kind is almost impossible unless we are content to compare epochs widely remote, e.g. the Middle Ages and the Eighteenth Century. Usually we shall come to the conclusion that each epoch of European civilization has its own new ideas in

Morals and Religion, which are valuable in their time and place. On the other hand the men who see new truths clearly are very likely to lose their hold upon ideas which have proved their value in the past. Thus we may contrast the medieval ideal of the loyal vassal with the modern ideal of the free and independent elector.

At the end of the book, when we have completed our review of these improvements, we shall return to the problem of what progress was actually made between 800 and 1789.[1]

[1] See p. 278.

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EUROPE IN THE TIME OF CHARLES THE GREAT

EUROPE FROM 800 TO 1789

PART I: THE MIDDLE AGES

CHAPTER I

THE CAROLINGIAN EMPIRE, 800–887

CARDINAL EVENTS

800	Coronation of Charles the Great.
814	Death of Charlemagne. Accession of Lewis the Pious.
818	Beginning of the Civil Wars.
840	Beginning of the great raids of the Northmen on France.
841	Battle of Fontanet: defeat of Lothair.
843	Partition of the Empire at Verdun into three Kingdoms.
870	Partition of Lotharingia at Mersen.
884–8	Reunion of the Empire under Charles the Fat.

WE begin our study with the empire of Charles the Great, or Charlemagne, to which, as to his family, the adjective 'Carolingian' is applied.

Extent of the Empire

Regarded purely from a secular point of view this is the last and greatest of the barbarian states founded on the ruins of the Roman Empire. It grew out of the kingdom of the Franks, which began to expand and to annex in the reign of Clovis, 481–511. It was a Christian and orthodox state, and owed much of its early success to this fact, being warmly supported by the Christians of Gaul against the other Teutonic states which had embraced the heresy of Arius of Alexandria—a heresy which is rebutted

both in the Nicene Creed and in that attributed to Athanasius. The Franks annexed the territories of the Burgundians, Alemanni, Visigoths (north of the Pyrenees), Lombards (North Italy), Bavarians and Saxons. They did not conquer the Visigothic kingdom of Spain, which fell a prey to the Mohammedans of Africa in 710–13. Neither did they conquer the Teutonic tribes of Scandinavia, who could only be effectively attacked by sea, an element on which the Franks were helpless. Nor, finally, did the Franks conquer the British Isles. But on the Continent Charles the Great ruled practically all the lands which acknowledged the religious authority of the Pope. There was an old alliance between the Carolingians and the Papacy. It had proved a useful alliance to the Popes, who without it would have been obliged to surrender their temporal dominions in Italy to the Lombard kings of Pavia. From an early date in his career Charles bore the title of Patricius of the Roman people, and was pledged to the defence of Rome against her enemies. When he was crowned as Emperor in 800 by Leo III, the understanding was that he would undertake the defence of Latin Christendom in general. Not merely defence against external enemies—the Greeks of the Eastern Empire, the Saracens of Spain, the heathen Slavs and Northmen; but also defence of the property of all churches, and the safety of all priests within his Empire. These duties gave an ecclesiastical character to the Frankish Empire, which came to bear the name of Holy Roman Empire. The duties were congenial to Charles. Before his coronation he had forcibly converted the Saxons to Christianity, and had engaged in theological controversies with the Greeks and with heretics in Spain. After his coronation he made war on the heathen Avars of Hungary and the Mohammedans of Spain, though not entirely from motives of piety.

Relations with the Papacy

It is interesting to find that in his time the seeds of later disputes between Empire and Papacy were being sown. The Papal theory is enshrined in a curious forgery, the Donation of Constantine, which purports to be a grant by that Emperor of many privileges to the clergy and Papacy, including especially the sovereignty of the latter over Italy

and the countries of the West. Charles as Emperor claimed the overlordship of the Papal States, and interfered in their affairs, in spite of complaints from the Pope. He on his side was annoyed because the Pope claimed that only he could crown an Emperor, and was therefore superior to the Emperor. Accordingly in 813 Charles crowned his eldest son, Lewis the Pious, at Aachen with his own hand. There was already in existence a doctrine of the proper relations of Pope and Emperor. This was the doctrine of the Two Swords formulated by Pope Gelasius (492–6). Christ, said Gelasius, had separated the offices of Emperor and Pope, giving to each office its appropriate duties. Each of the two dignitaries held his power by divine right. Each was supreme in the sphere of his own duties. The Emperor should obey the Pope in spiritual matters; he was entitled to the Pope's obedience in temporal matters. It was a neat theory, but it did not give any definition of the two spheres of action. The States of the Church, for instance, belonged to St. Peter. Was the government of these states a matter in which a lay Emperor could justly interfere? Leo thought not. Or again, was the coronation of an Emperor a purely spiritual matter? If so, the Pope could refuse to crown as Emperor any claimant for whom he had a personal dislike.

System of Government

It should be noted that the creation or revival of the Holy Roman Empire did not make any difference to the methods of government in the Carolingian dominions. These methods were purely Teutonic, although Charles made some minor changes in the methods of his predecessors. The main features of the system were:

(i) Preservation of the laws of the nations constituting the Empire, and of the rule that a man's law depends upon his origin, not his domicile.

(ii) 'Capitularies', legal enactments, issued for administrative purposes in *Placita Generalia*.

(iii) Government of the provinces by *Comites*, counts, or *duces*, dukes (often hereditary), with the assistance of a local assembly (*Centena*) which was both a court of justice and a deliberative body.

(iv) Supervision of the *Comites* by the *Missi Dominici*, emissaries of the Emperor.

(v) The *Palatium* or Household; the germ of a central administration.

(vi) The *Fideles*, who formed the efficient part of the army and were granted *beneficia* or fiefs for life or during good behaviour.

The civilization of the Empire was rural. Even in Gaul and Italy the towns had no special form of government; they were in the demesne of the local count or some great local landowner. There was no survival, even in Italy, of the Roman municipal system. There was a certain amount of foreign trade; for Charles the Great maintained custom-houses on the frontiers. But the imports were chiefly articles of luxury (*species*), and the merchants who dealt in them seem to have been rather like pedlars of a superior class travelling in caravans from place to place. We have the regulations which Charles drew up for the management of his own estates (*Capitulare de Villis*). They seem to have been carefully managed. But the best class of the working population—the small freeholders who had been the back-bone of the army—were dying out, or rather were losing their independence.

Defects of the System

The Carolingian system of government broke down in the ninth century; partly owing to civil wars and the invasions of the Northmen; partly because of its inherent defects. The counts were allowed to treat their office as an hereditary estate, and often usurped large estates at the expense of the Crown or weaker landowners. The *fideles* neglected to perform their military service. The *missi dominici* ceased to function. The law-courts of the country were weakened by the growth of feudal jurisdictions. The old national laws were superseded by local customs. But many traces of the system survived in France, Germany, Italy: e.g. the local law-court (*centena*) with its doomsmen. Many of the Carolingian counties in these three countries became converted into fiefs. Some of the greatest fiefs (e.g. Normandy) are simply aggregations of counties.

Survivals of this kind raise an interesting question. That

is the question how far they reveal the true character and inwardness of the new system in which they are embedded like fossils in a rock, or like obsolete organs in the human body. For instance, in many towns of France, Flanders, Germany, we find that a law-court of the Frankish type survives in the eleventh, twelfth or thirteenth century. Are we to regard the court in such a case as the seed from which the town has grown? That is commonly assumed, but it is not lightly to be assumed. Still less can we assume that, because the officials of such a court have Frankish titles (e.g. *scabini échevins*) the law which they administer is archaic law. The puzzle is not one that occurs in this case alone. It occurs wherever we find in the later Middle Ages an institution which has one or two archaic features. This tells us something as to the origin of the institution. It does not follow that the institution is archaic through and through. The Speaker's Mace is archaic at the present day, but not the speakership or the House of Commons.

The Church

The Western Church was much more highly organized than the Western Empire. It was mapped out in metropolitan provinces, each ruled by an Archbishop and subdivided into bishoprics. The parochial system was still in its infancy; but in a well-organized diocese there was a staff of priests who were maintained by the bishop and were sent out as mission-workers in those districts which had no parish-priests. Monasteries were usually organized on the model supplied by Benedict of Monte Cassino (*c.* 600–650); though under Lewis the Pious the rule of Benedict of Aniane was widely adopted north of the Alps. In the government of their provinces the Metropolitan Archbishops were assisted by provincial councils. Similarly every bishop was assisted by a Diocesan synod of his clergy. Thus the government of the Church was in a sense a constitutional government. At the head of this system stood the Pope. The process by which his authority had been defined and recognized does not concern us here.[1] But his oldest

[1] An account of it is given in *The Cambridge Medieval History*, vol. III, c. 17 ('The Church from Charlemagne to Sylvester'), and by Professor Turner in vol. I, c. vi, of the same work.

function as head of the Western Church was to give decisions on disputed questions of rites, ceremonies, discipline. His decisions were embodied in letters called *Decretals*, which became part of the canon law. The earliest of the authentic Decretals, dated 385, was issued by Pope Siricius. In 446 we find Pope Leo the Great announcing that the care of the whole Church in the East as well as in the West belongs to the see of St. Peter. This claim was ratified by a decree of the Emperor Valentinian II (*c.* 455), one of the weakest of the late Roman Emperors. The claim to universal supremacy lost all meaning after the outbreak of the quarrel between the Roman and Greek Churches about image-worship. This dispute began in 725 when Leo the Isaurian issued his edict against images and Pope Gregory II defied it. After 772 the successors of Gregory II ceased to date their documents by the regnal years of the Eastern Emperors. In 800, when Charles the Great was crowned, the official theory at Rome seems to have been that he became Emperor *de jure* both in the East and in the West; though Charles himself was content to rank as Western Emperor, the equal and colleague of the Emperor in the East. The Church's view of the position of Charles did not mean that the Pope was inclined to allow the new Emperor to dominate the Western Church as the Greek Church had been dominated by the rulers of Constantinople.

Nevertheless the Emperor nominated bishops and abbots, who by the law of the Church ought to have been elected. He frequently legislated on ecclesiastical matters in his Capitularies; and the highest court for ecclesiastical causes was a law-court held by his Arch-Chancellor, who was simply the Emperor's principal Chaplain and Secretary. Charles the Great and Lewis the Pious consulted the Pope on ecclesiastical questions, as well as the bishops of the Empire; but the ultimate decision lay with the Emperor. In 813 Charles ordered the bishops to hold councils for reforming the state of the Church, but he required that the laws (*canons*) passed in these councils should be submitted to him for his approval. We even find him attempting to reform the rite of Baptism and to eliminate corruptions from the text of the Nicene

Creed. It is true that he consulted with the Pope about the Creed.. But he kept the decision in his own hands. *Vis à vis* the Church he behaved much as the Greek Emperors before his time. This is to be remembered, because it explains a good many disputes between Empire and Papacy in more civilized times, when the Emperors sometimes appealed to custom in support of claims which seem to us extraordinary.

In the Carolingian Empire several distinctive Roman elements survived:

Roman Elements in the Empire

(1) Latin was the official language used in royal documents, and the language used in the schools, and in the writings not only of theologians, but even of poets and chroniclers. Nor was this the vulgar Latin spoken by the common people of Italy. Thanks to Alcuin there was a renaissance of Latin studies in the schools of the Empire, but French (*Rustica Romana*) and German (*Rustica Theotisca*) were used in the *placita generalia* north of the Alps; and the clergy north of the Alps were required to preach their sermons either in French or German (Boretius, *Capitularies*, II, 157, 172, 176). (See the Oath of Strassburg in the Lingua Romana and Lingua Theotisca (842) taken by Lewis the German and Charles the Bold.)

(2) Much of the law of the Church (Canon Law) dated from pre-barbarian days. It had been codified by Dionysius Exiguus (*c.* A.D. 500), and a copy of it was given to Charles in 774 by Hadrian I.

(3) Roman Law, in a debased form, was the common law of Southern France (*Breviarium Alarici II*, A.D. 506) and the Rhone valley (*Lex Romana Burgundionum*), of Northern Italy and some parts of Eastern Switzerland. The law-books of Justinian were entirely unknown to the rulers of the Frankish Empire.

Before passing on to the political aspects of the break-up of the Carolingian Empire, we may see how it affected the Church.

The False Decretals, c. 850

One result of the anarchy which prevailed in the middle of the ninth century was to make the clergy close their ranks, and to inspire them to look about for principles or historical precedents by which they could vindicate their independence as a self-governing corporation.

This was a class policy, but it was not wholly selfish. The authors of it felt that the clerical estate would lose a large part of its moral influence if it was exposed to the pressure of brutal and passionate rulers. At all events the independence of the Church courts must be secured. It would be intolerable if questions of faith and morals were settled in the law-courts of tribal kings. The remedies which the reformers proposed were :

(*a*) No bishop should be put on trial except in a metropolitan synod.

(*b*) Judgments of metropolitan synods should be reviewed only in the Pope's court.

(*c*) No priest should be judged except by his bishop.

The first two were precautions to protect the bishops against the violence of kings and metropolitans, who might be the creatures and instruments of kings. The third and more dubious remedy is the root from which sprang 'benefit of clergy'—the immunity of the clergy of all ranks from being tried even on criminal charges by the lay courts. About the middle of the ninth century a group of ingenious ecclesiastics in the Frankish Church set to work to collect all the passages of the canon law which could be used to bolster up these claims. Not content with collecting, they falsified some texts and invented others when no genuine text existed to prove their case. The result was the collection of Decretals labelled with the name of Isidore of Seville, a friend of Pope Gregory the Great.

The movement to establish the independence of the clerical estate was not confined to Northern Europe. It found expression in the policy of Nicholas I, whom we have noted as the enemy of the Carolingian Kingdom of Italy. In the crisis of 863–5 this Pope and the Frankish clergy fought side by side against the lay power. This was the beginning of a long struggle between Church and State over the limits of clerical jurisdiction. The interests of Rome were not entirely identical with those of the national Churches ; but in general the Pope and the Churches were united against the State.

The main features of the period during which the Empire disintegrated are :

Dissolution of the Frankish Empire, 814–887

(i) The struggle between the Imperialists and the royal family as to the law of succession (Primogeniture or Partition), 817–843.

(ii) The conflicts between the claimants who sought to divide the Empire or to modify a division already made, 843–887.

(iii) The attacks on the Empire by Northmen and Saracens.

The work of disruption was accelerated by the growing pretensions of two great classes in the society of the Empire —the *Fideles* and the Bishops.

The Political History of the crisis is dull reading. There are so many claimants to a share of territory and they are so uninteresting. But the cause of the civil war, and its consequences, are interesting. The cause was that most members of the royal family demanded that the old Frankish law of partition between male heirs (*per stirpes*) should be maintained. This law had been the undoing of the Merovingians, the Frankish dynasty which preceded the Carolingian line, and the ecclesiastics of the Frankish Empire urged that the Empire ought to be indivisible. From time to time the Church party suggested a compromise. In 817 they proposed that the eldest son of Lewis the Pious should succeed him; but that sub-kingdoms should be created for the other claimants, to be held from the Emperor. This plan was tried in 843 at the Partition of Verdun. But, after the death of Lothaire I, who became Emperor under this settlement, a different system was tried. His kingdom, the *Lotharii Regnum*, was partitioned; and the Empire was ruled by three sovereigns who were *de facto* equal, though one of the three, the ruler of Italy, had the imperial title. In 884 there was an attempt to reunite the Empire in one hand.

The most important result of the Civil Wars was that the Empire tended to split upon racial lines and lines of language —West Franks, East Franks, Italians. This tendency was manifested in the Treaty of Verdun, when the kingdoms of West and East Franks first came into existence. But the 'Middle Kingdom', *Lotharii Regnum*, which separated East and West Franks in 843, was a most curious hybrid.

It stretched from the North Sea almost to Naples, and included Italian, French and German populations. The motive of those who fixed its boundaries was to give the Emperor Lothaire the two imperial cities of Rome and Aachen. After Lothaire's death (855) this political monstrosity was soon abolished (870). Italy became a separate kingdom. Provence in the lower part of the Rhone Valley became a kingdom under Carolingian rulers, which maintained its existence to 933. The northern provinces of the Middle Kingdom were divided between the East and West Franks on lines which roughly followed racial lines. In 895 the East Frankish provinces of Lotharingia were organized as a sub-kingdom. This in 913 was reduced to the status of a Duchy. The name of Lotharingia survives in the modern province of Lorraine. It was a fancy of the historian Freeman[1] that the extinction of the Middle Kingdom was a great misfortune to Europe, because the French and German peoples were brought into contact by that event. Freeman had a high regard for Charles the Rash of Burgundy, as the only statesman who ever attempted to reconstitute this Middle Kingdom.

Kingdom of the West Franks

The Kingdom of the West Franks had to bear the main brunt of the Viking invasions. It also suffered very severely from the growth of feudalism. This was a misfortune for Europe because Carolingian civilization developed furthest on the soil of ancient Gaul. It was the civilization of an aristocracy, and it flourished chiefly at the court of the West Frankish kings where the old aristocracy was chiefly to be found. Charles the Bald (843–77) gathered round himself a brilliant circle of poets, scholars, theologians, philosophers, and craftsmen skilled in gold-work, carving and the illumination of manuscripts. John the Scot is the most celebrated of the scholars whom he patronized. West of the Rhine there were at least half a dozen monastic libraries full of precious manuscripts which were not only treasured but read.[2] The civilization of the

[1] See above, p. ix, n. 2.

[2] See *Cambridge Medieval History*, III, 521, for a list of a dozen Latin authors of the first rank whose works are preserved in Carolingian codices.

Franks seemed to reach its highest point just as they lost their pre-eminence in war and politics.

Kingdom of the East Franks

The Kingdom of the East Franks must have appeared a singularly artificial creation in 843. It was founded on the ruins of a number of small Teutonic powers—the kingdoms of the Ripuarian Franks and Alemanni, the federations of the Saxons and Thuringians, and the Duchy of Bavaria. The credit of uniting these peoples together belongs to Lewis the German, a younger son of Lewis the Pious. He received Bavaria in 825 as a sub-kingdom with a commission to hold the Bohemian and Slavonic tributaries of the Empire to their allegiance. His ambition was to rule the whole of the territories east of the Rhine, and this ambition was realized in 843. At his death in 876 he also held a good slice of the defunct Middle Kingdom (under the Treaty of Mersen). He was most successful in defending the eastern Marches against the Slavs and in uniting his Teutonic subjects. But he can hardly be called the creator of the German nation. For he divided his kingdom between his sons, and the work of unification had to be done over again in the tenth century, by Henry the Fowler.

Kingdom of Italy

The Frankish Kingdom of Italy survived until 962, when it was annexed by Otto the Great. But its history was quite inglorious except for the first thirty years of its existence. It was then ruled by Lewis II, son and successor of the Emperor Lothaire. Lewis distinguished himself by his defence of Italy against the Saracens of Africa who before his accession had occupied Sicily (831) and Bari (840). In 847 Lewis led an expedition to South Italy to help the native princes (Benevento, Salerno, etc.); he repeated the attempt in 867; and in 871 he recovered Bari. He endeavoured to arrange a grand alliance with the Greek Emperor and the South Italian princes against the Saracens, and he may therefore be accounted a pioneer of the Crusading movement.

Equally notable, though not so creditable, was the feud which this Emperor waged with Pope Nicholas I in the years 863–5. Nicholas was the first Pope who threatened to depose

a King. The offender was Lothaire II of Lotharingia, a younger brother of the Emperor, who had put away his wife quite unlawfully, but with the permission of the clergy of his little kingdom. The Emperor occupied Rome with an army to oblige the Pope to give way. But Nicholas stood firm and King Lothaire unwillingly took back his wife (865).

CHAPTER II

THE NORTHMEN

CARDINAL EVENTS

840	Beginning of Norse and Danish attacks on Western Europe.
860	Swedish colony at Kief.
878	Alfred the Great wins the battle of Ethandun.
885–7	Unsuccessful siege of Paris.
891	Battle of the Dyle.
911	Treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte.
1017	Cnut, King of England.

Early History

THE early history of the Scandinavian peoples is quite obscure. Later legends say that they were led to Scandinavia by Odin, who assigned Denmark, Sweden and Norway to his three sons. Our earliest notices of the Scandinavians in these lands come to us from Frankish missionaries—Archbishop Ebbo of Rheims, who visited Denmark in 822, and Ansgar, the Apostle of the North, who visited Denmark in 826, and afterwards preached in Sweden from 829 to 865. The great exodus from Scandinavia began in Ansgar's lifetime. The Swedes turned their attention to Russia. They established a colony at Kief before 860, and their great leader, Ruric, was ruling at Novgorod from 862 to 879. The Viking principality of Kief was established in 881. In Russia, as wherever else they settled, the Vikings rapidly became assimilated to the native population. In the tenth century the Vikings of Kief had dropped their native language and were using a Slavonic tongue.

The attacks upon Western Europe (840–911) were the work

of the Norwegians and the Danes, who may have left their original homes to escape from the rule of the new royal dynasties which were then being founded in the North.[1] Their numbers were comparatively small, and they owed their success partly to their virtual monopoly of sea-power, partly to the rapid movements of their land-forces. They were far from being uncivilized in the material arts, and they proved themselves successful colonists in the Danelaw of England and in Normandy. But in the first stages of the invasion they showed no respect for the foreign civilizations which they encountered, and were especially hostile to Christian monks and clergy, probably from a suspicion that all men of religion were warlocks.

Raids upon the Frankish Empire

Their raids upon the Frankish Empire were directed to the principal river basins, and were most severely felt on the Loire and the Seine. They received no serious check until they had been at work for forty years. Their first check was their failure to capture Paris, which they besieged in 885–7; a success at Paris would have enabled them to penetrate up the Seine valley into the heart of France. This event saved the West Frank kingdom, although it did not prevent the Northmen from settling in Normandy, a settlement which was recognized by Charles the Simple in the treaty of St. Clair-sur-Epte (911). A similar check was inflicted on them by the East Franks at the battle of the Dyle (891) not far from Louvain. In the East Frank kingdom the Vikings gained no permanent foothold.

Two problems of interest are raised by the story of the Viking migration, and, although these questions carry us away from the fate of the Frankish Empire, they have to be faced.

End of the Migrations

(1) Why did the migrations end in 911? We have, a hundred years later, the career of Cnut to show that the Vikings were still incomparable soldiers and seamen. But Cnut did not lead a migration. The bulk of his armies returned to Denmark after the conquest

[1] In Norway we hear of King Halfdane the Black (841–63) and King Harald Harfager (*c.* 870–932); in Denmark of Gorm the Old (860–935); in Sweden of Erik Emundsson (d. *circa* 885).

of England. We cannot say that the Danes ceased to be pirates owing to the influence of Christianity. The conversion of Denmark was still incomplete when Cnut came to the throne. The conversion of Norway was begun as early as 995 by St. Olaf; but it was only completed in the reign of Olaf II (1016–30). The most plausible explanation is, that the seafaring population of Scandinavia was drained away by the great migrations of the ninth century, which resulted in founding colonies not only in England and Normandy, but also in Ireland, and the Hebrides (802–25) and Iceland (861–75). Migration continued up to 1103; but it was directed to quarters where not much resistance was to be expected, e.g. to Greenland (983), to Vineland in America (986–1011), to the Orkneys and the Hebrides (1095–1103). This orientation of the later streams of emigrants suggests a reluctance to try conclusions with the new nation-states, England, France, Germany. Probably these last migrations were on quite a small scale.

Although individual leaders of the Vikings showed some statesmanship, none of them except Cnut made large plans or showed organizing genius. The colonies in Ireland and England were simply conglomerations of little republics which were never merged in a unitary state, until they were conquered or absorbed by the populations among which they settled. Normandy is an exception; but Normandy was not a united state until the eleventh century, when the settlers had adopted the language and civilization of the West Franks.

(2) How are we to fit these migrations and settlements into any theory of a providential order in history, or of an orderly evolution of Western European culture? Gibbon, and many historians since, treat the Vikings as one example of the process by which civilization is prevented from becoming effete—the infusion of new blood into the veins of an effete body-politic. But the Vikings, though nearer to the state of nature than the Franks and English, were superior to them in nothing but the arts of war and seamanship. Even Cnut compares very unfavourably with the great rulers of the House of Wessex.

Historical Importance of the Migrations

It is difficult to suggest that any contribution was made by the Danes and Norwegians either to the political or the social or the intellectual development of the countries in which they settled. They were simply the rearguard of the barbarian invasions. The most we can say to prove that the invasions were not an unmixed evil is :

(1) That where they settled in any numbers they improved the breed (e.g. in Yorkshire, East Anglia, Normandy).

(2) That their inroads brought to light the most serious defects in the government of any country which they attacked, so that indirectly political progress was stimulated.

Whatever we may think about the design or pattern of history, we must find place in our scheme for the struggle for existence, or it might be more correct to say for the struggle for a place in the sun, for a share in the good things of the world. By nature and instinct all communities of uncivilized or half-civilized men are predatory. Civilized states may be restrained by prudence or morality. But in earlier stages of social development every wealthy state must perpetually be on the defensive. Those that are not well armed will go to the wall.

CHAPTER III

FEUDALISM

FEUDALISM was the main remedy which was applied to the evils of the ninth century. It was nothing new. The roots of the feudal system are to be found in Merovingian times.

(1) *Vassalage.* The *vassus* was a free man who had put himself under the protection (*mundium*) of the King or other lord by the ceremony of *homage*, promising to be obedient to his lord's command and to serve him against all other men. The status of the Vassal was honourable ; but originally he was as completely in the power of the lord as a slave, except that he could not be transferred against his will to another lord. The main services exacted were military.

(2) The *Beneficium.* A fief was an estate granted to a vassal for life in return for his services. It only descended to the heir of the first vassal if the lord could be persuaded to re-grant it as a favour.

(3) The *Immunitas.* This was a *beneficium* endowed with special privileges by the King. He conferred on the holder of it some or all of his rights of justice and taxation ; and so feudal courts of justice came into existence.

Under the law of the Frankish Empire a vassal was bound by his oath of homage so long as he retained his fief, but ceased to be bound if the lord took away the fief. He could not renounce his homage without giving up his fief. This last he could not do without the

Law of Vassalage

lord's consent, unless indeed the lord had inflicted upon him some intolerable injury. The tie of vassalage was not hereditary; but it was customary for the vassals of a deceased lord to renew their contract with the lord's heir, and for the lord to admit the heir of a deceased vassal to his father's fief.

Under the Carolingians the feudal tie was turned to account for at least two novel purposes:

(1) The rulers of defeated states (e.g. Denmark, Bavaria) were required to take the oath of homage to the conqueror, and henceforth to rule as viceroys.

(2) All lay officials of the Empire were similarly required to take the oath, and the offices which they received, with all attendant privileges, were held as fiefs of the Crown.

The Frankish law of vassalage was naturally accepted in all parts of the Carolingian Empire, though it was subjected to endless local variations. It also passed in countries such as England and Spain, which had never formed part of the Frankish Empire. Therefore the late Professor Maitland was not altogether right when he contended (in his *Constitutional History of England*) that there never was one general Feudal System in Europe.

In the era of the French Revolution it became the fashion to blame feudalism for all the most odious features of the *Ancien Régime* in France and elsewhere. That verdict was unjust for two reasons: first, because many of these odious features were not feudal in origin, but were devised by the new monarchies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; secondly, because the abuses which were really feudal in origin (e.g. the exemption of the French *noblesse* from direct taxation) had only become abuses when feudal privileges were permitted to continue after the corresponding duties and burdens of the feudal landowner had become a dead letter. The eighteenth-century critics of feudalism are rebuked by Guizot in his lectures on the *History of Civilization in Europe*. There was, Guizot remarks, a period of European history in which Feudalism was necessary, the only possible way of organizing society.

Value of Feudalism

Feudalism was necessary in the ninth century for the following reasons:

(*a*) As the most effective device then known for ensuring the loyalty of the great landowners and the official classes.

(*b*) As the only method by which an effective army could be raised in an age when the untrained and undisciplined foot-soldier was useless.

(*c*) As the best method of providing for the security of life and property. Failing an effective system of royal justice and police, failing also any sure means of keeping the Northmen out of the Empire, the poor and defenceless must be encouraged to group themselves under the protection of those landowners who had a military following.

Evils of Feudalism

There were evils latent in the feudal system from the first. Some of them were clear to the legislators of the Frankish Empire. There are complaints that the class of small freeholders, formerly the backbone of the state, was becoming a class of vassals who rendered no service to the state but only to their lords. There are also statements that free men were obliged to become vassals against their will. But still Charles the Bald enacted in 847 that every free man may commend himself as a vassal to any lord that he likes to choose. Two other evils are specially apparent under Charles the Bald (842–877). One was the new principle that fiefs ought to be hereditary, even when the fief is an office of trust held from the Crown. In 877 he expressly conceded that the office of count should pass from father to son. This concession must have been reluctantly made, for it was a grievous blow to the royal authority. But the custom of heredity was, in fact, firmly. established before the new law was issued. If Charles had attempted to put back the clock he would have been face to face with a large body of discontented royal officials.

The other evil was the practice of building private castles without the King's permission. Castles were badly needed as places of refuge from the Vikings. But a kingdom in

which every disaffected landowner was free to build a castle would be a kingdom in which no order could be maintained. In 867 Charles the Bald laid down the rule ' No castle without a royal licence '. It is unlikely that he was able to enforce the rule. But the rule survived him and was subsequently adopted in Normandy and England. The private castle of the early Middle Ages was usually a den of bandits; and the anarchy of Stephen's reign was merely the reappearance, for a few years in England, of a state of things which persisted in France for more than 200 years.

CHAPTER IV

GERMANY AND THE REVIVAL OF THE EMPIRE, 918–1039

CARDINAL EVENTS

918	Henry the Fowler, King of Germany.
954	Otto I (the Great) defeats the Hungarians at the Lechfeld.
962	Otto is crowned as Emperor.
980	Otto II goes to Italy.
983	Otto III.
1003–17	Wars of Henry II against Poland and Bohemia.
1039	Death of Conrad II.

THE ninth century was an age of political decadence both in Western Europe and in the Greek Empire. The Greek Empire was better governed then than the Empire of the Franks, but still was on the defensive against the Arabs, the Bulgarians, and the Russians. The tenth century was an age of recuperation both in East and West. In the East the Macedonian dynasty began a career of reconquest and reorganization which covers a period of nearly two hundred years, 867–1057. In the West we have :

(*a*) The rise of the West Saxon dynasty in England, 878–975.

(*b*) The unification of Germany and the Revival of the Western Empire under the Saxon Emperors (919–1002), i.e. Otto I and II, the descendants of the German King Henry the Fowler.

The two evils from which the realm of Lewis the German suffered after his death were :

EUROPE IN THE TENTH CENTURY

(*a*) Revival of the old tribal divisions as Duchies owing a nominal obedience to the East Frankish Crown—Saxony, Bavaria, Suabia, Lotharingia.

(*b*) The Hungarian invasions of 899–924.

The Hungarian Invasions

The Hungarians belonged to the same Central Asiatic group of nomad peoples which had provided armies for the great raid of Attila and the Huns upon the Roman Empire in the West (451–2). The Avars, who were a menace both to the Slavs of Eastern Europe and to the Greek Empire in the ninth century, and the Patzinaks and the Ottoman Turks, who came westward after the Hungarians, were of the same stock. So were the Mongols who threatened the eastern Marches of Germany in the thirteenth century. But of all these Asiatic hordes only those of Attila and the Hungarians penetrated far into Western Europe. The exploits of the Hungarians on European soil were formidable enough to strike terror in Germany.

899 First raid into Italy by way of Friuli.

906–7 Conquest of the Moravian Empire and destruction of the Ostmark.

910 Combined forces of Franconia, Suabia and Bavaria under Lewis the Child defeated at the confluence of the Danube and the Lech.

915 Saxony invaded and Bremen sacked.

919 Raid through Germany as far as the Rhine.

924 Devastation of the Lombard Plain. Pavia sacked. Return of the invaders by way of Provence, Burgundy and Germany. A nine years' truce for his Duchy bought by Henry the Fowler, Duke of Saxony, King of Germany who left the rest of his kingdom to defend itself.

933 Invasion of Saxony resisted successfully by Henry the Fowler.

954 Last invasion of Southern Germany defeated by Otto I at the Lechfeld.

971 Beginning of the conversion of the Hungarians by Bishop Pilgrim of Passau. (The work was completed in the reign of St. Stephen, the first Christian King of Hungary (d. 1038).)

The Saxon dynasty received the credit for the final exclusion of the Hungarians from Western Europe. No doubt deservedly. But the numbers of the Hungarians were small, and their method of fighting only seems to have been formidable while it was unfamiliar. They were better at raids than at pitched battles; and in Saxony at all events the best way of frustrating their raids was found to be the building of castles on the routes which they usually followed.

It is worth asking the question why Central Europe was never again exposed to an Asiatic peril. The answer seems to be that, up to the Fourth Crusade, the Greek Empire guarded the main route from Central Asia to Europe—the route which runs westward across the Ural Mountains along the northern shore of the Black Sea, passing through a long belt of steppe country. When the Greek Empire had fallen the Mongols did appear in Eastern Europe (1241). They made short work of the Poles and Hungarians, but after one incursion into Silesia they withdrew from German soil. By that time the marches of Germany bristled with strongholds; and were defended by the toughest of the great feudal families of the Holy Roman Empire—men who had spent their lives in making war upon the Slavs. Tradition makes Henry the Fowler build cities along the Saxon frontier. But these cities were simply walled places of refuge and garrison centres. In some cases monasteries were fortified.

The victory of the Lechfeld added no territories to the German kingdom. But much territory was gained in the long and terrible warfare with the Slavonic tribes and states of the Eastern frontier. These gains were made in the reigns of Henry the Fowler and Otto I, chiefly by Margraves, to each of whom was assigned a special zone of the frontier for conquest and colonization. Henry the Fowler began this long campaign by capturing Brandenburg and extorting homage from St. Wenceslas of Bohemia (929). In 963 the Duke of Poland did homage to Otto I. But the most solid conquests were those at the expense of the disunited tribes in the Elbe basin and in the country between the Elbe and Oder. There were many ups and downs in the long campaign. Much that was acquired under Henry I and

The Slavonic Marches

Otto I was evacuated in the years 982–1002, to be painfully recovered thereafter. But these two rulers sketched the plan of a German kingdom extending to the Oder. The Archbishopric of Magdeburg on the Elbe was founded in 955.

The Slav Peoples

The Slav peoples, considering that they held the whole of Eastern Europe from the Urals to the Elbe, play a very small part in the early Middle Ages, though in the later Middle Ages Poland and Bohemia become important. They were by no means unwarlike, and they offered an obstinate resistance to German encroachments. But they had no historical traditions to unite them, and no common religion before they were converted to Christianity. Wenceslas (d. 936) was the first Christian ruler of Bohemia; and a Duke of Poland, Micislav, first accepted baptism in 963. Slavonic society was still in the tribal or clan stage of development, and the King, where a king existed, was only the head of an aristocracy of tribal chiefs. Originally the King seems to have been elected by the peasants to protect them from the oppression of the chiefs. This at least was the case both in Bohemia and Poland. Economically the Slavs were backward. They made little of provinces which in the hands of German farmers became very productive. Their population was scattered in small hamlets. But their numbers made them formidable and they sent out swarms of agricultural colonists into the thinly populated regions of Eastern Germany. When they came under foreign princes of ability Bohemia and Poland became formidable enemies: Bohemia under the Counts of Luxemburg, Poland under the Grand Dukes of Lithuania.

Constitution of the German Kingdom

The constitution of the German Kingdom under Henry the Fowler was of a federal character. Saxony and Franconia were the only two provinces which were in his demesne. The Duke of Lotharingia was rather an ally than a subject. The Dukes of Suabia and Bavaria made treaties recognizing his royal supremacy, but reserving to themselves many of the *regalia*. Thus the Duke of Bavaria struck his own coinage and nominated the bishops of the Bavarian sees. Otto the Great endeavoured

to increase his hold over the Duchies by granting them to members of his own family. But this plan was not altogether successful, as the Dukes of the royal house tended to identify themselves with the views and ambitions of their own subjects. Otto relied greatly on the support of the German Church. He gave the great Archbishoprics (Mainz, Köln, Trier) to relations of his own. One of these, Archbishop Bruno of Cologne, was his Arch-Chancellor and responsible for the training of the clerks of the royal Chancery from whom new bishops were selected. One of the reasons which made him aspire to the Imperial title was that he desired the help of the Pope in controlling the German Church. He was lavish in his grants of lands and privileges to the chief bishops in North and Central Germany, and used these ecclesiastical princes as local viceroys. On the whole the bishops served him well; and he asserted his control over the bishops of the Duchies as well as over those of his demesne. But Otto was responsible for the system of ecclesiastical principalities.

The central government was weak. Otto was recognized as the leader of the national host. But the only troops that he could himself call out were the royal vassals and the free landowners of Saxony and Franconia. To obtain contingents from the Duchies and bishoprics he had to enter upon separate negotiations with each Duke and bishop.

The King had his Law Court which heard disputes between his great vassals, and dealt with appeals from all over the Kingdom. But this court was not composed of professional judges, but of such of the German princes (tenants-in-chief) as happened to be in attendance on the King. The King's Court did justice according to the customary law of the province in which it happened to be sitting. There was no national code of laws, neither did the decisions of the King's Court give rise to a body of Common Law, such as was formulated in England by the Curia Regis. For legislation and for discussing matters of high policy the King used the General Assembly of the Princes (lay and secular) which met at his court. This was not a large body; a session at which fifty persons were present was thought to be altogether exceptional

(see Ekkehard of Ursperg, s.a. 1106). The Assembly did not legislate much, or on many subjects; for the King was not supposed to tamper with the customary law of the provinces.

There was no civil service except the Chancery, which was a bureau for managing the King's correspondence and drafting charters of privilege and other formal documents. The King was supposed to rely on the great officers of his household as ministers of state. In practice he usually relied on court favourites or the more able of the men who administered the royal demesne.

The King had a considerable revenue for which he was not dependent on his Council. Much of this revenue was derived from the royal estates in Saxony and Franconia; much more from the profits of justice and from the confiscation of estates of rebels. Finally he obtained a regular revenue from tolls and customs both on foreign trade and on the internal trade of the country, and from the sale of charters of privilege. But there were no regular taxes on property, nor was the Assembly of the Princes accustomed to vote supplies.

It is not wonderful that only the greatest and most popular of German sovereigns made this constitution work tolerably well. It *is* wonderful that a state possessing such a constitution was for about 300 years the leading state in Europe. How was this possible? First Germany was on the whole a prosperous country; she had also a greater population than that of any other European state. Her ruling aristocracy were great soldiers and administrators. They were also loyal to a King who was personally respected and successful. They believed that the German nation was ordained by Providence to rule Europe and to protect the Church. They were sensitive about the national honour. They were eager to extend the imperial territories. And the German clergy believed that they were bound to assist the Emperor in propagating Christianity in the Slavonic countries. But the whole system of government collapsed like a house of cards when the German nobility lost their faith in the last of the Hohenstauffen Emperors.[1] Some of these nobles no doubt had supported the Crown from interested motives.

[1] See below, p. 63.

But the best rulers seem to have received a large measure of disinterested loyalty.

Enterprises of the Ottos

The Imperial enterprises of the Ottos call for separate consideration. Otto the Great turned to Italy after he had made his position in Germany secure. He began by exacting an oath of homage (952) from Berenger of Friuli, the last holder of the Carolingian Kingdom of Italy. It was on this occasion that Istria, Aquileia, the Trentino and Verona were annexed to Bavaria. In 961 he evicted Berenger, who had proved an unsatisfactory vassal. He took this step at the invitation of Pope John XII, who was on the worst of terms with Berenger. In 962 he went to Rome and caused himself to be crowned as Emperor. This had probably been the plan at the back of all his earlier relations with Italy. He can hardly have acted as he did in the interest of the Pope, who was thoroughly annoyed by the revival of the Empire and was deposed in 963 for conspiring against Otto.

The Kingdom of Italy had the same boundaries in 962 as in 800, extending from the Alps to the frontiers of the Papal States. Pavia was the old capital, but Milan the most important city. South of the Papal States were the Lombard principalities of Benevento, Capua and Salerno. Apulia and Calabria were strongly held by the Greek Empire, Venice and Naples and Amalfi usually acknowledged the Greek supremacy. Sicily was in the hands of the Saracens.

Otto I's relations with Italy and the Papacy

Otto I in 962 had no designs of extending the Kingdom of Italy, and in his coronation treaty with John XII he demanded only the rights claimed by Charles the Great over the Papal States. But he insisted that his overlordship should be recognized by each Pope who might be elected in the future, and claimed the right of keeping an ambassador at Rome to watch the Pope's administration. In fact, this settlement did not prove satisfactory. After 964 Otto practically deprived the Romans of the right of electing the Pope. For the next forty years the Popes were nominees of the Saxon Emperors. Similarly circumstances obliged him to interfere in the South, because the Greek Empire and the Lombard princes were inclined to

support the claims of an Italian pretender (Adalbert, son of Berenger) to the Italian Crown. Hence Otto coerced the rulers of Capua and Benevento into an acceptance of his overlordship. He also made war on the Greek Empire in Apulia and Calabria. The situation became easier after 972, when the son and heir of Otto married the Greek princess Theophano. But Otto's experiences in Italy showed that an Imperialist policy was bound to produce embarrassing complications. Collisions with the Greeks were inevitable; collisions with the Saracens were more than probable. Otto I, to the best of his ability, remained a German ruler, using the Papal alliance and the Imperial title to support his German schemes.

Otto II and Otto III

It was otherwise with Otto II and Otto III. Both threw themselves headlong into Italian politics, with disastrous results. Otto II conceived the ambitious plan of a Holy War with the Saracens who were beginning to invade Apulia and Calabria. Otto III chose to make Rome the capital of the Empire, built a palace on the Aventine, and tried to remodel the German Court and the Imperial Chancery on Byzantine lines. Some of these follies may have been encouraged by the Italian Empress Adelaide, the mother of Otto II, and the Greek Empress Theophano, the mother of Otto III. Both Empresses took an active part in the government of Germany and Italy. Both showed a special interest in Italy. But Otto III survived both Theophano (d. 991) and Adelaide (d. 999), and single-handed pushed on the new Imperial policy. His head was full of classical learning and traditions imperfectly understood. He assisted the revival of the Papacy by appointing to it the learned and virtuous Gerbert (Sylvester II).

Reaction against the Imperial Idea

After the death of Otto III there was a violent reaction against the Italian policy on the part of his successors Henry II (1002–24) and Conrad II (1024–39). These Emperors duly visited Italy to be crowned at Pavia or Milan and at Rome, but they interfered little in Italian politics. The results were not altogether fortunate. The Papacy, the Italian bishops and the Italian feudatories began to ignore the Emperor. In the years 1036–8 Conrad

II had to wage a long and unsuccessful war against Aribert Archbishop of Milan, who tried to usurp the regalian rights over Milan and the lands of his see. But, on the other hand, Henry II and Conrad II took up the threads of the German policy of Otto I. Henry renewed the alliance of the monarchy with the German Church, and was its most liberal benefactor (e.g. he founded the see of Bamberg). On the eastern frontier he reasserted the Imperial supremacy over Poland and Bohemia, and restored the marks.[1] The success of Henry II encouraged his successor to pursue a more ambitious policy. In 1032, on the extinction of the royal house of Burgundy, Conrad annexed that kingdom, which extended from Basle to Marseilles, and included the County of Burgundy, a large part of Western Switzerland, Savoy and the left bank of the Rhone. In Germany itself he made over to his son (the future Henry III) the great southern duchies of Bavaria, Carinthia, Suabia. He would not place himself in the hands of the Council of the Princes, but made use of base-born counsellors (*ministeriales*).

[1] The line of frontier-provinces by which the Empire was protected on the east.

CHAPTER V

THE REVIVAL OF THE PAPACY, 1046–1122

CARDINAL EVENTS

1046	Henry III intervenes in Rome: Synod of Sutvi.
1059	Alliance of Nicholas II and Robert Guiscard.
1073–85	Hildebrand, Pope as Gregory VII.
1077	Canossa.
1088–99	Urban II, Pope.
1122	Concordat of Worms ends the Investiture Contest.

UP to the year 1100 there were in Western Europe only two considerable nation states, the German and the English. The Continent became aware of the resources of the English state during the reign of King Cnut, who made England for a short time the head of a Scandinavian Empire and the greatest maritime power in Europe. The kingdom of France was founded in 987 by Hugh Capet; but up to the accession of Louis VII (1137) France had little weight in European politics, the King of France being little more powerful than two or three of his greater vassals.

The great fact in the history of the eleventh century is the transformation of the Papacy into a political and religious force of the first magnitude. The theoretical powers of the Papacy were very large in early times, as is shown by the careers of (for instance) Gregory the Great and Nicholas I. But these powers were exercised and extended between 1046 and 1122 by Popes of whom the greatest were Gregory VII and Urban II. The extraordinary feature of this Roman revolution is that it was carried out by a clerical party in

the teeth of determined opposition from the barons of Rome and from the Emperors Henry IV and Henry V. The opposition was sometimes defeated by the skilful and even unscrupulous diplomacy of the Popes, who allied themselves with the political enemies of the Empire both in Italy and Germany. But the main strength of the Papal cause was derived from the disinterested and conscientious support of the common people, of the middle classes, especially in the Italian towns, and of a large party of ecclesiastical reformers in Germany and Italy who are commonly but erroneously called the Cluniac Reformers. Many of these reformers were connected with new religious orders, such as that of Cluny; but the religious orders which did most to promote the reform movement were founded in the Duchy of Lotharingia and in Central Italy. The great spokesmen of the Reform movement were Cardinal Humbert (d. 1061), a Lorrainer, and Peter Damiani (d. 1072). Both these men became Cardinals, and to both of them Gregory VII was indebted for his leading ideas. The watchword of the reforming school was *ne clerici impliciti mundo sint*: let not the clergy be entangled in the world.

Reforms in the Church

The reforms demanded were chiefly two—a rigorous prohibition of clerical marriages, and the extirpation of simony. The first of these reforms meant the revival of a rule which the Western Church (though not the Greek Church) had adopted at least as early as the Council of Nicaea, but which in practice had been greatly relaxed in the West, so far as the lower ranks of the clergy were concerned. For the second reform there was apostolic sanction; simony was the crime of Simon Magus. But in fact the reformers of the tenth century branded as simoniacal a number of practices which had hitherto been treated as legal. In particular they denounced the appointment of parish priests by lay patrons. They also denounced the granting of bishoprics, abbeys, &c., by lay investiture. They were right in saying that these two practices led to many unworthy appointments; right in saying that neither the parish priest nor the bishop should be tempted, either by gratitude or by fear, to serve the interests of his patron rather than those of the Church. But the proposed reforms were

revolutionary in the sense that they would take away valuable rights from kings and landowners. Kings might argue, did argue, that unless the great bishops and abbots were bound to them by feudal law the Church would no longer be a support to the royal authority but an *imperium in imperio*. Hence the reforms were fiercely resisted by the ruling classes everywhere. Yet, in the end, the reformers obtained a good part of what they had demanded. This was possible because the Papacy assumed the lead of the reform movement. And it is remarkable that the most high-minded Emperor of the eleventh century was indirectly responsible for putting the Papacy in command of a movement hostile to the alliance of Church and State in the work of civil government.

Henry III and Leo IX

This Emperor was Henry III (1039–56). His ambition was to take up and complete the plans of Otto I in Eastern Europe and in Italy; like Otto I he desired an alliance with Rome; like Otto he deposed an unworthy Pope in order to set up a Pope whom he trusted and respected. The Synod of Sutri (1046), which he convened for this purpose, marks a turning-point in Papal history. For it put an end to the old bad system, which had so prevailed at Rome, of treating the Papacy as a prize to be contended for by the great baronial houses of the Papal States. While they nominated the Popes it was inevitable that the Popes should generally be bad. Before Henry III came to Rome there had been a sort of civil war in Rome between three rival claimants for the Papacy. Gregory VI, the reigning Pope, had bought the Papacy. The third Pope whom Henry III nominated was his own cousin Bruno of Toul, who became Leo IX. Leo was a Lorrainer and belonged to the school of ecclesiastical reformers which was strong in that duchy. Leo took into his service the Cardinal Humbert, and also the great Hildebrand, who had been in the service of the Pope deposed at Sutri. Encouraged by such men, he adopted a vigorous and independent policy. He filled the Cardinal's College with reformers. He went on progress through North Italy, France and Germany to hold Papal synods, in order to assert his authority as the supreme

judge and the supreme legislator of the national Churches. In Rome itself he held annual synods to which he invited many bishops from north of the Alps. At the Synod of Rheims (1049) he reaffirmed the old principle that all prelates ought to be elected by the clergy and people. Leo IX refrained from quarrelling with the Emperor, who persisted in nominating German prelates, though with due attention to the character of the candidates. But the concord of Church and State ended with the death of the two cousins. Leo died in 1054; Henry III in 1056.

The new Emperor, Henry IV, did not come of age till 1072. During his minority those who ruled in his name gave little attention to Italian affairs, and the Reform party had its own way at Rome. In 1059 Nicholas II published a decree providing that in future the Pope should be elected by the Cardinals, and leaving to the Emperor and the Roman people only the right of approving the choice of the Cardinals. In the same year Nicholas made an alliance with Robert Guiscard, the leader of the Norman colonists who had been pouring into Lower Italy since 1041. Under this alliance the Pope accepted Robert as his vassal for Apulia and Calabria and gave him the right to conquer Sicily from the Saracens. This amounted to a denial of the claim which every Emperor since Otto I had put forward to the overlordship of South Italy. But Nicholas needed the military protection of the Normans and thought that he could affront the German Regents of the Empire without running any risk. In fact, the Regents tried to set up a German Pope after the death of Nicholas (1061). But the Italians remained loyal to the Pope who had been elected at Rome. His name was Alexander II. He ruled until 1073, avoiding further conflicts with the imperial court. But on his death Hildebrand was acclaimed by the people of Rome as Pope Gregory VII. He was connected with a great Roman family of Jewish origin; and for some years he had taken a large part in the government of the city of Rome, being the Archdeacon of the Roman Church. He was accepted by the Cardinals, no doubt because they knew him to be a thorough-going advocate of Reform.

The struggle between the Empire and the Papacy

Gregory waited for two years before assuming an aggressive attitude towards the Empire. In the interval he endeavoured to obtain from Henry IV a reform of the German Church, especially the abolition of lay investiture and the prohibition of clerical marriages. But the young Emperor was not inclined to surrender the rights of his ancestors, especially as a number of the German bishops resented the Pope's desire to meddle in the government of the German Church. His position, however, was weakened in 1073 by a revolt of the Saxons, who complained that Henry IV oppressed them by his exactions. Worsted in the field, the rebels turned to the Pope for help, denouncing the Emperor as a tyrant and a monster of vice; and Gregory seized the opportunity to force on a struggle. At the end of 1074 he issued a proclamation to the German people urging them to take into their own hands the work of evicting the married clergy from their benefices, since the bishops neglected to do this. Early in 1075 he issued from Rome a decree forbidding lay investitures; and he is said to have threatened the Emperor with deposition because, at the end of 1075, the Emperor nominated one of his own chaplains as Archbishop of Milan. The result of these measures was that the Emperor and the German Bishops renounced their obedience to the Pope, alleging that his election had been obtained by bribery and corruption. Gregory replied by excommunicating the Primate of Germany, suspending or excommunicating all other bishops who supported the Emperor, and issuing against the Emperor sentences of excommunication and deposition (February, 1076). These sentences encouraged the Saxons to rebel for a second time; and in the autumn of 1076 Henry IV was at the mercy of the rebels.

First Phase, 1075–7

At this juncture, when Gregory was proposing to go to Germany in person, and to settle the fate of the Emperor and the future of the Empire in consultation with the German princes, Henry IV saved his crown, at the expense of his dignity, by escaping from his conquerors and appearing before the Pope as a suppliant at Canossa. The story of his submission has been considerably embellished by chroniclers who had no means of knowing

Canossa, Feb. 1077

precisely what happened. But the terms of the reconciliation are on record and they are very hard. He was to enforce the reforming decrees in Germany, and he was to satisfy the grievances of the rebels in such manner as the Pope should think proper. It is also clear that he appeared before the Pope in the garb of a penitent. The Pope was at first unwilling to absolve Henry IV. He only did so under the strongest pressure from his chief supporters, the Countess Matilda and Abbot Hugh of Cluny, who insisted that it was his duty, as a Christian, to show forgiveness. Gregory must have known that the Emperor's promises would only be observed till a chance occurred of breaking them. In pardoning the King without any reference to the German princes, Gregory broke the agreement that he had made with the rebels, and for a time he and the cause for which he stood were thoroughly discredited in Germany.

For these reasons some eminent historians have argued that the interview of Canossa was a defeat for the Pope and a victory for the Emperor. Gregory had been outmanœuvred by the man whom he despised. There is some truth in this argument; but it ignores the moral effects of Henry's submission. Every one except the German rebels felt that the Pope had behaved to his enemy as a Christian should. Henry's best friends could not overlook the fact that he had solemnly owned himself in the wrong, and had given promises for the future which he made no attempt to carry out. As a party leader in Germany he was still formidable. No one, however, could say that he had behaved well or wisely as an Emperor. By his submission he had humbled the Imperial office. He had acknowledged the doctrine of Pope Nicholas I that the Pope may sit in judgment on an Emperor.

Canossa did not end the German rebellion, which was continued by the anti-Kings, Rudolf of Suabia (1077–80) and Hermann of Lützelburg (1081–8). Until Rudolf began to lose ground Gregory remained neutral. In 1080 he leagued himself again with the rebels and for the second time excommunicated and deposed the Emperor. He had certainly not been hasty in deciding that Henry was a perjurer. He did not judge the Emperor's character more hardly than

Second Phase, 1077–88

many of Henry's German subjects. But he put himself in the wrong by the ill-considered violence and informality of his proceedings. First, we must notice that, whereas in 1076 the responsibility for deposing the Emperor would have been divided between the Pope and the German princes, in 1080 the German rebels were defeated and the Pope acted by himself. Henry was condemned without a public hearing, on grounds imperfectly understood. There were grave doubts, even among the German reformers, as to the lawfulness of the sentence of deposition. Gregory wrote a long and laboured defence of his action in 1081 to Bishop Hermann of Metz; but what must have struck the readers of this apology is the Pope's failure to give any satisfactory precedents. What was to become of the Empire if any Emperor could be deposed by any Pope? This question was the more serious, because Gregory not only deposed Henry IV but nominated as his successor Duke Rudolf of Suabia. The fact that Rudolf was killed in battle soon after this sentence was very generally interpreted as the judgment of God upon the Pope himself.

Thus the sentence of 1081 produced a reaction in Germany, which heartened the Emperor and all those who had consistently opposed lay investitures, which were solemnly declared by the Pope to be the principal subject in dispute. From 1080 to 1097 Henry IV stood at the head of a strong party of Imperialist laymen and conservative clergy. This party included many of his subjects in the Kingdom of Italy. From 1080 to 1100 the party maintained an anti-Pope, Archbishop Wibert of Ravenna. In material resources the Imperialists were superior to the Papalists; Gregory VII depended on the Countess Matilda of Tuscany and on Robert Guiscard, and Robert proved a broken reed because he was busy with his own designs on the Greek Empire in the Balkans. Up to a point the Imperialists were successful. In 1082 the Emperor laid seige to the Leonine City; in 1083 he took the whole of it except the castle of St. Angelo. In 1084 the anti-Pope was installed in the Lateran Palace, and Gregory escaped from Rome under the protection of Robert Guiscard and his Norman troops. A year later (May, 1085) Gregory died in exile at Salerno. But the Cardinals

who had followed him to Salerno elected a successor, and the orthodox Pope, living under Norman protection, was perfectly safe. After the Norman raid upon Rome in 1084 the Emperor and his anti-Pope did not venture to establish themselves in Central Italy.

Third Phase, 1088–1106

In 1088 the election of Urban II by the orthodox cardinals gave to the reforming party a leader who was as determined as Gregory VII and far more sagacious. From that point the fortunes of the Imperialists began to decline. They were still successful in the civil war. The anti-King Hermann gave up the struggle in Germany in 1088. Welf, Duke of Bavaria, who was induced by the Pope to come forward in Hermann's place, had no better success and made peace with the Emperor in 1098. But the clergy and the common people both in Germany and in the Kingdom of Italy fell away from the Emperor's side. Perhaps the main cause of this was the brilliant success of Urban II in launching the First Crusade. In 1106 Henry IV was deposed by his own son, with the approval of a great part of the German princes. The motives of the conspirators are obscure. But it is generally supposed that the ruling classes in Germany desired a reconciliation with the orthodox Pope, and thought that this could never be effected till Henry IV was put out of the way. For some years the Reformers had been industriously blackening the reputation of the old Emperor. Their worst charges seem hardly credible, but in fact they were widely believed.

Fourth Phase, 1106–19

The new Emperor Henry V soon discovered that the chief questions to be settled between the Empire and Papacy were not personal questions at all. The demands of the Papacy could not be conceded without a radical revision of national laws and customs affecting the relations of Church and State. When this was represented to Paschal II (1099–1118) he curtly intimated that the laws of the Empire must be revised. Lay investiture could not be tolerated in any shape or form. In 1111 Paschal had come to the reasonable conclusion that, to justify his extreme demands, it was necessary that the Churches of Germany and Italy should resign all the lands and secular privileges

which they had received by grants from the Emperor. But the Pope's own supporters would not hear of this settlement, and Paschal was obliged to make a public repudiation of his proposal at the Lateran Council of 1112. The war between Papacy and Empire was resumed, and Henry V endeavoured to set up a new anti-Pope (Wibert had died in 1100). At last in 1119 the German nobility insisted that negotiations should be reopened. The Pope of that date, Calixtus II (1119–24), was more inclined to compromise than his predecessors. He began by giving up the demand that the appointment of parish priests should be taken out of the hands of lay-patrons. He went on to propose that newly elected bishops and abbots should be invested by the Emperor (and other Kings) with the temporalities of their office, but should be invested with the ring and the crozier by ecclesiastical authority. He also conceded to the Emperor the right of deciding disputed elections of bishops and abbots. This meant in practice that the Emperor could decide whenever the electors were not unanimous.

These terms were embodied in the Concordat of Worms (1122). The settlement was a moral victory for the Reformers and the Papacy. But it did little to increase the independence of the national Churches, or to improve the character of the episcopate. Not only in the Empire but in all the national kingdoms the ruler continued to nominate the bishops and to use them as ministers of State. The attempt to raise the standard of character among the parish priests was altogether abandoned.

Moral Effects of the struggle

The Popes who resisted Henry IV and Henry V had proved to Europe that the Papacy had the support of a large body of public opinion, which no lay ruler, however powerful, could afford to despise. It is remarkable that the settlement of 1122 said nothing about the married clergy. It said nothing because that question had been settled by public opinion. The married clergy had been compelled by their own parishioners either to put away their wives or to quit their benefices. Similarly there was no need to put into the treaty any new regulations against simony. The grosser methods of traffick-

ing in Church preferments were now condemned by public opinion. Neither was it necessary to demand that the Election Decree of Nicholas II, the Magna Charta of the Holy See, should be ratified. That decree seemed now so reasonable to right-minded men that no Emperor would dare to challenge its validity on grounds of principle.

The Wars of the Investitures are generally regarded as one of the gloomiest episodes in medieval history. That was an iron age and the great figures in the contest, whether Popes or Emperors or rebels or reformers, seemed ready to go to any lengths in support of their own opinions, as Urban's exploitation of the quarrels of Henry IV shows. But the war was a war of ideas—a war between men who were convinced that a free Church was necessary for the salvation of men, and other men, equally sincere, who held that the State was necessary for the temporal well-being of men, and that a State which allowed the Church all the freedom that the Church desired was bound to go to rack and ruin. The political pamphlets of the controversy show that educated men were thinking hard about the central questions of political science and of Church government, and it is significant that some of these pamphlets were written by comparatively obscure men. In Italy the movement produced poets, orators, satirists, preachers; it even produced demagogues in Milan and some other cities of the Kingdom of Italy, where the citizens, or a part of them, were at the same time Church reformers and political innovators. Out of the ferment of these times proceeded a movement for the emancipation of the Italian cities from the control of the Empire, or of bishops nominated by the Emperor. At the height of the conflict between Papacy and Empire the first Crusade was launched—an enterprise which showed how deeply the consciences of the feudal aristocracy were stirred. If we judge this age, as we are apt to judge most ages, by the best men that it produced, we should concentrate our studies upon Urban II, a high-minded though by no means a spotless character; upon St. Anselm, who is one of the five or six great speculative thinkers of the medieval Church; and upon Cardinal Peter Damiani, who was, in the field of

moral reform, a worthy forerunner of St. Bernard and St. Francis.

Character of Gregory VII

What are we to say of Gregory VII, who set in motion all this turmoil, and was the author of so much good and evil that he can never have foreseen? I do not think that he has ever been better appraised or better defended than in the first scientific account of his career, which was written by the Protestant historian, Johannes Voigt.[1] Voigt says that the one great idea of this Pope was to ensure the freedom of the Church; that was the end to which he devoted the whole of his astounding energy. Gregory held the Church to be the creation of God, and the State to be the invention of frail and sinful men. His method of liberating the Church was to secure the free election of bishops; and that was the best possible method, in those days, of making the Church independent and worthy of independence. His claims to a sort of feudal suzerainty over Spain, France, England, Lower Italy, Hungary are to be regarded simply as expedients by which he hoped to realize his main object in lands which were not subject to the Empire. Gregory, Voigt continues, was the child of his age, a man of destiny, doing what the trend of historical development required that he should do. The wars which he provoked were in their effects like thunderstorms. They cleared the atmosphere. They were necessary for the welfare of the age in which he lived. We should not blame Gregory for assuming that the Church could only remain independent if she was ruled monarchically by a Pope wielding absolute power. Gregory lived in an age when a strong monarchy was thought to be the best form of government for all purposes. As for his moral standards, they were those of the age in which he lived and of the hierarchy to which he belonged.

[1] *Hildebrand als Papst Gregorius und sein Zeitalter.*

CHAPTER VI

THE KINGDOMS OF FRANCE AND ENGLAND, 987–1215

CARDINAL EVENTS

987	Hugh Capet, King of France.
1060–1108	Philip I, King of France.
1066	Norman Conquest of England.
1097–8	France under Interdict.
1108–37	Louis le Gros, King of France.
1152	Henry II of England marries Eleanor of Aquitaine.
1180	Accession of Philip Augustus of France.
1215	Magna Carta. Foundation of the University of Paris.

THE two western kingdoms of France and England were formed where there had been two Roman provinces, both of which were subdued by Teutonic barbarians at about the same date (the end of the fifth century and the beginning of the sixth). England became Teutonic; in Wales and Scotland the Celts held out but lost their Romanism. In France the vanquished kept their language, and in the south their Roman law. The Franks adopted the French language and helped to found a Latin people.

The stories of England and France are closely intertwined from 1066 to 1215, owing to the incessant conflicts of the House of Capet with the Houses of Normandy and Anjou. Furthermore, there is enough resemblance between the institutions of the two to suggest comparison. In both the same kind of administrative system was introduced by the Crown. After 1215 there was in both a movement in the direction

of parliamentary government, to which we find no parallel whatever in the medieval kingdom of Italy, and in Germany none before the fifteenth century. Both as to administrative and as to parliamentary institutions England led the way. Henry II was imitated by Philip Augustus (1180–1223), Edward I by Philip le Bel (1285–1314).

Difference between the English and French Polities

The most characteristic feature of the Old English polity is the persistence of the primitive community of the hundred, and the vigorous vitality of the shire-system, which first appeared in early Wessex and before 1066 was systematically applied to the whole of England south of the Humber and the Mersey. In the eleventh century England was divided into earldoms, some of which represented ancient kingdoms, such as Mercia and East Anglia. But these earldoms were mushroom growths, and they were wiped off the map, with one or two exceptions, at the Norman Conquest. The Palatinates of Durham and Chester and the highly privileged Marcher lordships along the borders of Scotland and Wales, were the only fiefs in medieval England which resembled those of continental France.

In England again the royal demesnes were scattered over the greater part of the country. In nearly all the shires the King of England was the greatest landlord or one of the greatest. He had also very complete control of the waste lands and woodlands called forests. The Carolingian rulers of West Francia were at one time equally well endowed.' But their demesnes were squandered or taken from them by force in the civil wars of the ninth and tenth centuries. When Hugh Capet obtained the throne (987) he started with a royal demesne which mainly consisted of the possessions of his own family in the Isle of France—a strip of country extending from Paris on the north to Orleans on the south. The Isle of France was surrounded by great fiefs (Normandy, Flanders, Vermandois, Champagne, Burgundy, Blois, Touraine), whose lords owned allegiance to the Crown and sometimes rendered military service. But they governed their dominions much as they pleased. The early rulers of the Capet family sometimes asserted themselves by assisting a rebellion in the fief

of an unfriendly vassal, or by asserting the right of protecting the churches of France against local oppressors, or by building up coalitions of friendly vassals to deal with an over-mighty subject. French history from 987 to 1137 is chiefly local history. The great fiefs of Normandy, Anjou, Flanders and Champagne were better governed and more prosperous than the royal demesne. It is in the fiefs of Northern France that we trace most clearly the development of French civilization. French commerce and industry throve chiefly in the great cities of Flanders, the great fairs of Champagne, and the seaports of Normandy. The religious revival of the eleventh and twelfth centuries throve better in Normandy and Burgundy than in Paris. As for the country lying to the south of the Loire, the whole of it from the Rhone to the Atlantic was practically *alter orbis* until the marriages of Eleanor of Aquitaine with Louis VII (1137) and with Henry of Anjou (1152) gave Aquitaine a lively interest in the politics of the North. Up to the end of the thirteenth century Aquitaine had its own distinctive civilization, and its own distinctive speech, the Langue d'Oc. The Aquitanians were the spiritual heirs of the Romans and the Visigoths. They had never been teutonized by the Franks or by the Northmen. The political history of Aquitaine is extraordinarily involved and obscure. But its art, its poetry, its municipal institutions, and its peculiar religious heresies are better worth attention.

Divisions of France

As for the early Capet kings, it has been demonstrated by French historians that they possessed a traditional policy, and followed it with remarkable consistency, making the utmost of such prerogatives as they still retained. But the results were small and the dynasty cut a poor figure beside the Saxon and Franconian Emperors. Very singular is the career of Philip I, who reigned nearly fifty years (1060–1108) and witnessed the Norman conquest of England, the meteoric careers of Gregory VII and Henry IV, and the marshalling of the First Crusade. Twice Philip attracted the notice and incurred the censures of Gregory : in 1074 when he was found to be plundering the Italian merchants who travelled through his dominions ; and in 1094 when he was excommunicated for contracting a bigamous marriage. Since

Policy of the Early Capets

excommunication did not move him to repentance, his kingdom was laid under an interdict in 1097–8. Supported by the sympathy of his great vassals and profiting from the embarrassments of the Papacy, he defied these censures and kept his unlawful wife. Needless to say he was not invited by Urban II to the Council of Clermont and lent no assistance to the First Crusade. It is more surprising that he neglected to promote the Truce of God [1] in his dominions either in 1095, when it was recommended by Urban II, or in 1107.

A new spirit is discernible in Louis le Gros (1108–1137), a man of enormous energy and determination, though not conspicuous for his ability. He devoted himself for twenty years to the reduction of the robber barons of the Isle de France. From time to time he made expeditions into the country north of the Seine to deal with other barons who were a terror to the bishoprics of Beauvais, Noyon, Laon and Rheims. He was thus in a very practical fashion the friend of the Church and of the Commons. The militia of the Isle of France fought with a good will under his banner; and one of his expeditions against a particularly notorious baron of the North was blessed as a crusade by a Papal legate (1114). But the range of his activities was very narrow. Once he visited Auvergne to punish a count who had molested the Bishop of Clermont. Twice he invaded Flanders to establish there a ruler of his own selection. But these were exceptional ventures, and in Flanders the King was frustrated. He made it a rule for himself and his successors that the petty *noblesse* of the royal demesne must be brought under strict control; and that is his contribution to the development of France.

Louis le Gros, 1108–37

With the accession of Louis VII (1137–79) France becomes involved in European politics. This King married the heiress of Aquitaine (1137), and for fifteen years ruled the Duchy in his wife's name, thus exercising a wider authority than any ruler in France had attained since 887. In 1152 he obtained a dissolution of the marriage,

Louis VII, 1137–79

[1] The Truce of God, an agreement to abstain from fighting on certain days of the year, was the most famous of a series of medieval attempts to limit the evils of war and anarchy.

with the disastrous result that Henry of Anjou obtained the hand of Eleanor and the Duchy of Aquitaine. This disaster did not lead at once to war ; for Louis was not warlike. But it had the consequences of producing strained relations ; of making Louis eager to seize any opportunity of thwarting or embarrassing his over-mighty subject, who in 1154 had succeeded Stephen on the throne of England. Louis VII was a devout man, keenly interested in the religious movements of the time. He joined the disastrous Second Crusade, against the advice of his great minister, Abbot Suger of St. Denis, and was absent in the East two years (1147–9). He gave hospitality to Becket while Becket was living in voluntary exile from England (1164–70). He took the side of Alexander III in the long conflict between that Pope and the Emperor Frederic I. Thus he established a friendship with the reforming clergy of his time, and France came to be regarded at Rome as a power worth cultivating, a possible check upon the grandiose designs of the Hohenstauffen.

Philip Augustus, 1189–1222

Philip Augustus (1180–1222) reaped where his predecessors had sown. He was above everything a diplomatist, skilled in intrigue, and a statesman who could form large plans in silence, hold them in reserve till the favourable moment appeared, and then put them into execution with skill and despatch. He was highly strung and had little physical courage. But he had the courage of his opinions in great matters, and he dealt resolutely with those who withstood him, however great their influence. Like Henry II of England, whom he much resembled in character, he was determined to increase the power of the Crown, and employed in his service men of low rank in preference to great nobles. In the years 1181–5 he resisted and overthrew a coalition of three great feudal houses, Flanders, Champagne, Burgundy. In 1186 he began to intrigue with the sons of Henry II against their father, and in 1188–9 waged war on Henry with such good results that the King of England had to purchase peace by cessions of territory and the payment of a war indemnity. In 1191, on his return from the Third Crusade, he took in hand his plans for the total expulsion of the English from France. Those

plans, defeated for a time by the military skill of Richard I, were partly carried into effect in the six years after Richard's death. Normandy, Brittany, Anjou and Touraine passed out of the Angevin Empire. In 1214 Poitou was also abandoned by John, who kept only Gascony with its wine-trade and the great ports of Bordeaux and Bayonne. It was left for Louis VIII and Louis IX to carry the conquest of the Midi a stage further by the annexation of the dependent county of Toulouse, 1216–17. At the same time occurred the invasion of England by Prince Louis (afterwards Louis VIII), at the invitation of the English barons who had extorted Magna Carta from King John.

At the death of Philip Augustus, the kingdom of France was not yet a unitary state like England. The Dukes of Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and the Counts of Champagne and Flanders still kept large powers over their fiefs. But the power of all feudatories was diminished in important matters—

The Organization of France

(1) By the protection which the Crown gave to the clergy even in the most privileged fiefs.

(2) By the protection given to the towns, which under Louis VI, Louis VII, and especially Philip Augustus, were allowed to purchase charters of self-government from the Crown, and to become tenants in chief, no matter to what lord they had previously owed allegiance.

(3) By the practice of granting royal *Sauvegardes* to individuals, and communities who were subject to private lords.

In administration the great innovation of Philip Augustus is the introduction into the old *Curia Regis* (general assembly of magnates) of an inner ring of experts, chiefly lawyers. These men now became the judges in the royal court of Justice, which may be compared with the Justiciars *de Banco* in England. But he also made a new departure in local government by dividing the royal demesnes into bailiwicks, or districts of fairly large size, comparable to the shires in England, and appointing one or more bailiffs to supervise the administration of the minor local officers, to collect the taxes

and royal dues and to hold courts of justice. These bailiffs somewhat resemble the itinerant justices who periodically visited the English shire-courts from the time of Henry I onwards. But in France there was no shire-court and consequently no opportunity for the inhabitants of the bailiwick to take a share in the government. This may explain why the smaller feudal tenants of France developed no taste or aptitude for politics.

France's contribution to European Civilization

Let us now turn to consider briefly what France had contributed to European civilization by 1223 : (i) She was in a special degree associated with the development of the monastic movement. This movement is denounced by eighteenth-century critics as an unmitigated evil, chiefly on the shallow argument that it withdrew a number of able-bodied men from productive industry—an argument which might equally be used to condemn all the arts and professions. Other critics, with more show of reason, have complained that the monastic life produced at the best a character wanting in strength and energy, ' a fugitive and cloistered virtue ', and that the orders of mendicant friars founded by St. Francis and St. Dominic were not only more useful to society, but trained a finer type of Christian. This may be admitted with the proviso that the rulers of the monastic orders were by no means wanting in philanthropy or practical statesmanship, and some of them—for instance, the Abbots of Cluny and St. Bernard—were the uncrowned kings of the lay society in which they moved, and the greatest moral reformers of the Middle Ages. After all, an institution like monasticism must be judged by the men that it produces, and the ideas for which they stand. This is not the place to discuss the leading ideas of medieval monasticism. But the best of them will be found in the *Imitatio Christi* by Thomas à Kempis, which, although composed in the fifteenth century, is a dateless book, as new to-day as when it was first written. There are two standard justifications of the monastic life. The first is archaic and naïve ; the monk stands before God as a perpetual intercessor for mankind. The other is that the monk is a model of the saintly life, a life free from all earthly ties, un-

(i) The Monastic Movement

encumbered by worldly possessions; a life in which prayer, adoration and contemplation are the all-absorbing activities. Here we have the Christian counterpart of the *βιὸς Θεωρητικός* of Aristotle's *Ethics*.

The French contributions to the realizing of this ideal are:

(*a*) The reformed Rule of St. Benedict of Nursia, which was prepared by Benedict of Aniane, and made binding on all the monasteries of the Frankish Empire by a capitulary of 817.

(*b*) The Order of Cluny, which grew up round the Burgundian monastery of that name, which was founded in 910, and adopted the Rule of Benedict of Aniane. This Order was the first model of a federation of monasteries, living under the same Rule and subject to the parent house.

(*c*) The Cistercian Order, which derived its name from the parent house of Cîteaux, founded by the Englishman Stephen Harding, who was joined by St. Bernard in 1113. This Order, with a stricter rule than that of Cluny, enjoined severe manual labour and a puritanical simplicity in religious services.

(*d*) The Carthusian Order, so called from the fact that the parent house was La Chartreuse (founded in 1084, in the diocese of Grenoble). The leading idea of this Order was that the individual monk should live the life of a hermit in his own private cell. La Chartreuse was on the left bank of the Rhone, politically in the Empire, but in French-speaking territory.

(ii) In the second place France was one of the leaders, though not the only leader, in the organization of the Communes or Free Cities, which are one of the most striking developments in the lay society of the Middle Ages. The other great centre of free municipal institutions is the Kingdom of Italy. The grand defect of the constitution of these Free Cities was that they aimed at securing for their citizens a number of local monopolies in trade or manufacture. On the other hand, they were invaluable as sanctuaries in which artisans and their employers,

(ii) The Free Cities

merchants and their customers, could live and do business without fear of being robbed or exploited by the lords of the soil. They became the nurseries of a middle-class between the feudal aristocracy and the peasant. It was this middle-class which made the political and religious revolutions of the sixteenth century.

(iii) Learning, Art and Literature

(iii) Up to the middle of the thirteenth century France led the way in the renaissance of learning, art and literature. There is ample evidence of this :

(*a*) The greatest centre of classical studies in Europe at the beginning of the twelfth century was the Cathedral School of Chartres in which John of Salisbury was trained ; the Cathedral School of Paris at the same date was the chief European centre of philosophical studies. Out of the school at Paris grew the University, which received a royal charter in 1200 and a Papal charter in 1210. For all subjects of the medieval curriculum, except Law and Mathematics, the University of Paris was pre-eminent down to the fifteenth century. It was the principal nursery of scholasticism.

(*b*) In art France produced the ' Norman ' style of architecture, which emerges about 1050 and is really a variety of the old Romanesque ; also the ' Gothic style ', which originated in the Ile de France, and whose beginnings are exhibited in Suger's cathedral at St. Denis (built 1133–44). It was in this style that French architects and their English disciples built the greatest of the cathedrals—Rheims and Amiens and Laon, Salisbury and Westminster. Closely associated with these architects were the sculptors who decorated the portals and west fronts of Bourges and Chartres and Rheims, at a time when sculpture was in its infancy among the Germans and even among the Italians. In France also the art of stained-glass-making attained a high pitch of excellence while the Gothic movement was still young.

(*c*) In literature France produced those rough-hewn epics of the early feudal age which are known as the Chansons de Geste (Songs of Great Deeds). The earliest of these, the Pilgrimage of Charlemagne and the Chanson de Roland (known only through one manuscript in the Bodleian Library), belong to the eleventh century. They appear to have been the work of anonymous minstrels, who frequented the great fairs of France, or the more popular resorts of pilgrims. These poems profess to be historical, but they reflect the manners, the passions and the ideas of the feudal classes. Thus the two leading ideas of the heroes in the Chanson de Roland are war against paganism and loyalty to the Emperor their overlord. Raoul of Cambrai is a study of family feuds and civil wars. There is a whole cycle of Chansons (cycle of Guillaume d'Orange) relating to the war against the Saracens. Somewhat later, towards the year 1150, the fashion changed and Romances in verse, based on the Arthurian legends of Brittany, became the vogue. These Romances dealt with the story of Tristram, the adventures of the Knights of the Round Table, or with the quest of the Holy Grail.

Finally we have to notice the growth in Languedoc of a vigorous school of poetry, that of the Troubadours, which is sometimes satirical, or political or religious, but most frequently concerned with the themes of chivalry ; as also the growth in Northern France of comic fables in verse, written evidently for the amusement of the lower and middle classes, and quite merciless to their social superiors. Such is the celebrated romance of Reynard the Fox ; and to the same school belongs the Parisian satirist Rutebeuf, the contemporary of St. Louis.

THE CRUSADES

CHAPTER VII

THE CRUSADES

CARDINAL EVENTS

1095 Council of Clermont.
1097 First Crusade.
1146 Second Crusade.
1187 Saladin wins the battle of Hattin; fall of Jerusalem.
1189 Third Crusade.
1202 Fourth Crusade.
1248 Louis IX of France (St. Louis) sets out on Crusade.
1270 Second Crusade and death of St. Louis.

IT was the view of the great German historian Ranke that the whole interest of medieval history centres round the clash of East and West. Gibbon took broadly the same view. Ranke held that all progress is due to the strife of nation with nation and culture with culture. It is difficult to prove this for the Middle Ages, when progress was due quite as much to evolution from within as to foreign influences; but it cannot be doubted that the conflict of East and West makes one of the most important chapters in the history of our period. At its very beginning the opposition of Islam and Christianity is the most striking phenomenon in the Mediterranean. The European provinces of the Roman Empire were on the whole still Christian. The African provinces had accepted Mohammedanism. The battle-grounds between the two religions were Spain (from 710), which was held by the Caliphs of Cordova, and Sicily (from about 840), which was held for the Sultans of Cairo. But the interest shifted to Asia Minor in 1071 with the defeat and capture of

the Eastern Emperor Romanus by the Turks under Alp Arslan.

The Crusading movement, in the sense of a movement for the conquest or for the defence of Jerusalem and the Holy Places, began in 1096 and ended in 1291, with the final evacuation of the Holy Land. But in Spain, on the shores of the Baltic and the banks of the Danube, in the Adriatic and round the coasts of Greece, and along the north coast of Africa, there was almost unceasing warfare against heathendom up to the end of the fifteenth century. Both before and after 1291 the idea of the Holy War was turned to account by statesmen, as in the Portuguese and Spanish Crusades (e.g. Crusade of Lisbon, 1147), and also by adventurers. Of the adventurers some were seeking for new principalities and others for foreign markets; we may note in the first category the activities of the Teutonic Knights and the Knights of the Sword, and in the second the Crusade of Nicopolis (1396) and the Crusade of Friar Capistrano (1456). Yet the Crusading movement was started by a high-minded Pope, Urban II, as a measure, it would seem, for the reformation of the feudal classes. It was proclaimed at the end of a century in which Europe, no longer endangered by foreign enemies, seemed to be relapsing into a state of civil war. The struggles between rival factions in France, Germany, Italy, had been followed by the greatest civil war of all—that between Empire and Papacy. Were not these troubles due in part to the fact that the feudal aristocracies had lost their legitimate occupation, now that the Northmen and the Hungarians and the Saracen invaders of Italy had been repelled? Could not an opportunity be found of employing them in the service of Christianity? This is the natural interpretation of Urban's thought, if we consider what he actually said to the knights who assembled at Clermont (1095) to hear him preach the Crusade. He said that now was the time to turn away from making private war on fellow-Christians to undertake a war against the unbelievers, a war for which the times were ripe. 'Let those who have so long behaved like robbers now become the knights of Christ. Let those who have served as mercenaries for a miserable

Motives of the Crusades

hire, now fight to secure an eternal reward.' Here, he added, you are the enemies of God ; but in the war against the Turks you will be God's friends.

It is true that Urban, in his speech, represented the position of the Greek Empire as desperate. He pointed out that the Turks were established on the shores of the Sea of Marmora and were perpetually encroaching upon the lands of the Greek Christians. He urged them to expel the Turk from the whole of the Greek Empire. In a subsequent proclamation to the Flemings he said that the object was 'the liberation of the Eastern Churches'. Did Urban really think that the situation was especially critical for the Greek Empire in 1095? He may have thought so. But, if he did, he was mistaken. The situation had seemed desperate in 1071, when Jerusalem was captured by the Turks and the main army of the Eastern Empire was destroyed in the battle of Manzikert. In 1073 the Greek Emperor had appealed to Gregory VII and the Pope had issued an appeal to Europe 'that we may come to the help of the Christian empire'. Since then the situation in the Eastern Empire had improved. The Emperor Alexius Comnenos was anxious to obtain volunteers from Europe to strengthen his armies. But the enemies with whom he was immediately concerned were the Patzinaks to the north of the Black Sea. He appealed for volunteers to the Pope at the Council of Piacenza in 1095. But he was intensely surprised and annoyed when the immense hordes of the First Crusade began to arrive at Constantinople, especially after he discovered that their destination was Jerusalem. Perhaps Urban himself was surprised at the response which his appeal had evoked.

Political situation of the Eastern Empire in 1095

Probably in 1095 Urban was not so much alarmed at the situation in the East, as eager for moral reasons to revive the plan of Gregory VII, whom he revered as his master and example. But he may also have been influenced by the complaints which pilgrims, returning from the East, had made of the insults to which they were subjected by the Turks. Although, in his speech at Clermont, he took a statesmanlike view of the situation, and by no means suggested that the

rescue of the Holy Sepulchre was the one thing needful, the Holy Sepulchre became the war-cry of the pilgrims, and the rank and file insisted upon making Jerusalem their first objective.

Many books have been written about the Crusades, and the older books are often better reading than the new. Gibbon has devoted five brilliant chapters of the *Decline and Fall* to them; and the history by Michaud in four volumes, which shows a greater knowledge of the sources, is as easy to read as a novel. But there is no part of medieval history in which it has proved harder to disentangle the truth from pleasing fictions. The history of the First Crusade, and also that of the Fourth, has been drastically revised since 1841. Before that date the critics were led astray by chroniclers whose good-faith is now seriously impugned. Albert of Aix has imported fables into his account of the First Crusade; Villehardouin has done his best to misrepresent the events and the motives which diverted the Fourth Crusade to Constantinople. Albert chose to exaggerate the importance of that obscure and irresponsible adventurer Peter the Hermit. It was Peter, he alleges, who put the idea of a crusade into the head of Urban II, by laying before the Pope an appeal from the Patriarch of Jerusalem. In fact, Peter had never been to Jerusalem, had nothing to do with the Patriarch, and only appeared on the scene after the Council of Clermont, when he did preach the Crusade in France, and did start for the East with an army of poor pilgrims which he led to Constantinople and afterwards to Nicaea.

Sources for the history of the Crusades

Villehardouin does his best to conceal the fact, which is now well established, that the leaders of the Fourth Crusade never intended to go to the Holy Land, but had in view the conquest of the Eastern Empire and perhaps of Egypt. This secret was carefully concealed from the rank and file, and egregious deceit was used to convince them that, unless they placed new rulers on the throne at Constantinople, they had no chance of recovering the Sepulchre. It is very curious to compare the story told by Villehardouin with the facts as given by Dr. Ernest Barker in his *Crusades* (1923). In the narratives of the German Gunther and the Picard Robert of

Clary, we have the story as told by men who were themselves deceived.

The best account of the First Crusade is given in the *Gesta Francorum*, written by one of the followers of the Norman Bohemond of Taranto, the eldest son of Robert Guiscard. This narrative naturally emphasizes the influence of Bohemond. But without Bohemond the Crusade must have been a failure; for it was he who captured Antioch and afterwards held the city against a siege. Without securing Antioch the Crusaders could never have reached Jerusalem. On the other hand, the course of events shows that Bohemond regarded the Crusade as a war of conquest and colonization. He would not proceed to Jerusalem, but remained behind in possession of Antioch, which he claimed as his share of the spoil. His behaviour was the more indefensible because he, like the rest of the leaders, had taken a solemn oath at Constantinople that he would not appropriate any territory of the Greek Empire. He justified himself by alleging that Alexius had failed to give to the Crusaders that measure of support to which they were entitled. Some modern critics (e.g. Palgrave) represent Bohemond as the moving spirit among the leaders and their evil genius; the supposition being that Bohemond used the First Crusade as an excuse for reviving his father's plans for the dismemberment of the Eastern Empire.

The First Crusade

Italian legends gave the chief honour to another Norman, Tancred, a cousin of Bohemond, who took the lead in the assault upon Jerusalem. (Note the importance of Tancred in the Italian epic of Torquato Tasso, the *Gerusalemme Liberata*.) But Albert of Aix and the other writers who had special interest in the crusaders of the Low Countries, conspired to exalt Godfrey of Bouillon, the first King of Jerusalem. Godfrey, however, only came into prominence owing to the withdrawal of other and more remarkable leaders.

The most tangible results of the First Crusade were several Frankish principalities—Edessa (overthrown in 1144), Antioch (which became dependent on Jerusalem in 1130), Tripolis (founded by Count Raymond of Toulouse, 1102–5), and Jerusalem. The great problem, after the capture of Jeru-

salem, was to create a standing army which would be strong enough to defend these states. The great body of the Crusaders came back to Europe. The work of defence then devolved upon the barons of the Latin states and upon the Military Orders of the Templars, Hospitallers and Teutonic Knights. Large bodies of pilgrims came to Palestine, even in years when no Crusade was preached; and some of these pilgrims took a share in the fighting. But they were not very useful as soldiers, being totally ignorant of the conditions of warfare in Palestine. Without the Military Orders the Latin kingdom would have been in a poor state indeed.

The Second Crusade

The Second Crusade was better organized than the First, thanks to the part taken in it by Louis VII of France and the Emperor Conrad III. It was launched for a perfectly definite purpose—that of averting the danger to which the Frankish principalities were exposed by the aggressions of the Mohammedan rulers of Mosul. The immediate cause of the Crusade was the fall of the Latin principality of Edessa which guarded the mainland route from Mesopotamia to North Syria. The forces of the Franks were unequal to this task, although they employed large numbers of mercenary soldiers (some Mohammedans) whom they recruited on the spot, and although they had as their ally the Emir of Damascus. For the Crusade was hampered by the presence in the army of a large number of untrained and ill-armed pilgrims, who came forward owing to the sermons preached by St. Bernard. It was impossible to pay for ships to transport so great a multitude, and the Crusade marched by land, as that of 1096 had done, although it was now recognized that much waste of life and energy could be prevented by shipping the armies direct to Syria. The best troops were decimated and exhausted before the march through Asia Minor was completed. In Syria the operations were impeded by quarrels between the French and German Crusaders; and the plan of campaign was badly conceived. Edessa was not restored. Mosul was not attacked. Instead the Crusaders were induced by the Frankish princes to attack Damascus, though Damascus was hostile to Mosul, and the campaign against Damascus was an ignominious failure.

Conrad and Louis finally broke off the Crusade and went home in disgust. There were no solid results to show; and from this time the fortunes of the Kingdom of Jerusalem steadily declined.

One reason for this was the faulty organization of the Franks. The greater part of the conquered territories was held by sixteen tenants-in-chief, and each of these exercised all but sovereign power over his own fief. The Kingdom of Jerusalem was exceedingly poor, for taxation fell almost entirely upon the tillers of the soil, the clergy, the barons and the Italian merchants who had settled in the towns being all exempt. The quarrels and rivalries of the ruling families were another cause of weakness. But the downfall of the Kingdom was hastened by the appearance in Egypt of the great soldier-Sultan Saladin, who took the throne of Egypt in 1171. His family came from Mosul, and it was his ambition to supplant Mosul and to make his own sultanate the greatest Mohammedan power in the Levant. In the course of the years 1174–83 Saladin subdued all the weak Arab states which lay east and south of Palestine, and he also made himself master of the Arab Holy Places, thus acquiring the right to be considered the leader of the Holy War. During this period the Franks unwisely stood upon the defensive, leaving Saladin to choose his own moment for attack. When at last he struck, in 1187, he soon annihilated the Latin army in the battle of Hattin (west of Lake Tiberias), and Jerusalem capitulated. This left Tripoli and Antioch as the principal strongholds of Christianity.

The Third Crusade

The Third Crusade was proclaimed by the Pope in 1188 for the purpose of recovering Jerusalem, and all Christendom was tithed for the expenses of the venture. The cross was taken by Henry II of England and his successor Richard I; by the Emperor Frederic I; by Philip Augustus of France. King William of Sicily supplied a fleet to defend the Syrian coast-towns. Three of these kings actually set out; and though Frederic was drowned on the march through Cilicia, his German crusaders appeared in some force alongside the French and the English at the siege of Acre.

In this Crusade sea-power was properly employed for the first time, that is by the French and the English, both for the transport of the troops and for the carriage of supplies. Richard I captured the island of Cyprus on his way to Syria, and gave it to Guy of Lusignan, under whose family Cyprus became the main base for Crusaders in the Levant for the next two hundred years. But the Crusading armies were not strong enough to recover Jerusalem and the interior of Palestine. They staked everything on the recovery of Acre and other coast towns, hoping that Saladin would be intimidated by these successes and would give up Jerusalem to secure a peace. But Saladin was fully aware of the weakness of the Crusading force, and under the truce of 1192 he kept Jerusalem, only promising that pilgrims should have access to the Holy Sepulchre. It was left for the Emperor Frederic II to recover Jerusalem, Nazareth, and Bethany. These he obtained under a treaty, as the price of withdrawing the army of Crusaders which he had taken to Syria in 1228. Jerusalem was lost again in 1244; after which it was never again recovered by the Christians. The last Christian strongholds in Palestine were lost in 1291. In the thirteenth century it was generally recognized that the best chance of restoring the Frankish power was to attack Egypt and to oblige the Sultan to sign a treaty ceding Syria and Palestine. This plan was tried by the leaders of the Fifth Crusade (1217) and by St. Louis (1250). In each case the unfortified seaport of Damietta was taken without difficulty, and in each the attempt to march inland from Damietta was ignominiously defeated.

The Fourth Crusade

The Fourth Crusade was originally planned by Innocent III as early as 1198. He was the last great Pope who was strongly attached to the Crusading ideal; he set two Crusades on foot and he was arranging a third at the end of his life; he did not live to see it, but it set sail in 1217. It is surprising that he was not disillusioned by the results of his previous efforts. In both cases he was egregiously deceived by the laymen whom he recognized as leaders. The Fourth Crusade ended in the destruction of the Greek Empire; the later Crusade against the Albigenses

handed over a large part of the south of France to military usurpers. Innocent protested, but his protests were disregarded.

The Fourth Crusade, which was recruited chiefly in France and Flanders, was originally under the command of the Count of Flanders and the Count of Champagne. But the second of these leaders died before the expedition started. His place was taken by Boniface, Marquis of Montferrat, who was hand-in-glove with the head of the Hohenstauffen family, Philip of Suabia, who was a claimant for the Empire in 1198–1208. Philip's main object was to secure for himself the Holy Roman Empire. He desired to obtain the support of the Greek Empire, and he proposed to obtain it by restoring to the throne the Emperor Isaac Angelos who had been deposed in 1195, and whose daughter was married to Philip. The Venetians, who supplied the ships for the Crusade, were brought into the scheme in the winter of 1202–3, and the army was informed that the help of Isaac Angelos, who would furnish troops for the reconquest of the Holy Land, was indispensable to their enterprise. They agreed very unwillingly to go to Constantinople ; and the Pope made an energetic protest.

The expedition was completely successful in overthrowing the usurper. But unexpected developments followed. The young Alexius Angelos was unable or unwilling to control the city mob who resented the intervention of the Crusaders ; in 1204 he was assassinated by a namesake and a rival, Alexius Ducas, the leader of a nationalist party. The leaders of the Crusade then decided (in 1204) to get rid of the Angeli ; and, having done so, proceeded to partition the Empire. The Venetians obtained an important share of the spoil, and founded a maritime Empire in the islands and on the coasts of the Aegean which survived until the coming of the Turks. Baldwin of Flanders took Constantinople and the surrounding territories ; Boniface took Thessalonica, which became the capital of a dependent kingdom. Other leaders obtained settlements in the Greek peninsula ; a Duchy of Athens and a Principality of Achaea were established. Some of these principalities survived till

Partition of the Greek Empire

the fifteenth century, as did the Venetian sea-empire to an even later date.

This partition destroyed the Greek Empire, but not the Greek race or the Greek Church. The nobles of the Empire and also the orthodox clergy worked hard to organize a reaction, and three Greek states were founded in lands which lay beyond the reach of the Franks. These were :

(1) Epirus, ruled by despots of the house of the Angeli. This state disputed the supremacy of the Balkans with the Bulgarians, but came to an end in 1318 with the assassination of its last ruler.

(2) Trebizond, the territory between the river Halys and the Caucasus, long cut off from Constantinople by the Sultanate of Iconium, but a great mart for Asiatic trade. Here the family of the Comneni established themselves and assumed the Imperial title. Their Empire lasted until 1461, but in the later stages of its existence it paid tribute to the Turks.

(3) Nicaea. Here a third Empire was established which became the leader of the nationalist party at Constantinople and of the Greek inhabitants of North Anatolia. Michael Palaeologos, the fourth Emperor of Nicaea, recovered Constantinople in 1261 with the help of the Genoese fleet. This was really an episode in the long maritime rivalry of Genoa and Venice. It should be noted that the claim to the Latin Empire was passed on by the House of Flanders to the French House of Anjou, through the marriage of Philip son of Baldwin II (d. 1272) to Beatrice, daughter of Charles of Anjou. In 1281 Charles planned to attack Constantinople, but was stopped by a massacre of the French in Sicily known as the Sicilian Vespers.

CHAPTER VIII

THE HOHENSTAUFFEN AND THE PAPACY, 1138–1197

CARDINAL EVENTS

1138 Election of Conrad III, the first Hohenstauffen Emperor.
1152 Election of Frederic I (Barbarossa).
1158 Diet of Roncaglia.
1159 Alexander III elected Pope.
1176 Battle of Legnano.
1181 Submission of Henry the Lion.
1183 Treaty of Constance.
1197 Death of Henry VI.

THE military and diplomatic conflicts of the Papacy and Empire in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries are exceedingly complicated. They have a dramatic interest because they become a series of duels between rulers who are masterful and ambitious, and who are not fighting for personal advantage, but for the honour and safety of the great institutions which they represent. It is impossible to refrain from admiring the cool tenacity of Popes like Alexander III, Innocent III and Innocent IV; while Frederic Barbarossa and Frederic II, the two greatest of the Hohenstauffen family of Emperors, are undoubtedly two of the wisest statesmen of the Middle Ages, who, if they had succeeded, might well have saved Italy from a large part of the misfortunes of its later period. The cause of the Hohenstauffen failure was that their policy, however moderately it was pursued, was bound to clash with the legal rights and (still more important) the political aspirations of the Papacy.

Innocent III held that the Papacy could not be free unless supreme in South and Central Italy. Such aspirations were not approved by the whole of Europe; but the Popes had resources and supporters which made them practically invincible. The issue of the conflict might have been different if the two Frederics had convinced their brother-rulers in Europe that the interests of all secular rulers would be imperilled by the success of the Papacy. But the rulers of France and Spain and England were not convinced. The struggle was, on the face of it, a struggle for temporal dominion in Italy. They did not desire to see the Emperor more powerful there; already he seemed great enough to menace the welfare of other European powers. A papal monarchy in the Italian peninsula would not be formidable. In the event the Papacy ruined the Empire, but did not unite Italy; on the contrary it left Italy more disunited than she had been at any time since 961.

Political Theories of Empire and Papacy [1]

The Empire was defended by the doctors of Civil Law on the assumption that the Hohenstauffen were the lawful heirs of Augustus, Constantine and Justinian, entitled to every prerogative which was claimed for the Emperor in the Code of Justinian. Their inclination was towards a doctrine that the Emperor is for most purposes head of the Church as well as the State—not qualified, of course, to interfere with questions of faith and morals, but still competent to exercise authority over the highest ecclesiastical persons for many purposes. The arguments drawn from legal texts were reinforced in and after the thirteenth century by others drawn from the *Politics* of Aristotle—a work which was then studied in the Universities. The cream of the philosophical case for the Empire is given in the *De Monarchia* of

Ghibelline Doctrines [2]

[1] For the literature of the subject see Gierke, *Political Theories of the Middle Age*, ed. by Maitland. Two medieval works of great importance are the *Polycraticus* of John of Salisbury and *De Regimine Principum* of St. Thomas Aquinas.

[2] The names of Ghibelline and Guelf, which were given to the imperialist and papalist doctrines respectively, originated in Germany, being derived from Weiblingen, a castle of the Hohenstauffen, and Welf, the family name of their greatest German opponent, Henry the Lion.

Dante (1265–1321). His main points may be summarized thus:

(1) It is the divine ordinance that the whole human race should endeavour to realize one single aim or purpose.

(2) When a number of persons have to work together for a single purpose they must be directed or ruled by a single will. That is, mankind should be ruled by one individual, in fact an Emperor. This is the celebrated Principle of Unity accepted as a commonplace by all the schoolmen, the one dispute being whether it was the Pope or the Emperor who was ordained to fulfil the duty of ruling the human species.

(3) The Emperor's will is or should be to secure harmony and concord between all members of the human race; to enforce a universal peace which is indispensable if humanity is to fulfil the end for which humanity exists.

(4) But the human race is distributed in a number of separate kingdoms. Dante assumes that the existence of these kingdoms is justified; and that kings ought to keep the authority which they exercise at present, but to exercise that authority as subordinates of the Emperor.

(5) The authority of the Emperor over subordinate rulers is that of a judge or umpire who composes disputes, thus preventing the outbreak of war between one state and another. His court is, as we should say, an international tribunal. Unless the Emperor has this kind of jurisdiction, he is not truly supreme, and the Empire cannot be one united whole.

(6) But the Emperor is not to intervene in everything, 'in every petty decision of each municipality'. Every nation, kingdom and city must have its own system of laws, 'but in those things that are common to all the human race should be ruled and guided by him'. That is, the Emperor enforces those broad

principles of justice which are eternally and everywhere the same.

(7) In the third book of the *De Monarchia* Dante marshals his arguments to prove that the Emperor holds his office from God and not from the Pope. Some of his arguments are based on scriptural texts, others on the history of the old Roman Empire. We need not dwell on these, although they are instructive as examples of rather perverse ingenuity. The grand historical argument is that the Roman Empire came into existence before the Christian Church, and that the Emperor's authority is recognized in several sayings of our Lord, e.g. 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's', and 'My kingdom is not of this world'. The philosophical argument with which he concludes is not at first sight easy to reconcile with the Principle of Unity. Providence, he says, has set two ends before mankind—(*a*) the blessedness of this life which consists in the free exercise of our human faculties, and (*b*) the blessedness of eternal life which consists in contemplation of God's being. So far as the first end is concerned, men ought to be directed by the Emperor; but as concerns the second, by the Pope. The Emperor is supreme in the world of action; the Pope in the world of inner life. It appears from an earlier chapter that he meets the difficulty of reconciling this doctrine with the Principle of Unity by saying that Pope and Emperor are both subject to God. In the mind of God the two aims or ends are harmonized and united.

To these contentions were opposed the Guelf doctrines of those who supported the Papacy.

The Guelf Doctrines

(1) These start from the assumption that kingship and the Empire itself are a consequence of the Fall of Man. Kings and magistrates were not needed until sin came into the world. The temporal power is ordained by God as a corrective

and a scourge of sin. In the state of innocence men lived together as one family or a group of families united by mutual good-will.

(2) Though both the Empire and the Church are of divine origin, the Church is rightfully supreme over the State, because the Church guides man towards the highest end of his existence.

(3) By ecclesiastical writers the Church is constantly represented as standing to the State in the relation of soul to body, that is of ruler to subject. The practical deduction from this analogy was that the Emperor ought to govern in accordance with the dictates of the Pope. But this was an extreme position, which could hardly be taken up by those who held the old doctrine of the two swords, according to which the Emperor had his own independent sphere of authority.

(4) Other Papal writers claim that the Emperor holds the Empire as a *beneficium* from the Pope; that consequently the Pope may depose an Emperor, or even take away the Empire from the German nation. These claims were hotly denied by the Imperialists, who maintained that the Emperor's coronation oath bound him to defend the Roman Church, but not to be its vassal. They admitted that in dignity the Pope took precedence of the Emperor; but still, they said, within his proper sphere as the guardian of men's temporal interests, the Emperor was responsible to God alone.

The Italian Combatants, 1158–97

The first line of the Papal defences was Lombardy. From 1158 to 1176 the free cities of the Lombard Plain, headed by Milan, barred the way to Rome. This they did not wholly or mainly as loyal sons of the Church or as Italian patriots. The Lombard cities had begun to shake off the control of the Emperor during the War of Investitures. They had become self-governing republics under charters of privilege. But in many cases they had usurped privileges and powers (of justice, taxation, etc.) which no Emperor had granted them.

Their feud with the Empire dated from the Diet of Roncaglia, 1158, when Frederic I announced his determination to revindicate all the rights which legally belonged to him in Italy. For the purpose of resisting the Emperor most of these cities combined, under the leadership of Milan, in a Lombard League. It collapsed in 1162 when Milan was captured by the Emperor and razed to the ground. It was, however, revived in 1167, with the help of the Republic of Venice, at a moment when Frederic had become master of Rome, when the Pope had fled into exile and when Italy seemed to be at the mercy of the Germans. The reappearance of the League completely changed the situation and Frederic fled back to Germany, fearing that his communications would be cut. He renewed the war against the Lombards in 1174, but was ill supported by the German nobility (to whom Henry the Lion set a bad example), and therefore found himself outnumbered. The turning-point of this second war was the heroic and successful defence of Alessandria, the capital of the Lombard League (1174–5), named after Alexander III, which had been built after the Emperor's flight from Italy. The war was practically ended by the defeat of the Emperor in the pitched battle of Legnano (1176). By that time Frederic despaired of obtaining reinforcements from Germany, and he opened peace negotiations with the Pope.

The Lombard League of 1167 was much more solid and formidable than the earlier league destroyed in 1162. In 1167 the cities bound themselves to act together in defence of their liberties for the next fifty years, thus giving their league something like a permanent character. They agreed to make no peace until all the cities were unanimously in favour of doing so. They set up in 1168 a central Council or Congress which made ordinances that were binding on all the members. Thus the Lombard League became a sort of Federation. Its importance was very much increased when it entered into close alliance with the League of Verona, a smaller federation of cities lying east of the Lombard Plain. In 1176 these cities of the North seemed to have the future of Italy in their hands. Unfortu-

The Lombard League

nately for themselves their League only remained a true federation while there was immediate danger of an Imperial tyranny. Perhaps it was fortunate for Italy that the League did not become supreme in the North. For these free cities ruled tyrannously over the territories which they annexed, oppressing both the peasants and the feudal classes. One reason why the Hohenstauffen Emperors nearly succeeded in conquering Italy was that they had the support of a large part of the Italian population, especially of the feudal landowners, who looked to the Emperor as the defender of peace and justice. Finally the stronger Italian cities showed no respect for the liberties of other cities weaker than themselves. The triumph of the Lombard League would have led to the extinction of all but a few of the greatest city republics.

Frederic Barbarossa and Alexander II

Frederic Barbarossa found the Pope and the Roman Cardinals more elusive enemies than the Lombard towns. Their persons were sacrosanct and he would not have been any better off if he had captured them all. All that he really asked of Rome at the beginning of the struggle (1157) was that Pope Adrian IV would not intrigue with the Lombard cities or with the hostile Norman King of Sicily and Naples. He became desperate when, after the death of Adrian, the Cardinals elected Alexander III (1159–81), who while yet a Cardinal had affirmed that the Emperor was the vassal of the Pope. Convinced that a friendly Pope would never be elected by the lawful electors, Frederic resorted to the device of Henry IV. From 1160 to 1176 he maintained an anti-Pope, illegitimately elected by the bishops of the Imperialist party; and twice during that period Alexander III was driven into exile; he lived in France from 1162 to 1165; and in South Italy from 1167 to 1170, in the Campania from 1170 to 1178. But the national states of Europe remained faithful to Alexander in his wanderings, and Frederic knew that, if Alexander died, another Pope equally hostile would take his place. The Italian ambitions of the Emperor could not be realized unless the moral influence of the legitimate Pope was first destroyed. The Peace of Anagni (1176) relieved the Emperor from this false situation. He had to pay

heavily for it. He renounced his anti-Pope. He undertook to make with the Lombards a peace which the Pope could approve and would confirm. He was obliged to renounce his claim to regalian rights in the Patrimony.

Frederic had learned his lesson, and made up his mind to live at peace with the Pope for the future. He obtained from the Lombard towns better terms than he could have expected; for the towns were weary of fighting. He had to concede to them the right of electing their own magistrates; but he kept the right of vetoing any election to which he objected. He renounced the large and indefinite claims which he had made in 1158. But he was recognized by the towns as their lawful sovereign, to whom allegiance had to be sworn by each individual citizen. He kept his feudal rights over all fiefs of the Empire. He also kept the right of hearing appeals from the municipal law courts, and of receiving the tax called *fodrum* whenever he came to Italy. These rights were secured to him by the Treaty of Constance (1183). They were not very valuable. But the Lombard League fell to bits as soon as the treaty was signed. There was no longer any organized opposition to the Imperial power in Northern Italy. Frederic no doubt hoped to achieve by degrees all that he had intended in 1158.

Treaty of Constance, 1183

Both in Germany and Italy the position of Frederic was strong at the end of his reign. In 1181 he settled old scores with the leader of the German opposition, Henry the Lion, Duke of Bavaria and Saxony. The Duke was deprived of these great fiefs and both of them were subdivided, so that in future the Crown might not be troubled with vassals who were in effect tribal kings. Henry the Lion survived till 1194. He hoped to recover his old position with the help of the House of Anjou; for he had married a daughter of Henry II; and he raised rebellions in the years 1186–94. His party was held together after his death by his son Otto of Brunswick, who obtained the Empire in 1199 and held it until 1211.

The history of Henry the Lion shows that the German aristocracy were tired of Italy and that the German opposition was disposed to side with the Pope against an Emperor who devoted himself to Italy. The opposition did not desire

to destroy the Empire. But they did expect the Emperor to come to terms with the Pope and to rule in Germany rather than in Italy. Frederic Barbarossa did not read the signs of the times. He devoted himself to a new plan of extending his influence in Italy. In 1186 he married his son and heir Henry to Constance, the heiress of William II of Sicily. Pope Urban III treated this marriage as a *casus belli* because William of Sicily was his vassal and his leave had not been asked. His real fear was that the Papal States would be enveloped and strangled by Imperial Italy when the Kingdom of Sicily passed to the Hohenstauffen. The war was suspended by mutual consent when the news reached Italy that Jerusalem had been captured by Saladin. The Emperor departed with a German army to the East, where he died (1190).

Policy of Frederic Barbarossa

His conduct in abandoning his own interests to serve those of the Cross might have secured a lasting peace, if Henry VI had not proceeded, immediately after being crowned as Emperor at Rome (April, 1191), to claim his wife's inheritance. For the next seventy years the future of the Kingdom of Sicily and Naples is the burning question of European politics. It was not until 1194 that he achieved his object. For up to that year he was opposed by Tancred (d. 1194), a rival who had the support of a large party in the Regno,[1] and the good-will of Richard Cœur de Lion, the Welfs, and the Pope. The German domination in Sicily was much resented. But in 1197 Henry VI crushed a rebellion with appalling brutality. He proceeded to establish in the Regno and in Imperial Italy a new aristocracy composed of his most faithful German supporters. Thus he gave Tuscany to his brother Philip of Suabia, Spoleto to Conrad of Urslingen, Ravenna and the Romagna to Markward of Anweiler. He seemed to intend that the Pope should be surrounded by a ring of German feudatories. If Henry had lived longer he must sooner or later have been involved in a death-struggle with the Papacy, so provocative were his

Sicily and Naples

[1] That is 'the kingdom': the name was given to the kingdom of Naples and Sicily to distinguish it from the republics and duchies of Central and Northern Italy.

measures. Rightly or wrongly he was credited with boundless plans of conquest in Africa, where Roger the Great had made considerable annexations; in the East (the Kingdom of Jerusalem) and on the shores of the Bosporus. But he died bequeathing his conquests and his plans to his infant son Frederic II.

Why was the Regno so tempting to the rulers of Germany? The mainland provinces were neither populous nor wealthy. Sicily, however, was rich and fertile, producing corn, flax and timber, sulphur and salt, paper and cotton. The tunny fisheries were famous; so too, the manufactures of silk and cloth, which were royal monopolies. An Arab traveller states that Palermo about this period was the largest and most beautiful of the capital cities of the world. Her beauty was probably due to the magnificence of her churches and of the royal palace. She was wealthy because a centre of international trade. Sicily was no doubt a lucrative prize for any conqueror. But it is probable that Henry VI also appreciated the value of holding such a magnificent naval base at the meeting-point of the East and West Mediterranean. Since the twelfth century the Norman kings of Sicily had a powerful navy, which was used in 1149 and again in 1185 for operations against the Greek Empire in the Aegean and in the Bosporus. The navy of Sicily joined to the military forces of Germany and Imperial Italy might well seem irresistible.

Sicilian Civilization

Sicilian civilization fascinated Northerners of this period. Yet it was rather exotic and hybrid. Norman, Byzantine and Arab styles contended for mastery in the architecture of the Regno. A large part of the population of Sicily was of African descent, professed Mohammedanism and was allowed to live according to the law of the Koran. In Apulia and Calabria there were many Greek settlers and the Orthodox Church was tolerated, although the Latin Church was everywhere established. Roger I of Sicily forbade any attempt to convert his Mohammedan subjects, and they were allowed their own mosques even in Palermo. Learning and the sciences were cultivated at the Norman court, but chiefly by foreigners. Roger II patronized

the Arab geographer Edrisi, who made for him a silver sphere engraved with a map of the inhabited world (of this there is a copy in the Bodleian Codex of the *Geographia Nubiensis*). One of Roger's officials, the Emir Eugenius, translated into Latin the *Optics* of Ptolemy. Yet there was a cultivated class of Italians in the Regno who resented the rule of foreigners and were unaffected by the cosmopolitan culture of the Court. There are two historians of the Regno who represent this class. One is Fulco of Beneventum, who wrote the history of the years 1102–40 as a bitter opponent of Roger the Great. The other is Hugo Falcandus (highly praised by Gibbon), who wrote the history of the years 1154–69. He finished his work after the marriage of Constance to Henry VI. He loathed the German barbarians and looked back to the reign of Roger the Great as a golden age. He has been called the 'Sicilian Tacitus'.

As we shall not return to the Regno, we may note here that it was the real basis on which the power of Frederic II was founded. From it he drew the greater part of his revenue, a large part of his army (which was recruited by the feudal quotas of his Sicilian tenants-in-chief), and the whole of his navy. Though he neglected the government of Germany, he attended solicitously to that of Sicily and Naples. His Constitutions of Melfi (1231) codified the law of the Regno. In 1232 he began the practice of summoning assemblies representative of the towns and cities. But although he was an innovator, he built upon the foundations laid by his Norman predecessors. He kept, for instance, their system of taxation and their organization of the courts of justice. His Sicilian policy may have been selfish, but it made the Regno prosperous. The Sicilians were loyal to him throughout his career and they bitterly resented the destruction of his family by Charles of Anjou.

CHAPTER IX

THE PAPACY AND FREDERIC II, 1197–1250

CARDINAL EVENTS

1198	Election of Philip of Suabia and Otto IV.
1208	Murder of Philip.
1211	Deposition of Otto and election of Frederic.
1213	Innocent III triumphs over Philip Augustus and John of England. Battle of Muret.
1215	Lateran Council.
1228	Sixth Crusade.
1245	Council of Lyons.
1250	Death of Frederic II.
1268	Death of Conradin.

THE greatness of the Hohenstauffen, though not the family itself, ended with the Emperor Frederic II. During the years 1198–1211 Frederic was the ward of Innocent III, to whose charge he was bequeathed by his mother, Constance (d. 1198). The Pope did not intend that Frederic should succeed to the Empire; he held that, as a minor, he was ineligible, and also that it was inexpedient to allow the union of the Regno with the Empire. But he was a loyal protector of the Regno, which he governed ably and in a disinterested spirit.

Frederic II as Innocent's Ward

In Germany the Ghibelline princes chose Philip of Suabia, brother of Henry VI, as Emperor. The Guelfs chose Otto of Brunswick, son of Henry the Lion. Both elections took place in 1198 and a civil war broke out between the rival factions. They were at first evenly balanced; in 1201 Innocent declared for Otto IV on the

Struggle for the Empire

ground that the Hohenstauffen had always been enemies of the Church and that Philip himself was an excommunicate. In return for his support Innocent obtained from Otto the Concordat of Neuss, which recognized the Pope as overlord of the Regno and the rightful heir of the Mathildine inheritance (then held by Philip of Suabia).[1] The Pope then informed the German princes that those who opposed the claims of Otto IV would be excommunicated. But his claim to be the arbiter in a disputed election was almost unprecedented. The claim had only been asserted before by Gregory VII, and though Gregory's cause triumphed after his death, the pretenders whom he set up had perished miserably. The Guelfs and Ghibellines proceeded to fight out their quarrel. Fortune, however, favoured Innocent. In 1208 Philip of Suabia was murdered by a personal enemy when his cause appeared to be triumphant; and the German princes, weary of civil war, accepted Otto IV. But Otto, as soon as he felt that he had at his back a united Germany, repented of his bargain with the Pope, and showed his intention to seize the whole of Imperial Italy, without regard to the Pope's claims, and to expel Frederic II from Sicily and Naples. In 1210 he was excommunicated by Innocent, and in 1211 the German princes were persuaded to depose Otto and to elect Frederic. Thus the Hohenstauffen were reinstated in the Empire at the instance of Rome.

Frederic, like Otto IV, had to pay dearly for recognition. He promised to make over Sicily and Naples to his infant son, and recognized the claims of the Pope to Ravenna and the Mark of Ancona. These arrangements were observed so long as Innocent lived—partly, no doubt, because Frederic was obliged to fight for his position in Germany. He consolidated this at the Battle of Bouvines, 1214, but he was not really secure till Otto IV died (1218) two years after the death of Innocent III.

From 1198 to 1216 Innocent was the dominating figure in European politics. He encountered and got the better of three other sovereigns besides Otto IV. He obliged

[1] That is to the possessions of the Countess Matilda of Tuscany. (See above p. 37). (*Editor.*)

Philip Augustus to give way about the divorce of Ingeborg of Denmark after a struggle which lasted twenty-five years. He obliged John to give way about the appointment of Stephen Langton to the see of Canterbury. Both these victories were achieved in the year 1213, which is also the year of the defeat of Peter of Aragon, in the battle of Muret. Decidedly 1213 was for the Papacy *annus mirabilis*.

Zenith of Innocent's Power

Innocent's most cherished ambition was to launch a successful Crusade. He promoted the Fourth Crusade (1202–4), but was grossly deceived by Boniface of Montferrat and the friends of the Hohenstauffen. He promoted the Albigensian Crusade (1204), which was essentially a North-French enterprise ; and here again he was outwitted by the leaders who made the Crusade an excuse for conquering the Midi and dividing its spoils. Naturally dissatisfied with these results, though, as we have said, not fundamentally disillusioned, he made it the first business of his Lateran Council of 1215 to do something for the Holy Land. He proclaimed a new Crusade and promised that he would himself go to Brindisi or Messina to bless the Crusades on their departure. He intended that the new Holy War should be continued for three years. He required that one-twentieth of the ecclesiastical revenues of the Western Church should be devoted to the expenses of the Crusade. Innocent died immediately after the Council (July, 1216). But his efforts were not entirely wasted. Andrew, King of Hungary, and Frederic II took the cross ; and both in the end discharged their obligations. In 1217 Andrew led the Fifth Crusade to Egypt and captured Damietta, a place of such importance that the Sultan actually offered to exchange it for Jerusalem. Unhappily the Crusaders refused the offer, hoping to conquer Egypt, and were obliged in 1221 to capitulate and sue for terms of peace. In 1228 Frederic led the Sixth Crusade to Palestine. The force which he commanded was so considerable that Malek el Kamel of Cairo thought it best to negotiate, and purchased a ten years' truce by surrendering Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Nazareth. Frederic assumed the Crown of Jerusalem after the truce had been signed. He

was censured at Rome for having left his work unfinished; but the truce was respected by the Sultan until the Papalist party at Jerusalem gratuitously and foolishly infringed it. The result of their bad faith was that Jerusalem passed in 1244 into the hands of the Kharismian Turks. That event marks, to all intents and purposes, the end of the Crusading era. The expeditions of Louis IX to Damietta (1249) and Palestine (1250–4) were hopeless enterprises, as was also that of Edward of England to Acre (1271–2). It is arguable that the crusading policy of Innocent III was wrecked by the folly of his successors who spoiled the work of Frederic II. But even Frederic in the moment of victory could not re-establish the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. That kingdom and the principalities which depended on it had perished forty years before the Sixth Crusade.

Characteristics of the Thirteenth Century

The thirteenth century is the Augustan age of medieval civilization. In politics it is memorable for the work of several great national statesmen—Philip II and Louis IX of France, James of Aragon and Alphonso the Wise of Castile, Edward I of England. It was the golden age of the free cities of Italy and the Netherlands. It was an age of acute intellectual activity—witness the theologians Aquinas and Bonaventura; the great Italian mathematicians, such as Leonard of Pisa, and the scientists of different nationalities whose results are epitomized in Roger Bacon's writings; and the historical writers Villehardouin, Joinville, Matthew Paris, who are only the outstanding figures among a crowd of historians. It was a period in which medieval architecture, painting, sculpture, reached their maturity. It was also an age in which the Church, under the inspiration of St. Francis and St. Dominic, set itself more seriously than ever before to the two-fold task of helping poverty and correcting ignorance. But the great political conflict of the century is that between Papacy and Empire, between the ablest and most ambitious of the medieval Emperors on the one side, and a series of able and determined Popes on the other.

Frederic II much resembled his father, though he was undersized and wore no beard. Like his father he was

physically strong, an accomplished horseman and hunter and an expert swimmer. But his education was that of an Italian of the South. Ruling over a polyglot Empire, he of course knew German and Italian and French and Latin; as King of Sicily he found it necessary to know some Arabic and some Greek. He was an accomplished writer; he composed not only some of his more important political letters and manifestoes, but also a treatise on Falconry, which shows that he had a huntsman's eye for all the habits of wild creatures. He delighted in the study of science (including astrology) and of mathematics, particularly geometry. He was interested also in philosophy, caused some of the works of Aristotle to be translated for him, and discussed with philosophers the question of the immortality of the soul (see his *Sicilian Questions*). Owing to his love of philosophy he earned the reputation of a sceptic, and tradition (probably false) credits him with the saying that the world had been led astray by three impostors—Moses, Jesus and Mohammed. He was a close student of the art of war and applied his scientific knowledge to the improvement of the engines used in siege warfare. But it was to statecraft that he gave his most serious thought, and especially to the administration of the Regno. He seized upon the leading ideas of his Norman predecessors and developed them most skilfully, till he made the structure of the Sicilian administration a model to other states. But it must be admitted that this centralized system of bureaucracy pressed heavily upon his subjects; we hear many loud complaints about the spies and informers whom he employed and the arbitrary persecution of all who were suspected of disloyalty. On the whole his Sicilian subjects were surprisingly loyal to him through his long feud with the Papacy. Perhaps they were cowed by his severity; but many of them were loyal to his heirs when he himself had passed from the scene. Good government was rare in the Middle Ages, and those rulers who kept order with a high hand were admired and even loved by their subjects in spite of occasional acts of tyranny.

Frederic II

Frederic made a strong and often a favourable impression on those with whom he came in contact. He was cheerful

and accessible and a good talker. At the same time he was rather reserved about his larger ideas and projects. He never really explained his ideal of the Empire, which Ghibelline theorists had to infer from his actions. He was a warm-hearted man, and towards the end of his life was embittered by the treachery of those whom he had accounted his best friends. He was also proud of the imperial dignity and thought of himself as lifted high above the ruck of men. But he could control his pride and he showed great patience when there was anything to be gained by patience, e.g. in his later dealings with the Roman Curia. He could resent injuries passionately, and against those who betrayed his trust he sometimes showed an inhuman desire for revenge. But he was sincerely anxious to promote the welfare of his subjects.

Policy of Frederic II

Though some sides of his policy are exceedingly modern in spirit (e.g. his Sicilian administration), yet his political theories were medieval. He thought the Papacy an indispensable institution. He thought that the Church ought to be free and independent in matters of faith and morals. Therefore he helped the Church to root out heresy in his dominions. But he insisted that the Church had no right to interfere in secular politics, or to encroach on the traditional prerogatives of the Empire. Whatever may have been his private views about religion, he never attacked the theory of the Papal monarchy in his manifestoes, but only denounced the actions of particular Popes who, in his view, had exceeded their lawful powers. His great desire was that a *modus vivendi* between Papacy and Empire should be arranged. It was his Italian policy which made such a working arrangement impossible. He was badly mistaken if he really supposed that he would be allowed, on any terms, to consolidate under his own rule the whole of Italy outside the Papal States.

His fixed idea, one may even call it his fixed delusion, was that the imperial power could be and should be based on Italy rather than on Germany. One reason for this belief was that Sicily was more patient of taxation than the Germans. Another was that Frederic by his birth and upbringing was

a child of the South, who never felt at home in Germany. But the loyal support of Germany was essential to the success of his plans. He could never dispense with German armies. Yet he sorely tried the loyalty of the Germans by his long absences from Germany and his neglect of German affairs. He endeavoured to maintain his influence in Germany by almost unlimited concessions to the Princes, lay and ecclesiastical. In 1220 he abandoned most of the imperial rights over the lands of the ecclesiastical princes. In 1232 he made large concessions to the secular princes—the right to coin money; control of imperial justice in local courts; control over the knights of the Empire living within their territories; a promise that he would grant no charters of privilege to cities within their territory.

It may be that the chief defect of Frederic as a statesman was that he had not the faculty of attracting popular enthusiasm. Perhaps this was due to defects of character, perhaps to his pride and reserve. Those who knew him personally admired him for his talents; and both in Italy and in Germany he had a large body of supporters who believed in his policy because they stood to gain by it. Of these supporters the German adventurers whom he and his father before him had quartered in different parts of Italy were the most stedfast. But they were so detested that their support perhaps did him as much harm as good.

The Conflict between Frederic and the Papacy

The conflict between Frederic and the Papacy was opened by Gregory IX, 'an old Pope in a hurry', who was convinced that Frederic meant to break all his engagements. Gregory excommunicated him in 1227 for not having started on Crusade, and invaded the kingdom of Naples while Frederic was absent. On his return in 1230 Frederic imposed a peace, the Treaty of San Germano (1230), in which he promised to do justice to the Papacy concerning any ecclesiastical property that he held wrongfully. The peace lasted for six years, during which Frederic came to the assistance of the Pope when Gregory was expelled from Rome by the Roman people (1233); and the Pope declared for Frederic when King Henry raised a

rebellion in Germany and was supported by the Lombards (1234–5). Owing to this help Frederic got the better of the rebels; the young Henry was committed to prison in Apulia, where he ended his days (1242).

But in 1236 Frederic declared war on the Lombard League with the unanimous approval of the German princes; and he rejected the Pope's offer to mediate. The existence of the league was contrary to the Roncaglia decree; and its members had unlawfully disputed the regalia. Frederic gained a great victory over the League at Cortenuova (1237). Milan was so humbled that her magistrates sued for peace, offering, as one of the conditions of peace, to dissolve the Lombard League. But Frederic committed the serious mistake of demanding an unconditional surrender. He was unduly elated by his victory, and clemency to the vanquished was not a principle that he understood. Hence the war continued. He is said to have shown great arrogance at this time towards the Pope and the Romans, and to have boasted that in the future he would fix his capital at Rome.

Nemesis soon arrived. In 1238 the fortune of war began to turn against Frederic and the spirits of the league revived. The turning-point was the unsuccessful siege of Brescia. The cause of the change of fortune was mainly that the Germans were tired of the war and gave Frederic little support. But he was also beginning to be embarrassed for want of money. The next blow was that Venice and Genoa both declared against him. They controlled the sea on both sides of the Italian peninsula, and could impede both his military operations and the trade of the Regno. The third blow came in 1239—a renewal of the Papal ban against him. Gregory IX justified this measure by a number of reasons not very convincing. By going on with the Lombard War the Emperor was making it impossible to launch a new Crusade; he was a heretic; and he was said to have described Christ as one of the three Impostors. But the real reason was political. In 1238 Frederic had foolishly and gratuitously laid claim to Sardinia (claimed from of old by the Pope) and had caused Enzio, his natural son, to be crowned King of Sardinia.

In these years Frederic attempted to establish a despotic

system of government in North and Central Italy. He appointed Enzio General Legate of Imperial Italy. He also appointed a number of General Vicars (governors of provinces) and Podestas (governors of cities). He tried to get rid of the old feudal aristocracy in Imperial Italy. The new officials were sometimes North Italians, sometimes Sicilians or Germans. But all ruled as autocrats without regard to local law and custom. They were the Emperor's nominees and responsible to him alone. Frederic was determined to deprive the free cities of their rights of self-government. Perhaps the new system, when firmly established, would have fostered material prosperity. It would certainly have put an end to the internecine feuds of the free cities, and it might have saved the *contadini*, or country-folk, from much oppression.

Frederic in Italy

At first Frederic's cause appeared to thrive under the Papal ban. Genoa and Milan submitted in 1241, and in that year Frederic laid siege to Rome. Gregory IX, who was in Rome, died in August 1241. Frederic at once broke off the siege and announced that he would do nothing to impede the free election of a new Pope. He imagined, quite wrongly, that he had been fighting against the whims of a crazy old man, and that a new Pope was bound to be more reasonable.

In 1243 Pope Innocent IV was elected, and Frederic, who believed that Innocent was a friend, evacuated the Papal States. In 1244 he accepted a peace the terms of which were dictated by Innocent. He gave up all lands of the Pope which he had conquered since 1239, and he promised to accept the mediation of the Pope and Cardinals in the quarrel between himself and the Lombards. These were hard terms, but there is every reason to believe that Frederic was sincere. In spite of his successes he was still hard pressed for money, and he had called up his last soldier. But he soon discovered that the Pope and Cardinals would not agree to any terms of peace with the Lombards which he considered safe or reasonable. He repented of his promise to Innocent and tried to shuffle out of it. This was the opportunity for which Innocent had been waiting, and he took the fullest advantage of it. He made a dramatic flitting from Rome to Genoa,

and announced (quite mendaciously) that he fled because his personal safety was in danger (June, 1244, only three months after the treaty with Frederic). Late in 1244 he removed from Genoa to Lyons and summoned a general council to judge between himself and Frederic.

Council of Lyons

At the Council of Lyons (1245) Innocent indicted Frederic on the old charges of heresy and atheism. It was alleged that he was on friendly terms with the Sultan of Egypt and other heathen princes. It was complained that he had fulfilled none of the promises which he had made at different times to the Holy See. The Kings of France and England represented that such charges should not be discussed without hearing the Emperor's defence, and suggested an adjournment which would give Frederic time to prepare his case. But Innocent would only grant a quite nugatory adjournment of twenty days. At the end of this period Frederic offered to undertake a new Crusade and recover Jerusalem from the Kharismian Turks; also to bring about the reunion of the Greek and Latin Churches. Innocent was not content; he made the counter-proposal, not altogether unreasonable, that Frederic should at once fulfil the terms of the truce of 1244. It is doubtful whether Frederic would ever have agreed to this in good faith. He had come to the conclusion that the promises which he gave so light-heartedly twelve months before were suicidal. But while he was preparing to negotiate Innocent issued the sentence of excommunication and deposition. He could count on the help of the Lombard towns in Italy, and in Germany the Guelf faction came forward to support him, electing as Emperor Henry Raspe, the Landgrave of Thuringia (1246, May). The Landgrave died in 1247, but the German ecclesiastical princes set up William, Count of Holland, in his place. Innocent IV had evidently as much influence in Germany at this time as Innocent III had possessed during the boyhood of Frederic II.

But the main fighting in 1245–50 took place in North Italy. Here the Ghibellines, led by Frederic's Vicars-General and supported by a few of the cities, fought against the armies of the Lombard League. The Lombards had the advantage

because they could stand on the defensive behind their city-walls and wear out the resources of the Emperor. He was specially hard hit by his siege of Parma (1248), which was a failure, and cost him nearly the whole of his army. His supporters began to fall away. In 1249 his chief minister, Peter della Vigna, was detected in high treason. He was high in Frederic's favour and his only possible motive for treachery is that he wanted to detach himself from the losing side. The failure of the Hohenstauffen was made inevitable by the death of Frederic II (1250).

Could Frederic have retrieved the situation if he had lived? His admirers thought so then and still think so. The Lombard League was always in danger of falling to pieces through the quarrels of the leading cities among themselves. Innocent IV had behaved with such obvious unfairness in the proceedings against Frederic that his cause was coldly regarded by the European sovereigns. Even St. Louis, a loyal son of the Church, urged the Pope to come to terms with the Emperor. In Germany the Guelf cause gained no ground while Frederic was alive, for the German laity thought that the Pope intended nothing less than the destruction of the Empire. The kingdom of Sicily remained loyal and the Imperialists of North Italy, led by the Vicars-General, were a formidable force.

Death of Frederic

All this may be granted. The Imperial cause might have been maintained longer if Frederic had lived. But he was bound to die some time and there was no one to take his place. And even if he had lived his position would have been precarious. The German laity might be sympathetic but they did not come to Italy to fight for the Empire. And Sicily was a squeezed sponge.

We need not follow the lamentable adventures of Frederic's heirs, Conrad IV (d. 1254), Manfred (d. 1266) and Conradin, who was executed as a criminal after the battle of Tagliacozzo (1268). The Hohenstauffen family was wiped out, with the exception of Constance, daughter of Manfred, who married Peter, and so gave to the royal house of Aragon a claim upon Sicily and Naples, the cause of much future bloodshed. Innocent IV succeeded in destroying 'the brood of vipers'.

He also destroyed to all intents and purposes the Kingdom of Italy. But his success was illusory. It was gained by bringing the House of Anjou into Sicily and Naples. The rule of that House was calamitous to the Regno ; its ambitions were dangerous to the Papacy. Worst of all, Innocent had discredited the Papacy in the eyes of Europe. It was generally felt the Papacy had been pursuing temporal ambitions and had shrunk from no crime to realize those ambitions.

CHAPTER X

THE DECLINE OF THE PAPAL POWER, 1294–1497

CARDINAL EVENTS

1296	Boniface VIII issues the Bull *Clericis Laicos.*
1302	Bull *Unam Sanctam.*
1305	Settlement of the Papacy at Avignon.
1378	The Great Schism.
1409	Council of Pisa.
1414–18	Council of Constance.
1431–49	Council of Basle.

THERE are two aspects under which we may consider the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. First, in this period the medieval organization of Church and State was collapsing. That collapse is illustrated by the annals of the Papacy after Innocent IV and of the Empire after the fall of the Hohenstauffen. Secondly, the period is one of new beginnings in politics and civilization. It is the period in which the national state comes to its own in France and England. It is the period in which the Emperor himself becomes a national monarch. It is also the period in which medieval literature and medieval art lose their primitive character; it is the period of Chaucer and Petrarch and Boccaccio. It is the period when the painter and the sculptor begin to rank above the architect in popular esteem. Art and literature were losing something in grandeur; but they were taking on a humaner aspect.

We must begin by tracing the decadence of the old order

in the Church. There is no doubt that the decline of Papal influence in European politics dates from the pontificate of Boniface VIII (1294–1303)—well-meaning, honest, not a conscious revolutionary, but determined to make his authority supreme both in Italy and in Europe. When we notice the main activities of Boniface VIII we are struck at once by the fact that he was constantly coming into collision with nationalism in one form or another:

Decadence of the old order in the Church

(i) His Italian policy was founded on a close alliance with Charles II of Anjou (1285–1309), to whom he owed his election. This alliance was resented by those cardinals who came from North or Central Italy. They did not wish the Papal policy to be controlled from Naples. They consequently made common cause with the House of Aragon which claimed the Regno, and which had actually got possession of Sicily after the Sicilian Vespers (1282). In 1297 these Italian cardinals tried to get rid of Boniface by encouraging the Roman family of the Colonna to make war upon him.

(ii) In 1296 Boniface published the Bull *Clericis Laicos* asserting that the clergy of the national churches might not be taxed by the national sovereigns without the Pope's consent. His point was that most unnecessary and iniquitous wars (particularly those between the French and English) were being waged at the expense of the clergy. He hoped that his Bull would usher in a reign of peace, but as the Bull was defied by Edward I and Philip le Bel, Boniface was obliged to give up his project. The Bull *Romana Mater* of 1297 permitted the clergy to make voluntary gifts to their sovereigns in cases of urgent necessity.

(iii) In 1302 Boniface cited Philip le Bel to appear at Rome and stand his trial on a charge of oppressing the French clergy. The Estates-General of France, at Philip's instance, announced that the Pope was not competent to sit in judgment on the King of France. Boniface replied by issuing the Bull *Unam Sanctam* (stating that every human creature was subject to the Roman See), and he also excommunicated Philip for contumacy. He announced that this sentence would not be withdrawn until Philip admitted that the French clergy could

not be taxed. Philip replied by denouncing Boniface as a heretic, and appealed to a General Council. He also allowed his confidential servant, Guillaume de Nogaret, to enter into a plot with the Colonna against the Pope. Boniface was kidnapped by the conspirators at Anagni and roughly handled. He was quickly rescued by the citizens of Anagni. But he was eighty-six years old and he died of the shock (1303).

The fate of Boniface VIII showed that the Papacy was very far from secure, even after its victory over the Hohenstauffen. It needed the protection of a powerful sovereign ; and as the Emperor was no longer available for that purpose, a protector would have to be found in one of the national kings. In 1305 Philip le Bel assumed this protectorate. He procured the election to the Papacy of Bertrand de Gol, Archbishop of Bordeaux, who took the title of Clement V (1305–14). Clement removed the Papal Court from Italy. He resided first at Bordeaux, afterwards at Lyons and finally at Avignon, where he was in the kingdom of Provence, but close to the French frontier and completely under Philip's influence. Here the Papal Court remained till 1378 and built a vast palace which is now the property of the French Government. The territory of Avignon was purchased by the Holy See from the Crown of Naples in 1348 for 80,000 florins of gold, and the contract was ratified by the Emperor Charles IV.

The Avignon Popes

The Avignon Popes were suspected by the English and the Germans of being the mere tools of the King of France. There was some ground for these suspicions. Clement V played a most discreditable part in the suppression of the Knights Templar (1308–12), in order to oblige Philip the Fair. The atrocious charges which the King brought against the Order were never proved ; his motive in instituting the prosecution was to get hold of the vast wealth which the Order had accumulated in France. John XXII (1316–34), a native of Cahors, who had been the Chancellor of Charles II of Anjou in 1308, proposed to take away the imperial dignity from Lewis of Bavaria (1324), and to confer it on Charles IV, King of France. John started the quarrel

Francophile Policy

with the Empire for reasons of his own. But his proposal to make the Empire a French institution was very naturally taken as a proof of his subservience to the French Crown. In 1342–5 Clement VI, formerly Archbishop of Rouen, who had endeavoured to bring about peace between Edward III and Philip VI, was accused by the English of favouring the side of France. Gregory XI, a member of the French family of Beaufort, who arranged the truce of 1375–7, fell under the same suspicion. It is probable that these suspicions had something to do with the anti-papal legislation of Edward III (Statute of Provisors 1351, Statutes of Praemunire 1353 and 1365). But neither in England nor in Germany was there any talk of a formal breach with the Papacy until the end of the century. The Great Schism of 1378 was the first event which raised a suspicion that the Pope might not be an indispensable institution.

Financial Policy

The Avignon period is marked by a great increase in the demands of the Papacy for financial assistance from the national churches. These demands were sometimes necessitated by the extravagance of individual Popes (John XXII, Benedict XII, Clement VI). But the Holy See was permanently impoverished by the failure of the revenues of the Papal States. The expense of the central administration increased as its duties increased. New methods of raising money were therefore devised:

(i) *Annates*, the first fruits or first year's revenue of every benefice collated by the Pope, or confirmed by him.

(ii) The *Sale of Absolutions, Indulgences and Dispensations*, which was justified in the Bull *Unigenitus* of 1343 by reference to the doctrine of the 'Thesaurus Meritorum'. The sale of indulgences reached the highest point in 1390, a year of Jubilee, when Boniface IX sent Papal collectors all over Europe to sell indulgences to those who were unable to visit Rome in person.

(iii) *Provisions*, which had been frequently made in the thirteenth century. Clement VI went further than any of his predecessors, by asserting (in 1344) that

the Pope had the right to appoint to any and every office in the Church. What made this claim particularly scandalous was the fact that the Pope often granted an ecclesiastical benefice with a dispensation from residence. This was the method of extortion at which the English Act of Provisors was levelled; but this Act was very irregularly enforced. The Kings of England as a rule found it advantageous to come to an understanding with the Pope, and to allow him to make a certain number of provisions.

(iv) *Tithes* of movable property. These were constantly imposed on the clergy to finance the wars of the Popes in Italy, which were euphemistically called Crusades. The clergy of the Empire continually protested against this form of exaction, but the Pope disregarded their protests, and they seem to have paid.

It would be a mistake to regard the Papacy in this period as wholly degenerate and inattentive to its higher duties. In some respects the record of the Avignon Papacy is creditable.

(i) It endeavoured to reform both the monastic orders ('Black' Benedictines, Austin Canons) and the secular clergy.

(ii) It encouraged and assisted the foundation of new Universities in France and Italy.

(iii) It organized missions to Africa, China and India.

The Great Schism

The Great Schism (1378–1414) followed on the death of Gregory XI, who migrated back to Rome in 1376, much against the will of the King of France. It was partly due to the eccentric and outrageous behaviour of Urban VI, a Neapolitan, who was elected in April, 1378, as the result of a compromise between the French and Italian parties in the Cardinals' College. They knew little about the man whom they elected. They believed him to be a pious nonentity. He turned out to be a rash, bad-tempered and self-willed politician of a most autocratic temper. He was expected to be a mediator between the French and Italian

factions; but he turned out to be violently pro-Italian, and he exasperated the French Cardinals by nominating a large batch of Italians to the Sacred College. The French Cardinals thereupon declared that Urban's election was invalid. They seceded from him and elected in his place, in 1378, the Cardinal Robert of Geneva as Clement VII. The new Pope was more remarkable for his military ability than for any of the ecclesiastical virtues. But he was accepted both by Charles V of France and, what was more surprising, by Queen Giovanna of Naples, as preferable to Urban VI.

But, since Clement was supported by the French, the Churches of England, Germany and Scandinavia stood by Urban VI. The minor powers ranged themselves on one side or the other, in accordance with their political sympathies. Scotland, for instance, followed the lead of France. Poland and Hungary followed the lead of Germany. In Italy the two rival factions carried on a civil war, partly in the Papal States and partly in the kingdom of Naples, where Urban's supporters succeeded in dethroning Giovanna I. Urban died in 1389, having done almost everything that was possible to disgrace his cause.

The Two Dynasties

The schism was prolonged until 1415. In the interval three Italian Popes ruled at Rome; while Clement VII, who had established himself at Avignon, ruled there till 1394, and was succeeded by the Spaniards Benedict XIII (d. 1424) and Clement VIII (1429). The whole question at issue was whether the Papacy should be controlled by France or by the Italian Powers. By 1394 the sovereigns of Europe were all anxious to terminate the scandal, and the King of France was willing to make the Avignon Pope resign in favour of any Pope elected with the approval of the whole Western Church. The difficulty was to overcome the resistance of the Italian Popes and their Cardinals. The Schism forced men to think furiously about the constitution of the Church, and two schools of reformers emerged.[1]

[1] A note shows that the author intended at this point to insert some mention of the *Fraticelli*, a section of the Franciscan friars, whose ideas of poverty tended in the same direction as those of some of the heresiarchs. (*Editor.*)

(1) The advocates of the Conciliar Theory—Frenchmen like Jean Gerson and Pierre D'Ailly ; Germans like Dietrich of Niem ; Italians like Michael of Cesena.

(2) The heresiarchs, Wyclif and Hus. Wyclif attacked the theory of the Papal primacy in 1378–80.

The settlement of the Schism was a laborious business, the details of which do not concern us. But the general method by which a settlement was reached is remarkable and important. The method was discussion in great assemblies, which were called General Councils and in which only ecclesiastics were allowed to vote. But these assemblies acted under diplomatic pressure. Their proceedings were attended and were influenced by diplomatic representatives of all the chief European states ; and their decisions were determined largely, if not entirely, by political considerations. These councils were in fact, though not in name, international congresses.

The Council of Pisa

The first of these assemblies, the Council of Pisa (1409), proceeded on the assumption that the best way of settling the dispute was to persuade the College of Cardinals that they must lay aside their differences, must depose the rival Popes and must unanimously choose a successor who would have the confidence of the whole Church. The Cardinals fell in with the suggestion, but they failed to find a satisfactory Pope, and they also neglected altogether the work of reforming abuses. Moreover, the validity of the Council of Pisa was disputed by both the Popes whom it had deposed. Instead of two Popes there were now three. In 1413 the King of the Romans, Sigismund, appeared on the scene. He was asked by Pope John XXIII to protect the Roman Church against the King of Naples, Ladislas, who was actually in possession of Rome. Sigismund desired a reform of the Church in head and members, because such a reform was desired by the German nation. He therefore took advantage of the Pope's necessities, and agreed to help him, if the Pope would allow a second General Council to be summoned. John, whose private career before his election was, to say the least, very dubious, was most unwilling to accept these terms ; but his position in Italy was hopeless, and he at last agreed.

The Council of Constance (1414–18) was summoned by the Emperor with the Pope's concurrence. All princes and prelates were invited to attend. The princes did not come in person, but sent their ambassadors. The Churches of Europe were much better represented than they had been at Pisa. Besides the Cardinals, 33 Archbishops and 150 Bishops appeared at the opening session; and the Emperor himself presided until the question of the Papacy was settled. All three of the existing Popes were deposed (John XXII on account of his bad character), and the Cardinals then proceeded to the election of a new Pope, Martin V, who was recognized by all the sovereigns and all the national Churches.

The Council of Constance

The Council, however, did little to reform the Church. Its most important act, next to the election of the new Pope, was the condemnation and execution of the Bohemian heretic John Hus. But the effect of this sentence was, not to terrorize the Bohemian heretics, but to exasperate all classes of the Bohemian nation.

In 1419 the Hussites began a civil war in Bohemia, and by 1421 had made themselves masters of the kingdom. They defeated several German crusades which were launched against them, and in 1430 they devastated Saxony and Franconia with fire and sword. Peace was not restored until 1436, when the Hussites accepted a religious compromise known as the Compactata and acknowledged Sigismund as their lawful king.

The Council of Basle (1431–49) was summoned under a decree of the Council of Constance—the decree *Frequens* (October 3, 1417), which provided that the Pope should summon a new General Council in 1424, and that thenceforward a General Council should be summoned every five years. Martin V (who accepted this decree) managed to avoid summoning a Council until long after the appointed date. But in 1430 he discovered that, if he did not summon one, the Emperor Sigismund would do so on his own responsibility, in order to arrange terms of peace with his rebellious Hussite subjects in Bohemia. Martin died immediately afterwards, and his successor Eugenius IV at

The Council of Basle

once tried to dissolve the Council. But the Council appealed to the Decrees of Constance, which definitely stated that the Pope was bound to obey a General Council, and refused to dissolve. It even threatened the Pope with deposition. Eugenius gave way because Sigismund was behind the Council. In 1433 a temporary reconciliation was patched up. But the Council passed a decree reviving the Synodal System in the Church. Bishops were to be advised by Diocesan Synods. The work of Diocesan Synods was to be reviewed by Provincial Synods, that of Provincial Synods by General Councils. In 1436 the Council brought about a religious peace with the Hussites, and turned to the work of Reform. In 1437 Eugenius declared the dissolution of the Council and proceeded to summon a new General Council in Italy. This eventually settled at Florence and brought about a nominal reconciliation with the Greek Church. But in 1438 the Council of Basle declared Eugenius suspended, and in 1439 deposed him for heresy, electing as Pope, under the name of Felix V, the Duke of Savoy, who had been a hermit since 1431. Felix V and the Council maintained the Schism till 1443, when Felix wearied of the conflict and retired from Basle. In 1449 Frederic III expelled the remains of the Council from Basle and Felix abdicated.

CHAPTER XI

THE END OF THE MIDDLE AGES IN GERMANY

CARDINAL EVENTS

1313 Death of Henry VII.
1329 Lewis the Bavarian driven out of Italy.
1338 Diet of Frankfort.
1356 Golden Bull of Charles IV.
1411 Sigismund elected Emperor.
1448 Concordat of Vienna.

MEDIEVAL civilization was a plant of slow growth in Germany. Perhaps this was because Germany lay off the great trade-routes of Europe, the Rhine only excepted. There was little foreign trade except in the towns of the northern littoral, and such towns of South Germany (Augsburg, Nuremberg, Vienna) as were favourably situated for trade with Italy. The towns of Germany were slow in gaining charters of self-government, although many of them were densely populated and had guild organization in the thirteenth century. As we have seen, the towns were sacrificed by Frederic II to gain the good-will of the princes. This policy was continued by William of Holland, who forbade the cities to give their franchises to non-residents. So long as the towns remained subject to private lords they could hardly become the homes of an independent and intelligent middle-class. More than anywhere else in Europe the chivalrous class of Germany dictated the course of national civilization. In France, England and Italy there were universities which had a

Medieval Civilization in Germany

powerful influence on intellectual development. In Germany there were no universities, but only cloister schools, until the late fourteenth century.[1] These cloister schools were learned, especially that of Cologne, founded by the Dominicans, and that of Magdeburg, founded by the Franciscans. The great patrons of culture were to be found in the German aristocracy.

The noble class in Germany was more an hereditary caste than elsewhere. This principle was recognized in 1152 by Frederic Barbarossa, who ordained that only men of good birth might be knighted. Within the class of nobles the status and precedence of every man were regulated by the most intricate rules. The princes or high nobility were far superior to the rest. They were those nobles who held from the Emperor such an office as those of Duke, Margrave, Count. Below the *Principes* came the imperial knights who held fiefs from the Emperor, but were not, like the princes, high officials of the Empire. Lower still were the landless knights who attached themselves permanently to the court of some great prince, and fought in his cause, hoping one day to be rewarded with a fief. At the bottom of the scale, and legally outside the nobility, were the *ministeriales*, men of peasant stock who had earned distinction as soldiers or administrators, who did the work of knights and nobles but were still accounted baseborn and unworthy of knighthood. Socially they were far inferior to the robber-knights who supplemented the produce of a small estate by exacting unlawful tolls and customs from merchants, or by plying the trade of a highway robber. These bandits were the pests of Germany throughout the Middle Ages. Frederic Barbarossa in 1188 spent the whole summer in destroying the castles of robber-knights in the valley of the Weser. The princes also made war on these carrion; but the class persisted into the sixteenth century, and did infinite mischief to German trade after the fall of the Hohenstauffen. It was most numerous in the Rhineland and Suabia.

[1] The dates of the foundation of German universities are: Vienna 1384, Heidelberg 1386, Cologne 1388, Erfurt 1392 (founded by the citizens), Leipzig 1409.

Literature

The German princes were patrons of literature and scholarship in and after the thirteenth century. There is, for example, Hermann, the Landgrave of Thuringia (d. 1217), who has been commemorated by Wagner as the patron of the Minnesinger. These Minnesinger, who imitated and excelled the French poets of the courteous school, were themselves of knightly birth. Walther von der Vogelweide (*c.* 1170–1230), the greatest lyric poet of the Middle Ages, was the son of a poor knight of Tyrol. He spent his literary career at the courts of great princes—Frederic Duke of Austria, Philip of Suabia, Hermann of Thuringia, and the Emperor Frederic II. From Frederic II he received a fief as a reward for his poetical invectives against the Papacy. Another noble poet was Wolfram of Eschenbach, a contemporary of Walther von der Vogelweide and a poor knight of Bavaria. He took service with the Landgrave Hermann, and about 1215 composed his great epic *Parsifal* at the Wartburg. His Parsifal is the ideal Christian knight.

But scholars of lowlier antecedents were patronized by the German princes. During the great Interregnum South Germany was invaded by a number of Italian humanists, skilled in the writing of Latin epistles, pamphlets and even poems. They were mostly Imperialists who found no patrons in Italy after the death of Frederic II. In Germany they were employed as secretaries and controversialists by princes who had a taste for learning. Although they were individually insignificant, they prepared the soil in Germany for the Renaissance of the fifteenth century. Another group of publicists collected round Lewis of Bavaria in and after 1324, to defend the prerogatives of the Emperor against the Avignon Popes. Marsiglio of Padua, the author of the *Defensor Pacis*; Michael da Cesena, the General of the Franciscan Order, and the English schoolman William of Ockham, were the most eminent of the literary protégés of this Emperor. They gave currency to the doctrine that the government of the Church ought to be parliamentary, and that the ultimate decision of disputed questions of theology and discipline should be settled by General Councils. It is a matter of some historical importance that this theory, though not the work of German

brains, was formulated on German soil and sponsored by a German Emperor. The Germans became the driving force in the Conciliar party of the fifteenth century ; and it is arguable that the Reformation would scarcely have taken root in Germany, if the demands of the German Conciliar party had been frankly accepted at Rome.

In the fifteenth century the humanities began to be encouraged by the citizens of the cities of Strassburg, Augsburg, Nuremberg. We may notice Willibald Pirkheimer, of Nuremberg, Italian-trained, a humanist, a jurist and a protégé of the Emperor Maximilian. Nor must we forget the religious schools like that of the Brethren of the Common Life at Deventer (1471–1500).

Although the Germans were politically conservative, the character of the Holy Roman Empire was revolutionized in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. One of the greatest changes was the evolution of the College of Electors, a small body of six or seven of the greatest lay and ecclesiastical princes, who were allowed to control imperial elections. In the thirteenth century the theory was that all the princes had a voice in these elections, although in practice the rank and file of the princes merely assented to the name which was proposed by a few of the more eminent. But in the reign of Lewis the Bavarian we find that the Electors are becoming a sort of Privy Council who on occasion meet and deliberate and pass resolutions which are afterwards confirmed by the whole body of the princes assembled in the Diet. So in 1338 we find the Electors resolving that the consent of the Pope is not needed to ratify the election of a King of the Romans ; and that the King of the Romans is competent to administer the Empire. This declaration was ratified by the Diet of Frankfort in the same year. It amounts to a declaration that the election of the German monarch is an affair for the German people and for them alone. He could not be crowned Emperor except by the Pope. Until he was Emperor he had no rights in Italy. But such powers as he could exercise in Germany were conferred on him by the Electors and the Diet. The position of the Electors was fixed by the Golden Bull of 1356, which

Change in the Character of the Empire

we shall notice a few pages further on. The Empire was in fact becoming little more than a German monarchy. Poland had fallen away while the Empire was in dispute between Otto IV and Philip of Suabia. Poland became a kingdom in 1320 and a great power under the Jagellon dynasty which incorporated the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the Kingdom of Poland (1386). The Kingdom of Burgundy was lost after the death of Frederic II. Imperial Flanders passed into the hands of Philip Augustus of France in 1214. Hungary was ruled by Kings of the House of Anjou from 1309 to 1402. The independence of Switzerland was recognized by Maximilian in 1499.

The Imperialist Emperors

There were three of the successors of Frederic II who aspired to revive the Italian claims before 1500. These were Henry VII (1308–13), Lewis the Bavarian (1314–47), and Sigismund (1411–37). Not one of them was strongly supported in these plans by the German nation. Henry VII had great designs. He meant to recover both the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. He failed in 1311 to overcome the passive resistance of the Lombard League. He died when he was on the point of attacking Naples, and perhaps it was as well for his reputation that he did not live to undertake this quixotic enterprise. Lewis of Bavaria paid more attention to the problem of the Papacy. He tried to vindicate his own independence by setting up the anti-Pope, Peter of Corvara (1328), after he himself had been elected Emperor by the Roman people. He was driven out of Italy in 1329 by a league of Central Italian cities which had the support of Robert of Naples. He resumed the attack on the Papacy in 1337–8, with diplomatic weapons; he took the side of Edward III 'in order to conquer Avignon by conquering Paris'. But this project came to nothing. Edward III did not get the support that he had hoped from the princes of the Lower Rhineland; and in 1341 Lewis, who was growing old and tired, decided to drop the vendetta with Avignon.

The third of these imperialist Emperors was Sigismund, whom we have already met as the organizer of the Councils of Constance and Basle. His enthusiasm for the Imperial idea

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was at the highest point in the years 1415–16, when the Council of Constance was sitting. He announced that it was his intention not only to heal the Schism, but also to reestablish general peace in Europe. He would mediate between France and England to end the Hundred Years War. He would also mediate between Poland and the Teutonic Knights. When peace was restored he would undertake a Crusade, presumably to drive the Turks out of the Greek peninsula and the Balkans, which they had been attacking since 1356. The times were favourable for such a Crusade, since the power of the Turks had been shaken to its foundation by the Tartar invasion of 1402 and the defeat of Angora, and the Greek Empire had already taken in hand the re-conquest of the Morea. But Sigismund, though he ended the Schism, failed to reconcile France and England; and while the Hundred Years War lasted a general Crusade was out of the question. A German Crusade might have been possible if the peace of Germany had been secured. But Sigismund, by aiding and abetting the condemnation of John Hus at the Council of Constance, provoked the Hussite War which, beginning as a domestic rebellion in Bohemia, finally took the form of a war between Bohemia and Germany.

Charles IV and Frederic III

None of these imperialist Emperors did much for Germany. In German history the most important Emperors between 1250 and 1500 are Charles IV (1347–78) and Frederic III (1440–93). Their careers illustrate the German ambitions of the two great families of the Luxemburgs and the Hapsburgs. Both have been ridiculed by historians. Gibbon takes Charles IV as the type of the *fainéant* Emperors of the later Middle Ages. Frederic III is generally cited as a living proof of the futility of the German monarchy in the Renaissance period. The important point is that each of them floated on the crest of a wave of national sentiment. They were unsatisfactory rulers, but they lived in times when the German people desired the restoration of the royal power; and so they were honoured as symbols of national unity. In fact, they were useful to the German nation. Each of them worked hard for the aggrandizement of his own family. Charles IV devoted himself to the improvement of the Kingdom of Bohemia,

which he inherited from his father. He promoted the immigration of German settlers, who brought with them a higher degree of skill in agriculture and handicrafts than was possessed by the native population. He encouraged the growth of towns by granting charters of privilege. He founded the University of Prague (1348), which was for many years frequented as much by German as by Bohemian students. His intention was to make the Kingdom of Bohemia the basis of the imperial authority; and owing to their possession of Bohemia his sons kept the Imperial Crown for nearly sixty years after his death. Frederic III made it the business of his life to reunite and to enlarge the immense dominions of the Hapsburg family which in his youth were divided between three collateral branches. When elected to the Empire (1440) his only territories were the dukedoms of Styria, Carinthia and Carniola, and his possession of these lands was challenged by his younger brother. But he outlived all the rivals of his own family, and inherited all their lands. This great patrimony, which he bequeathed to his son Maximilian, made the Hapsburgs unquestionably the strongest ruling house in Germany, and secured them in the tenure of the Holy Roman Empire until 1806.

These two Emperors are responsible for the last two serious attempts to define and to stereotype the old order in Church and State in Germany. Charles IV issued the Golden Bull (1356) which determined the procedure in imperial elections, fixed the list of the Electors, and defined the very extensive privileges of the Electors in their electorates. Perhaps the most useful clause in the Golden Bull was that which prescribed that the four lay electorates—Bohemia, Saxony, Brandenburg, the Palatinate—should be impartible and should descend in the male line according to the strict rule of primogeniture. The electorates thus became the most stable features in the political map of Germany. Frederic III restored Germany to the allegiance of Rome in the year 1447 after a period of nine years, during which the Germans had maintained an attitude of neutrality in the long-drawn-out struggle between the Papacy and the Council of Basle. The reconciliation was inevitable. But a strong party among

the German princes led by the Electors wished to impose conditions on the Pope, and especially to obtain the abolition of annates, provisions and other burdensome prerogatives claimed by Rome. Frederic III was indifferent to ecclesiastical reform, and he was anxious to obtain the moral support of the Pope, to strengthen his otherwise precarious position in Germany. He therefore entered into a private bargain with the Pope, accepting as a bribe a good deal of valuable ecclesiastical patronage in his hereditary dominions. In return for this bribe Frederic undertook to oppose the electoral programme of reform, and he succeeded, by bribery and personal influence, in breaking up the league which the Electors had formed. Peace was accordingly concluded in February, 1447. The only concession of importance which was made by the Pope was a statement that the Decree *Frequens* of the Council of Constance was still in force. Otherwise the effect of the agreement was to leave the rights and liberties of the German Church exactly where they stood at the dissolution of the Council of Constance. The terms were embodied in the Concordat of Vienna (1448), which was meant to be a lasting settlement. But it was so unsatisfactory in its effects that it has been justly described as one of the chief causes of the Reformation.

PART II: MODERN EUROPE

CHAPTER I

THE NATION STATE

WE now have to consider the movements which mark the dividing line between medieval and modern Europe. Of these there are four, the rise of the National State, that of the Protestant Churches, the Renaissance of Classical Learning, and the expansion of Europe into Asia and America.[1] They were all closely connected, and in dealing with the first we shall find that we touch on points intimately concerned with the other three.

Church and State

In the fifteenth century there was profound dissatisfaction with the results of the Papal Supremacy. It impoverished the national Churches by taxation. It did not lead to better appointments in the national hierarchies. It encouraged vexatious appeals to the Court of Rome, both in matters of justice and in matters of politics. The attempt to limit the irresponsible prerogative of the Pope had failed both at Constance and at Basle. It seemed likely that the national Churches would be more efficient and less insubordinate if the powers of the Pope were greatly diminished and if in each state the whole of ecclesiastical patronage, and the right of dealing with all appeals from the Church courts in the last resort, were handed over to the

[1] This last is very fully treated by Wilbur C. Abbott in his *Expansion of Europe* (2nd ed., 1925). A general book covering the whole of our period from this point is the late Lord Acton's *Lectures on Modern History*.

ruling prince. There was also a feeling that national sovereigns should have the right of cutting down ecclesiastical endowments, when these were not being applied to any useful purpose. Monastic institutions especially were attacked. Thus in England in 1414, in consequence of the war with France, the alien priories, priories dependent on foreign mother-houses, were confiscated. These views also found expression in the statutes of Provisors and Praemunire, and in the proposals for partial disendowment of the Church which were made by the Lollards. In France the Pragmatic Sanction of Charles VII (1438) greatly limited the Papal rights of patronage in the Church, suppressed annates and limited, though it did not abolish, his right of hearing appeals. One effect of the Pragmatic Sanction was to give to the Crown the patronage of which the Pope was deprived. A less satisfactory concordat on similar lines was concluded in 1448 between the Papacy and the German Diet. Here, as in France, the Pope lost a part of his patronage, but did not altogether lose his right to annates.

In Spain Ferdinand and Isabella obtained from the Pope (1482) a renunciation of his rights of patronage, and in 1493, without the Pope's leave, they ordained that no Papal Bulls should be introduced into their dominions without the assent of the Crown. Ferdinand and Isabella also controlled the Inquisition, nominating the Inquisitor-General, from whom there was no appeal even to the Pope.

These arrangements about the ecclesiastical power mean a movement in favour of combining in one hand the supremacy in temporal and spiritual affairs. And, in fact, kings and other sovereign princes were beginning to claim for themselves all the powers formerly shared between Pope and Emperor. The doctrine of divine right was elaborated in the sixteenth century to justify these claims.

The New Monarchies

It is not difficult to see why popular opinion was favourable to absolute monarchy. All over Europe in the fifteenth century we find the absolute prince appearing as the saviour of society, and overriding ancient privileges and liberties with the general approval of his subjects, because they are satisfied with his work, because

they believe that he has saved them from anarchy and oppression. He is the leader in a class-war of the unprivileged against the privileged, 'Le nouveau Messie, c'est le roi'. Here is a list of such princes, with their achievements :—

(1) In France Charles VII expelled the English and Louis XI defeated the League of the Public Weal.

(2) In England Edward IV and Henry VII supplied good and abundant government.

(3) In Spain Ferdinand and Isabella put an end to civil war in Castile and united Granada to Spain (1492). Here and here alone the New Monarchy had a crusading character.

(4) Cosimo and Lorenzo de' Medici restored peace in Florence, by the destruction of the old Florentine aristocracy, and in Italy (1434–92).

The *Prince* of Machiavelli (written 1513, printed 1532) is the manifesto of the new political theory. Machiavelli did not make the theory but put it into a general form. It is based upon three cardinal assertions : (*a*) that the first duty of the citizen is to maintain the state in which he lives, and that any means are lawful when the safety of the state is in danger ; (*b*) that a state of anarchy such as existed in Italy when he was writing can only be cured by the rule of an absolute prince ; (*c*) that it is folly for such a prince in such a situation to allow himself to be fettered by any rules of traditional morality, even those derived from Scripture. He must observe the practice of the most successful statesmen of the past and imitate them. Christianity commands us, for instance, to forgive our enemies ; but a prudent ruler cannot always afford to do this. A wise ruler will remember that it is better to be feared than to be loved. Machiavelli believes that in the last resort a state is held together by naked force. Gratitude, loyalty, the moral law are insufficient checks upon the natural instincts of man. Now in the Middle Ages a good many sovereigns had acted on these principles, and they were privately approved by such shrewd observers as Commines. But Machiavelli was the first writer to contend not merely that such a ruler as Caesar Borgia was prudent, but also that he was morally right.

Machiavelli's 'Prince'

It will here be useful to summarize the characteristics of the new monarchies of the period.

Characteristics of the new Monarchies

(i) There was no violent breach with the institutions of the past. England kept her Parliament, France her States-General, Aragon and Castile their Cortes. In England the Courts of Common Law kept their independence and declared the law on the whole quite honestly; and the jury system survived. In France the highest court of Appeal—the Parlement de Paris—had the right of vetoing royal ordinances. In Castile there was the Audience or Appeal Court of Valladolid; and in Aragon there was the Justiciar, appointed for life and irremovable, whose duty was to see that no man suffered in life or limb or property without due process of law. Hallam [1] has shown how in England these legal checks could be overridden by the Tudors; and it is improbable that individual liberties were more secure in Spain or France than in England. But the new monarchs were not wantonly disrespectful to the judges or the national legislatures. In theory they recognized the existence of restraints upon their power. They felt that their position would be very insecure without the good-will of their subjects. But in these legislatures the Third Estate was usually weak.

(ii) The main organ of executive government was a small body of confidential advisers—the Privy Council in England, the Conseil du Roi in France, the Royal Council in Spain. This body in all three cases did a good deal of judicial work, particularly in cases of a semi-political character. In England and France such cases were handled by a judicial committee of the Council (Court of Star Chamber and the Grand Conseil). The Council always included a certain number of great nobles and ecclesiastics, but the real work was done by other councillors who were selected because of expert knowledge or special favour with the King. Very often these experts were men of no great social status or influence in the country, and their power in the Council was often resented by the old *noblesse* who claimed to be the hereditary advisers of the

[1] *Const. Hist.*, Chaps. I and V.

Crown, but had very seldom the education or the industry which would have qualified them. In the Middle Ages this professional element in the Council would have consisted partly of ecclesiastics, but laymen were now generally preferred—though Ferdinand of Spain relied much upon the Cardinal Ximenes and his own bastard son, the Archbishop of Saragossa. These counsellors were not in any way responsible to the legislature, but were liable to be very badly treated if they betrayed their trust, or if they were found to have given bad advice (e.g. the Cardinal Balue 1469, Antonio Perez 1578, Thomas Cromwell 1539), or if they fell into the hands of the feudal opposition (e.g. Olivier le Diable, 1483).

(iii) Everywhere in Europe the old organs of local government—the popular law-courts, the town councils—had become inefficient, and in practice justice, the collection of the taxes, and the maintenance of the public peace were duties discharged by nominees of the Crown. It was peculiar to England that the landowners of the counties should be employed for a good deal of this work (as Justices of the Peace, Lords Lieutenant, etc.), and that the towns were generally left to misgovern themselves in their own fashion. In France and in Spain these duties were discharged by paid officials (Baillis, Seneschaux, Gouverneurs, Corregidores, Alcaldes), who were answerable for their conduct to the royal council.

(iv) France and Spain under this system possessed standing armies, which were a source of heavy expense. England had no standing army, but in and after the reign of Henry VIII a considerable body of war-ships. These forces are partly responsible for the increasing burden of taxation in all the great states of the sixteenth and seventeenth century. Their existence made it possible to carry on wars of a different kind from medieval wars—wars in which sudden blows were struck and campaigns continued for a good part of the year; in which discipline and drill and skill in the use of artillery counted for more than the weight of numbers. One reason for the long ascendancy of the Hapsburgs in Europe was the high quality of the Spanish army, reorganized for Ferdinand of Aragon by the great general Gonsalvo de Cordova. The

Spanish army was, however, no match for that of France, after the reforms made by Cardinal Richelieu ; and the period of French ascendancy in Europe may be said to date from the battle of Rocroy (1643)—'Cette journée de Rocroi devint l'époque de la gloire française' (Voltaire).

(v) These governments were generally unpopular with the old nobility, who in return were regarded with the greatest suspicion by the Crown. The Tudors in England were milder than the Kings of France and Spain, because the back of the feudal system had been broken in England long before the end of the Wars of the Roses. Still the statute of Henry VII against Livery and Maintenance, and his reorganized Star Chamber were instruments for humbling the over-mighty subject, and the list of peers who were executed on treason charges by the Tudors is a formidable one. In France we have the Wars of the Public Weal, 1465–75 (corresponding to the Wars of the Roses, but later), the Wars of Religion and the Fronde, 1648–53, all led by discontented nobles. In Spain this kind of trouble was not so frequent. Ferdinand and Isabella at the very commencement of their reign in Castile had to face a formidable rising of the nobles (1474–6). But after its close they drew the teeth of the aristocratic opposition by resuming the grants which their predecessor Henry IV had made out of the royal demesne (1480), by stamping out the custom of private warfare, and by destroying castles on a great scale. The nobles reared their heads again on the accession of Charles V, complaining that they did not receive their due share of offices, honours and emoluments ; and some of them took a leading part in the revolt of the Communes (1520). A large number of nobles were proscribed at the end of the revolt (1522), and those were fortunate who escaped with the loss of their estates.

The Age of Diplomacy

With the new monarchies we reach the age of diplomacy, which was sedulously practised in the sixteenth century by all enterprising statesmen. The art had been practised in Italy at least one hundred years before. The diplomatic archives of the Venetian Republic begin at the year 1401 ; and it was in the maze of Italian politics that Louis XI served his apprenticeship to the art. He negotiated

with Francesco Sforza of Milan and with Ludovico il Moro; he mediated between Lorenzo the Magnificent and the King of Naples. Ferdinand of Aragon, who had the low cunning of a peasant, was another great practitioner, though his mendacity and bad faith were too palpable even for the diplomatists of that age. The growing importance of official conversations between European states is attested by the appearance in the sixteenth century of the 'ledger' or 'lieger' (permanent) ambassador who represents his country for all purposes at a foreign court. They were not always men of high rank; they were often men of doubtful character, and the reputation of the best of them for honesty was poor. Sir Henry Wotton defined the resident ambassador as 'an honest man who is sent to lie abroad for the good of his country'. Grotius in the seventeenth century still holds that the resident ambassador is a pernicious innovation, a mischief-maker and a spy. Latin was the usual language of diplomacy down to the age of Louis XIV. It was not uncommon to employ ecclesiastics as ambassadors. Thus Richard Pace, who became Dean of St. Paul's in 1519, was employed by Henry VIII as an envoy to the Swiss (in 1515–16), and to Venice (1521–5). But the business of an ambassador often required a robust conscience. Hence the lay ambassador became the rule. Witness the conduct of Don Guerau d'Espes in 1569, who promised the Catholic lords of England that they should have help from the Spanish Netherlands if they could keep one port open for the landing of Spanish troops, and was again conspiring against Elizabeth in 1570. In 1571 he was ordered to leave England within four days. In 1584 his successor, Mendoza, was similarly treated, being charged with complicity in Throgmorton's plot. Philip of Spain did not disown Mendoza, but made him ambassador at Paris.

The Virtues of an Ambassador

The early writers on the duties of an ambassador are agreed that one of his duties is to be 'an honourable spy'. For instance, he should make inquiries about the military and naval resources of the Power to which he is accredited. As to truthfulness, they hedge. Lying is risky because the liar may be found out. But

an ambassador may sometimes be able to do good service to his master by lying. Then he should lie, but he ought not to claim credit with his master for having lied.

There can be no reasonable doubt that the greater part of sixteenth-century diplomacy was barren of useful results. The praise which has been lavished on Wolsey's foreign intrigues (e.g. by Mandell Creighton) is quite extravagant. The best excuse for him is that he provided Henry VIII with just enough excitement to keep him from rushing into unnecessary wars. It is, however, easy to point to some cases where diplomacy has changed the course of history, e.g. the League of Cambray, originated in 1508 by Maximilian and Louis XII for the spoliation of Venice ; the Treaty of Chambord in 1552, formed by Henri II and the Lutherans to defeat the German policy of Charles V ; the treaty of Bärwalde, 1631, between France and Gustavus Adolphus, for the defence of Protestantism in Germany ; the Grand Alliance of 1701, which brought about the downfall of Louis XIV. But these, like all the diplomatic transactions in history which have been conspicuously successful, were so strongly suggested by the interest of all the parties concerned that little technical skill was required in order to bring them together. So, too, the lasting diplomatic settlements of modern history are very few. Still, in the sixteenth century an exaggerated importance was attached to diplomacy ; unimportant or important, it fills a large place in the annals of that age.

Criticisms on the new Monarchies

Sir Thomas More (1515–16), in his famous book *Utopia*, censures standing armies as the ruin of the State, foreign conquests as mere folly, and the morality of high politics as utterly unchristian. He censures the persecution of Christians by Christians, as not necessary to ensure political unity. The whole text of the *Utopia* is that the State should be adapted to the nature of man and should become an instrument for the amelioration of man's life. Another line of criticism is that of Francis Bacon (1561–1626) : the State should do more to promote human welfare by encouraging all useful sciences.

It is noticeable that the Empire did not succeed in adapting

itself to the new pattern, though in the sixteenth century the Imperial Crown became *de facto* the hereditary right of the Austrian Hapsburgs, and imperial elections were reduced to a formality. There was an interesting attempt to reform the constitution of the Empire in the reign of Maximilian I in the years 1495–1512. The plan originated from the ecclesiastical princes and less important lay princes, who desired to be protected both against the Emperor and against their powerful neighbours. Up to a point it was supported by the Emperor. But the reform party did not agree among themselves, chiefly because Maximilian desired to increase his prerogative, while the reforming princes desired a constitutional monarchy. In spite of this divergency of aims, several interesting measures were passed, some of which had permanent results.

The Empire

(1) To the Diet was added a Third Estate or College, that of the free towns of the Empire (1489). Hitherto the free towns had objected to paying direct taxes, because they were unrepresented. Even with this change the Diet was an imperfectly representative body. Of the two older Colleges one consisted simply of the Electors, and the other of the Princes. The free knights of the Empire were not represented —a grievance which led them to rebel in the next generation.

(2) In 1495 it was enacted that the Diet should be summoned every year and that no important decisions should be taken without its consent.

(3) In the same year, 1495, private wars were prohibited, and the *Reichskammergericht* was set up, as the supreme court of justice for the Empire. It was to do justice according to Roman Law (there being no German common law). This Court became permanent and lasted as long as the Holy Roman Empire. But its jurisdiction was curtailed by the privilege which was allowed to a number of the greater princes, *de non appellando*, that is, that there should be no appeal from the decisions of their courts. The Emperor's own demesnes and hereditary possessions were from the first exempted from the jurisdiction of the *Reichskammergericht*; and in 1497 Maximilian set up a rival court, the Aulic Council (Imperial Privy Council), which was completely under his

own control. This too became a permanent institution and competed for business against the *Reichskammergericht* in a most unseemly manner.

(4) In 1495 the Diet agreed to the imposition of a graduated Property Tax (the Common Penny) for the maintenance of a standing army. The whole population were forced to contribute, the well-to-do being assessed in proportion to their property, and the poor being subjected to a poll-tax. Each prince was required to collect this tax in his own dominions and hand it over to the Imperial Treasury. But the tax was unpopular, and the princes, to please their subjects, were negligent in collecting it. Hence in 1505 the Diet tried a new form of tax for military purposes. Each prince and each free city was assessed at a lump sum. The prince or the city had to pay this sum to the Treasury and was at liberty to raise the money by any method of taxation that he thought fit. But this tax also was unpopular, and for that reason was only levied in emergencies. When levied it was very irregularly paid by those princes who were too strong to be afraid of the Diet and the Emperor.

(5) In 1512 a new system of policing the Empire was introduced. The Empire was divided into *Circles*, or military districts, in each of which there was to be a standing force of gendarmes who were to give effect to the decisions of the Imperial Law Court, even in the territory of the Electors and other great princes. This was a courageous attempt to make the Imperial Law Court an effective tribunal. It was, however, resisted at first by the princes, and the system only came into force in 1521. The *Circles* were large. Thus Bavaria was a single *Circle*; so was Saxony; so were the Hapsburg lands.

(6) The constitutional reformers were anxious that there should be an Imperial Executive (*Reichsregiment*), without whose consent it should not be lawful for the Emperor to issue any commands or to make any decision of policy. Maximilian disliked this plan. For the Imperial Executive was to be composed of persons nominated by the Estates of the Diet. He accepted it in 1500, in order to obtain supplies, but next year refused to consult it or to have anything to do

with it. But the *Reichsregiment* was revived after his death (1519), Charles V only stipulating that a certain proportion of its members should be nominated by himself, and that he should not be bound to accept its recommendations, except when he was absent from the Empire. In the critical years of reformation and rebellion, 1521–30, the Empire was to a considerable extent governed by the *Reichsregiment*. Its government was feeble and unpopular, because it was supposed, rightly or wrongly, to have no regard to the interests of any class except the princes. Owing to its weakness, and to the long absence of the Emperor, the Protestant Reformation struck deep roots in German soil during these years.

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CHAPTER II

THE RENAISSANCE

CARDINAL DATES

1304–74	Petrarch.
1315–75	Boccaccio.
1397–1400	Chrysoloras in Florence.
1447	Nicholas V elected Pope.
1467–1536	Erasmus.
1474–1563	Michael Angelo.
1492–1556	Pietro Aretino.
1500–71	Benvenuto Cellini.

The Renaissance of Learning

IN origin the Renaissance was an Italian movement for the revival of classical studies, but more especially of Greek literature, and of those parts of Latin literature which had been neglected in the Middle Ages. Some classical authors had long been known and studied, e.g. Vergil and Seneca and Boethius; more or less reliable translations of the chief works of Aristotle had been in circulation since the thirteenth century. The Latin classics had long been admired as models of style; but without much discrimination. Many Renaissance scholars were still pure stylists, though, with more discrimination than their predecessors, they copied the writers of the golden age, and more especially Cicero. One of the chief claims of Erasmus to be remembered as a classical scholar is that he attempted to establish a simpler, more colloquial style of Latin writing than his contemporaries—a style based on Terence. But many Renaissance scholars were impressed by the wisdom of the classical writers and took them as authorities on the practical conduct of life, and on the ultimate problems of

philosophy. They were especially fascinated by the poetical imagination of Plato, and threw overboard the dry technicalities of the Aristotelean system. There was some risk that these neo-Platonists would become pagan philosophers. The main idea of this Platonic school was that the love of beauty is the key to wisdom. However, many scholars, and especially those of Northern Europe, approached classical literature in a devout and a conservative spirit, under the belief that classical studies would help them to a better understanding of Christianity. This view was medieval, but its sixteenth-century exponents were more scholarly than their predecessors.

The Beginnings

Florence may be called the starting-point of the Renaissance movement, because the new classical studies were made popular by the precept and the example of two Florentine literati—Petrarch (1304–74) and Boccaccio (1315–75). Next in importance to Florence came Venice. In each city there was a large class of wealthy and intelligent patrons of learning. The first teachers were Greek scholars from Constantinople, who began to migrate to Italy long before the capture of that city by the Turks (1453). We find, for example, Chrysoloras teaching at Florence (1397–1400) as the salaried servant of the Signoria or government of the republic. He lectured on the matter and the style of Plato, Demosthenes and Plutarch; incidentally he gave to Western Europe its earliest Greek Grammar. Another notable Greek scholar, famous as a collector of classical manuscripts, is John Bessarion, a Greek bishop who settled in Venice about 1440. He joined the Latin Church and became a Cardinal and Papal Legate († 1472). Such teachers found apt and enthusiastic scholars among the Italians. At Florence, in the time of Lorenzo de' Medici, there was an Academy of Platonic scholars. At its head was Pico della Mirandola (1463–94), who hoped to harmonize Plato's philosophy with the Christian revelation. Pope Alexander VI would not allow him to be indicted as a heretic, though he was forbidden to teach publicly in Rome, at least nineteen heresies having been discovered in his writings. But it should be noted that Pico went off to the study of Magic.

The new classical studies were admitted slowly and reluctantly into the Universities.[1] But the new learning was popularized through schools and through the printing press.

(*a*) Schools. A model was supplied by the famous Italian teacher Vittorino da Feltre (1378–1446), who kept a school at Mantua, from 1425 to his death, in which the Latin classics were the basis of the curriculum and Greek was taught to the more advanced pupils. He counted on the classics to supply his pupils with sound moral principles and political ideas. For this purpose he and his imitators relied especially on the works of Plutarch, Cicero and Livy. He was also a notable reformer in that he laid emphasis upon physical training ('gymnastic') as an essential part of education.

(*b*) The Printing Press. The pioneer in the publication of classical texts was Aldus Manutius of Venice (1450–1515), a scholar as well as a publisher. He was the first to print any Greek texts. His work was continued by his son and grandson throughout the sixteenth century, and the most remarkable of their publications were cheap texts of the classics (costing from 1*s*. to 2*s*. 6*d*. a volume in modern currency). The Aldine family employed eminent scholars to edit the texts which they printed. Other publishers followed this excellent precedent—notably Froben at Basle (who was for many years the employer of Erasmus), and Plantin at Antwerp, whose printing works are now a museum in which the technique and the plant of these early printers can be studied. The Plantin Press was founded in 1546.

Ecclesiastical Patrons

In Italy the new classical studies were also patronized by the Papacy and the higher clergy. Nicholas V (1447–55), himself a learned humanist, was virtually the founder of the Vatican collection of manuscripts. He took into his service the great critic Lorenzo Valla (1405–57), though Valla's fame at that time rested on the exposure of the 'Donation of Constantine', one of the title-deeds of the temporal power of the Popes. Valla also exposed another forgery of a more theological character—a book which had enormous influence on medieval thought—the 'Celestial

[1] For the opposition in Cambridge and Oxford, see Seebohm, *The Oxford Reformers*.

Hierarchy' attributed to Dionysius the Areopagite, a disciple of St. Paul. Valla's last great contribution to scholarship was a comparison of the Vulgate translation of the New Testament with the Greek text, which proved that the Vulgate was by no means impeccable. This no doubt prepared public opinion for the edition of the Greek New Testament by Erasmus (published in 1516). But it should be noted that the first complete edition of the Bible in the original tongues—the Complutensian Polyglot—was prepared by a syndicate of Spanish scholars working under the direction of the Cardinal Ximenes.

Restoration of Primitive Christianity

Biblical studies of this kind, conducted on methods of scientific criticism, contributed to the growth of the Reformation movement. The new Biblical critics were able to show that parts of the accepted theology of the Church were founded upon wrong interpretations of Biblical texts, and that others had no Biblical foundation at all. Colet and Erasmus led the way. Writing about 1520, Erasmus says that he would like the Popes to treat no doctrine as necessary to salvation unless it is clearly expressed in the Bible. 'If anyone desires to pry into more abstruse questions, to the end that he may elevate his mind and withdraw it from humbler thoughts, let him do so provided that all are not immediately compelled to believe the view of this or that individual.'

The Renaissance of Art

The classical Renaissance was only one symptom, though it was a most important symptom, of a general revolt against the belief of the medieval Church that it was unnecessary or even harmful to pay much attention to the appearances of this transitory world. This doctrine had never been carried to its logical conclusion, and the Church had patronized art on condition that art became edifying, that is symbolic of moral virtues and mysteries of the faith. Medieval artists had never entirely surrendered to this view of their subject, but so long as they worked mainly for ecclesiastical patrons they could not altogether defy it. But the work of Botticelli and Michael Angelo and Raphael shows us the beginning of a revulsion against the ecclesiastical spirit; and the revulsion was carried

to extremes in the works of the Venetian school (Giorgione, Veronese, Titian, Tintoretto), which are, as Horatio Brown says, ' untrammelled by the effort to express philosophic ideas or religious emotion '. In Italy the secularization of the painting art was delayed by the policy of the Papal See, Julius II (1503–13), Leo X (1513–21), and Clement VII (1523–34), who were all liberal patrons of the great artists. But this golden age ended with the Sack of Rome in 1527. Clement was too impoverished to carry on his great plans ; his successors cared nothing for them.

Portrait-painting and sculpture are the two most characteristic developments of Renaissance art. The portraits show the intense interest of the great painters in individuality ; the statues their delight in pure form. In architecture the Renaissance was less successful. The leading principle was a return to the antique. Architects founded their work on the principles of Vitruvius, whose treatise was rediscovered in 1411 by Poggio Bracciolini. Round arches, supported by Doric, Ionic or Corinthian columns ; façades ornamented with pilasters ; and for churches a lofty dome covering the transept—these are the salient features of the style perfected by Brunelleschi (1377–1444) and Alberti (1404–84). It is characteristic of the period that no one attempted buildings which could only be completed in several generations. The Renaissance building is the product of a single mind. Hence there is little of that richly ornamented detail with which Gothic churches are encrusted. Some of the best work of the best architects was put into palaces—e.g. the Pitti (by Brunelleschi), the Ruccellai (by Alberti), both at Florence ; and the Piccolomini at Siena.

In sculpture the Florentines led the way. They made no sudden and violent breach with the past. The earliest of the great Florentine sculptors, Ghiberti (1378–1456), who made the bronze doors of the Baptistery at Florence, was influenced by the French and Flemish masters of medieval sculpture ; but he was also a staunch realist. So, too, was Donatello († 1466), who, so far as he copied anyone, copied the Greeks and Romans, but excelled them all in the art of individualizing his subjects. In the work of Michael Angelo

we have the work of a revolutionary—an idealist who is also a scientist and technician.

The Renaissance of Science

There had always been a handful of eccentric and independent people in the Middle Ages who devoted themselves to the study of nature—especially to chemistry, optics and mechanics, medicine, geography. But the best minds were absorbed in philosophic studies, i.e. with working up into a system what was already known or believed. When the scholastic philosophy fell into disrepute the natural sciences began by degrees to come into their own. Astronomy became a popular science because of its practical utility to the explorers of the great oceans. Germany led the way, producing Copernicus (1564–1642), who gave the first blow to the system of Ptolemy in which the earth was represented as the centre of the universe. Copernicus established a probability that the earth revolved round the sun. Ptolemy had taken it for granted that the universe was finite, being enclosed on every side by the Sphere of the Fixed Stars. But the Italian Giordano Bruno (1550–1600) boldly affirmed that the universe was infinite. He was a philosopher, not a scientist ; but he based his reasoning on the facts established by Copernicus. Between 1609 and 1619 Kepler enunciated his laws of the revolutions of the planets round the sun. In 1638 Galileo published his discoveries as to the law of gravitation, which confirmed the hypothesis of Copernicus, and though they did not undermine Christianity, destroyed the medieval conception of the Universe. He thus rendered himself obnoxious to the censorship of the Congregation of the Index, which had decided in 1616 that the sun moved round the earth.

Apart from these astronomical discoveries, the sixteenth century was not rich in scientific results. We have to notice the speculations in chemistry of Paracelsus (1473–1541), a native of Switzerland—his theories dominated the work of other investigators till the eighteenth century ; the anatomical studies of the Netherlander Vesalius (1514–64) ; the discovery of the circulation of the blood by Michael Servetus (1509–55) and William Harvey (1578–1657) ; and William Gilbert's *De Magnete* (1600), which explained the phenomena

of magnetism on the assumption that the earth is itself one vast magnet.

Who are the individuals to study as types of the Renaissance? We learn most of its significance and possibilities from concentrating on the most eminent and single-minded of its representatives. But it is as well to remember that the movement had its earthly and even disreputable side. There were some thorough scoundrels among the scholars and men of letters who achieved a high reputation in their lifetime.

Pietro Aretino

Pietro Aretino is a case in point. He was born in 1492, the son of a shoemaker, and died in 1556. He was not a humanist; he could not even write or read Latin. But he was an accomplished poet and prose-writer in the Tuscan vernacular, an excellent art-critic and the first Italian to publish his letters in the vulgar tongue. He had tried to become a painter in his youth and had failed. Patronized by Leo X and by Leo's nephew, the Cardinal Giuliano, afterwards Clement VII, he was the most celebrated of the authors of *Pasquinades*, a form of literature which came into vogue in his time. He lived from 1527 to 1556 at Venice in a sort of disorderly and bohemian splendour. A thorough gourmand, he wrote with real feeling about the art of preparing mixed salads. Among his works is a tragedy on *Horatius*, the best produced in Italy in that century. He also wrote religious books because they paid. He was still more famous as a toady and blackmailer of artists and great men: 'The Kings of Europe were his tributaries.'

Benvenuto Cellini

Benvenuto Cellini (1500–71) was not quite so terrible a person as he would have us believe. His account in his *Autobiography* of his own exploits in defending the Castle of Sant' Angelo at Rome in 1527 reminds us of nothing so much as Falstaff's adventures with the men in buckram. On the other hand, he boasts of murders committed by himself in 1529 (to avenge a brother's death), and in 1534 and 1539, when the victims were a rival jeweller and an impertinent post-master. He gives a catalogue (probably incomplete) of illicit love-affairs in 1524 and 1530, again in 1533–4, with the Sicilian girl, Angelica, in pursuit

of whom he went to Naples, in 1540 with his French mistress, who may or may not be the same as his model and mistress, Caterina (1543), and in 1543–4 with Gianna Scorzona. He confesses to a theft of gold (1529–30).

Art was the business of Benvenuto's life. His father was a craftsman in ivory, and Benvenuto was apprenticed to a goldsmith at the age of fifteen, and slowly worked his way up to the head of that craft. He did not neglect the main chance in doing so, and earned a good deal of money by making whatever trinkets were in fashion from time to time. His honesty was by no means above suspicion. He was persistently accused of having robbed Clement VII, who was a generous patron to him. And if we can trust his own reports of his conversations with that Pope and with other great men who employed him, he was a swaggering, underbred fellow with no sense of personal dignity. But, as an artist, he had his own code. He almost worshipped the genius of Michael Angelo, and confesses that, as a young man at Florence, he did his utmost to acquire ' the exquisite manner ' of that great artist. However busy he might be with professional commissions, Benvenuto had always time to study with attention any notable works of art, whether ancient or modern, that came to his notice. His own tastes led him very distinctly towards the minor arts ; he excelled in the engraving of medals and of dies for coins. But he occasionally aimed higher, as when he made the statue of Perseus for the Loggia of the Signoria at Florence. His talents were generously acknowledged by Michael Angelo. Yet Benvenuto was simply a medieval craftsman of genius, turned loose in a world of new models and new ideas, driven to imitate them partly by his artistic sensibility and partly by his commercial desire to be in the fashion.

From these two questionable characters we turn to two of the really great men of the Renaissance, taking first

Michael Angelo

Michael Angelo (1474–1563). Michael Angelo Buonarotti was a member of a noble Tuscan family ; he was intended for a liberal profession, but insisted on becoming a painter and was apprenticed in 1488 to Domenico Ghirlandaio at Florence. He was allowed during

his apprenticeship to study the statues, reliefs and busts of the Greek and Roman schools which Lorenzo de' Medici (d. 1492) had collected. He caught the notice of Lorenzo, and was taken into his household so that he might pursue his artistic studies the more easily. Here he made the acquaintance of the great humanist Politian, who was the tutor of Lorenzo's children. Politian was an accomplished Greek scholar and encouraged the boy to work on classical subjects, but Michael Angelo read chiefly Italian authors, Petrarch, Boccaccio, above all Dante. After Lorenzo's death he remained in the household of Piero; but quitted it shortly before the expulsion of the Medici from Florence (which happened in November, 1494). He then lived at Bologna for about a year, and there continued his work as a sculptor, after which he returned to Florence.

Some time afterwards he went to Rome and made a name by the execution of the group La Pietà for a private patron. He returned to Florence when Pier Soderini was elected perpetual Gonfaloniere (1503) and in the next eighteen months executed his colossal David for the Republic. He was summoned to Rome by Julius II to build a gigantic Mausoleum for the Pope—a design which was not carried out till about 1535. It was for this design that Michael Angelo executed his statue of Moses. His relations with Julius were troubled by the discourtesy of the Pope's officials and by his own pride. In 1506 he left Rome in a huff, and was with great difficulty persuaded to return. But Julius treated him almost as an equal—an attitude which contrasts remarkably with that adopted by Francis I to Benvenuto. In 1508 Michael Angelo completed a colossal bronze statue of Julius II, which was set up in Bologna to commemorate the conquest of that city and was destroyed by the Bolognesi in 1511. In 1512 Michael Angelo completed for the Pope the frescoes in the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. The great picture of the Last Judgment in the same chapel was begun many years later and finished in 1541. He was not employed by Leo X (1513–21), except that he was commissioned to prepare marble columns for the façade of San Lorenzo in Florence. But Leo's cousin, the Cardinal Giuliano, commissioned him to execute the

statues for the tombs of the Medici, and these were completed after 1530, when the Cardinal was reigning at Rome as Clement VII. Paul III, the successor of Clement, encouraged Michael Angelo to complete the tomb of Julius, and to go on with the Last Judgment, for which he received from Paul III in 1535 a pension for life of 1,200 gold crowns (= £600). In 1546 he was appointed (by Paul III) architect of St. Peter's, for which he made an original design, because the cost of Bramante's plan (worked out in 1506–14) was considered to be prohibitive. It advanced very slowly owing to want of funds, and Michael Angelo found his work irksome; but his duties as architect were his main occupation up to his death. He did not live to see the cupola erected, but he made the model of it to scale.

Erasmus

From the artistic Renaissance we return to the revival of classical learning, taking as our typical figure Erasmus (1467–1536). Erasmus holds a middle position between the humanists of Italy and those of Northern Europe. For he was specially concerned with the interpretation of Christian literature, which the Italians generally were not; and yet he had the delight of the Italians in the elegances of Greek and Latin style. His taste in Christian literature was rather different from that of Colet, Dean of St. Paul's, or of Reuchlin or of Melanchthon. These men were drawn irresistibly to the study of theological doctrines, and Erasmus was not a theologian. On historical grounds he had come to the conclusion that there was not much dogmatic theology in Primitive Christianity, and he saw no reason why the Christians of his own day should desire to be wiser than the primitive Church. He could hardly have held to this position if he had studied seriously the thought of St. Paul as Colet and Melanchthon studied it. But he never made such a study, and his private opinion, which we find in his letters, was that the Reformers and the Catholics were quarrelling to a large extent about questions on which no certainty was possible (e.g. Free Will and Predestination). Both sides appealed to him for support, and both were angry with him for remaining neutral. They thought it impossible that he could be intellectually honest.

On one subject he heartily sympathized with the Protestants. He objected, as strongly as they did, to any ceremonies or usages which seemed childish or repugnant to common morality. Pilgrimages, indulgences, masses for the dead, all seemed to him calculated to conceal from the common man the true nature of righteousness and the moral responsibility of the individual. Privately he agreed with the Reformers that such abuses were only allowed to continue because in one way or another they enriched the clergy and the Pope. But he held that it was impossible to extirpate superstition by violence. He desired a gradual and peaceable reformation, which would make the clergy ashamed of imposing upon the unlearned, and would awaken the unlearned to a perception of what religion meant and what it demanded of them. This was a noble doctrine; so far as his doctrine went, Erasmus was in advance of his age. In practice he was not unfaithful to his theory; for he wrote several works to explain what in his opinion were the first duties of a Christian man. They brought together in an intelligible and attractive form the best thought on the subject that he had been able to collect in the course of his vast reading of the early Fathers (especially the *Enchiridion Militis Christiani*). He did more than this when he edited the Greek Testament. For he furnished a text and a translation which were easily accessible, and he set an example of scholarly interpretation which was badly needed. He maintained, not without reason, that in many passages the Vulgate used by the Church misrepresented the plain sense of the original text. As was inevitable, he made many mistakes, being a pioneer. Catholic critics are fond of reminding us that a better text of the Greek New Testament was issued by Catholic editors in the Complutensian Polyglot (1521), very shortly after the edition of Erasmus.[1] But it was the Erasmian text which was generally used, because it was cheaper and more accessible. Only six hundred copies of the Spanish edition were ever printed.

But the real charge against Erasmus is that he had not the courage of his own convictions—that he did not say

[1] See above, p. 117.

what he thought, boldly enough and plainly enough. This is true. But there are extenuating circumstances.

(*a*) His legal status was precarious. He was a member of a religious order, who had a licence from the Pope to absent himself from his monastery for the purpose of pursuing his studies. This licence might be revoked at any moment, and he had enemies and critics who pressed for its revocation whenever he gave them an opening to accuse him of unorthodoxy. Hence Erasmus was always apprehensive of doing anything which might make him obnoxious to the court of Rome. Once in his life he could not resist the temptation to satirize a Pope, who had recently deceased. *Julius Exclusus* (1516) is the wittiest of all his books—and by implication it is an attack on the temporal power of the Popes. Erasmus never dared to own himself the author of this book; indeed, he went out of his way to repudiate responsibility for it.

(*b*) He was essentially a conservative, and thought that no good ever came of exciting the common herd to rebel against authority. He thought that Luther was deliberately throwing the Empire into a state of anarchy, and by degrees even ceased to give Luther the credit for good intentions. He particularly disliked the contemptuous attitude which the Reformers took up towards nearly all those scholars who had tried to interpret Scripture before the Reformation. He himself valued the works of the early Fathers and thought his edition of St. Jerome was the most valuable of all his works of learning. He had even a good word to say for the scholastic philosophers. 'They wrote for their own age, and they have handed down to us much that they derived from the writings of the ancients and expounded most acutely.'

(*c*) He detested controversy: 'In any case let us avoid heated contention, the bane of peace and concord.' Reform should come insensibly and quietly as the result of the teaching of the discreet and learned few.

CHAPTER III

THE TURKISH POWER IN EUROPE

CARDINAL EVENTS

1360 Fall of Adrianople.
1453 Fall of Constantinople.
1526 Battle of Mohacz.
1535 Alliance of Francis I and Solyman.
1571 Battle of Lepanto.
1683 Relief of Vienna by John Sobieski.
1697 Treaty of Carlowitz.
1718 Treaty of Passarowitz.

IN writing the history of the Renaissance and of the other changes of the time, historians have laid great stress on the influence of the Turkish power, and formerly it was customary to attribute great importance to the capture of Constantinople. It is true that the advent of the Turks was important, but it began long before the close of the Middle Ages. In 1360 Adrianople was conquered; in 1376 Bulgarians and Serbians began to pay tribute; in 1396 the Hungarian Crusade, led by King Sigismund, failed at Nicopolis. This was an international adventure. The army included Germans, Swiss, Flemings, Poles, Englishmen, and so many Frenchmen that all the bells of Paris tolled when the news of the defeat arrived. It was followed by Turkish invasions of Greece, Hungary, and Styria. The fall of the Greek Empire was only postponed by the arrival of Timour and his Tartars in Asia Minor. The Sultan Bajazet was defeated and taken prisoner at Angora (1402)—a catastrophe which inspired Marlowe to write his *Tamburlane*. Timour

Conquests of the Turks

died in 1405; but the war against Constantinople and the Balkan states was not renewed until the reign of Murad II (1421–51). In this new period the defence of South-Eastern Europe was undertaken by the Hungarians, under John Hunyadi, voivode of Transylvania, who was the regent of the kingdom from 1438 to 1458, and his son Mathias Corvinus, who was elected King of Hungary and ruled from 1458 to 1490. John Hunyadi, not content with defending his own country, attempted to go to the help of Constantinople at the head of a Crusade, but was defeated at Varna in 1444.

In 1453, therefore, Constantinople fell. Striking as the event was, its importance has been exaggerated in two ways. It did not mean any great accession of territory to the Turks. The influence of the Greek scholars who in consequence of it made their way to Italy played a much smaller part than has been supposed in the Italian Renaissance. On the other hand, the capture of Constantinople greatly improved the strategic situation for the Turks, and it opened the way for them to become a maritime power. In his *Lectures on Modern History* the late Lord Acton paradoxically blames the Papacy for the fall of Constantinople: 'the failure to reconcile the Greeks had established the Ottoman Empire in Europe'. In another passage he throws the blame on the Greeks, but still insists that theological reconciliation would have saved the situation for a time, though not for ever.

Fall of Constantinople, 1453

In 1456, with the help of another Crusade, John Hunyadi defended Belgrade successfully against the whole force of the Turks. Mathias Corvinus, although up to 1475 he was more intent on conquering Bohemia than on defending Europe, continued this resistance. He repelled two invasions of Hungary, 1475 and 1479; he liberated the Moldavians in 1475. But the Hungarian state collapsed soon after his death. The *coup de grâce* was the battle of Mohacz (1526), in which Louis II was slain with most of his nobles. But it is more than possible that internal divisions contributed to this catastrophe. Hungary was a constitutional state; in the national assembly there was a

The Hungarians

body of elected representatives of the counties, and the liberties of the Hungarians were defined by a Charter of Liberties (Golden Bull), granted in 1222 by King Andrew and confirmed by King Louis in 1351. But this was a charter in favour of the feudal tenants and ecclesiastics; it made the privileged aristocracy the real masters of the kingdom. The peasants were serfs (Jobagiones) tied to the soil and without legal rights against their lords. In 1513, when they were called out for a Crusade against the Turk, they turned their arms against the nobles, and set up as their king George Docza (Revolt of the Kurucz or Cruciati). The revolt was stamped out and the serfs reduced to their former condition. Naturally they accepted the rule of the Turks with equanimity; and Hungary had to be recovered for Christendom in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Austrian armies.

Character of the Turkish rule

The Anatolian plateau was the real homeland of the Turks. Elsewhere were Turkish garrisons and governors and great landowners, all living on subject populations. There were in Asia Minor Armenians, Syrians, Arabs and Greeks; in the Balkans, Slavs, Magyars and Greeks. There was no compulsory conversion of Christians; there was still a Greek Patriarch at Constantinople. In the Balkans it was usual to govern through tributary princes; the Bulgarian and Serbian nationalities persisted, though Mohammedanism made converts. Christian renegades and Phanariot Greeks were largely utilized in the administration. Pashaliks were often sold and the administration was venal. Commerce was tolerated for the sake of tolls but left in the hands of the Venetians and French. Two conquests of the early sixteenth century, that of Egypt in 1517 and that of Rhodes in 1522, made the Turks completely masters of the trade-routes of the Eastern Mediterranean.

The power of the Turks was at its highest in the early sixteenth century, and the Memoirs of Charles V show that he and his brother Ferdinand were for some time of the opinion that their supreme duty was to defend Germany and Italy against the Turks. That impression evaporated

after the retreat of the Turks from Vienna before the joint armies of the Hapsburgs and the Empire (1529), although the Christian forces defending Vienna were much inferior in numbers and in weight of artillery. Though the Turks could put enormous numbers into the field, the real strength of their armies lay in the corps of Janissaries, which at this time only numbered about 12,000 men. Yet the Turks continued to play a considerable part in European politics.

Turkish Alliance with France

In 1525, at the lowest point of his fortunes, Francis I applied to the Sultan for help against Charles V. In 1535 he concluded with Solyman an offensive and defensive alliance against the Hapsburgs, with which was coupled a treaty of commerce. One result of this treaty was an inroad of the Turkish fleet into the Adriatic in 1537–9, which caused great damage to Apulia; a French fleet appeared in the Adriatic to watch the course of the war, and perhaps would have supported the Turks if the latter had gained any striking success, which, however, was not the case. In 1541 agents of Charles V assassinated, near Pavia, two agents of Francis I who were on their way to Constantinople. Yet little came of the alliance, since Francis was afraid to commit himself unreservedly to it, from fear of outraging the conscience of Europe. Its most lasting result was the commercial treaty of 1535, which gave the French freedom of trade throughout the Turkish Empire. No other European nation had this privilege. The English and the subjects of Charles V had to trade under the French flag if they wished to trade at all in Turkey. France also obtained a protectorate over the Holy Places. The political alliance was maintained under Henry II, who had great hopes of utilizing the Turkish navy in the Mediterranean, but after the Peace of Cateau Cambrésis (1559) Louis XIV repudiated it in the early years of his reign, when he sent 6,000 troops to help the Emperor Leopold at the battle of St. Gothard (1664), and in 1671 actually raised a fleet at Toulon for the purpose of attacking Egypt, the most vulnerable and most tempting province of the Turkish Empire; later, however, he dropped this plan in favour of a war with

Holland. In 1683 it was suspected that he had a secret alliance with the Turks against the Austrians; this is not proved, and Louis did his utmost to refute the suspicion; but he was certainly annoyed when John Sobieski of Poland went to the relief of Vienna in that year. The War of the League of Augsburg, which he commenced in 1688, may not have been accompanied by any agreement with the Turk; but it certainly came at an opportune moment when Turkey in Europe seemed to lie at the mercy of Austria; and in 1697 Louis offered to procure the inclusion of Turkey in the Peace of Ryswick—an offer which was not accepted. The Turks considered that they had been basely deserted by France at the end of this war, and in 1699 at the Peace of Carlowitz surrendered to Austria the whole of Hungary except the Banat or district of Temesvar and nearly all Sclavonia.

Turkish Naval Power

The corsairs of the Barbary or North African coasts enrolled themselves under the Sultan and enriched themselves in fighting for him at sea. Algiers and Tunis had been captured by Ferdinand of Aragon in 1509, and Algiers was put under a Berber chieftain who acknowledged Spanish overlordship. But in 1516 he was murdered by the Moslem pirate, Arudj Barbarossa, who then repelled a Spanish expedition sent against him by Ximenes (1516). In 1518 he was killed, in attempting to get hold of Tlermen, by the Spaniards. A brother of Arudj, Khaireddin Barbarossa (1518–46), was taken into the service of Solyman. He succeeded his brother in Algiers, and obtained the title of Beglerbeg, together with a contingent of 2,000 janissaries. In 1519 he repelled an expedition which the Spanish Viceroy of Sicily sent against Algiers. From 1529, when the Spanish fort Peñon d'Alger fell into his hands, Algiers became an impregnable base for Turkish pirates. In 1533 Khaireddin seized Tunis and in 1535 defended it against Charles V, who however took the citadel of La Goulette, routed Khaireddin's army and sacked Tunis. In 1541 Charles attempted a similar attack on Algiers with more than 35,000 men and 500 ships, but was ignominiously defeated. Khaireddin died in 1546. His son Hassan-Pasha (d. 1568) succeeded him,

and won great successes on land and sea, helped on sea by the pirate Dragul, who ruled in Tripoli and Tunis. These two defeated a Spanish Armada which was sent against them in 1560, and in 1565 were prominent at the siege of Malta where Dragul was killed. In 1568 Hassan-Pasha was succeeded at Algiers by the corsair Euldj-Ali, who also held a commission from the Sultan. Euldj-Ali commanded the left wing of the Turkish fleet when it met its famous defeat at the hands of Don John of Austria at Lepanto (1571); and it was due to him that the losses of that fleet were repaired within two years after the battle. In 1573 Don John seized Tunis, but failed to hold it against Euldj-Ali. At the end of the sixteenth century the Algerian corsairs were still the terror of the Western Mediterranean. Algiers became a city of over 100,000 souls, many of whom were European renegades. In the time of Charles V they constantly raided the coasts of Spain and Italy. Khaireddin Barbarossa negotiated on equal terms with Francis I of France, and in 1543 his fleet helped Francis to seize the town of Nizza (Nice). In 1538 Charles V himself condescended to negotiate with Khaireddin, and offered to hand back Tunis as the price of peace. About that date the trade of Venice was almost brought to a standstill by Khaireddin's piracies.

Lepanto, 1571

Quite apart from these corsairs the Sultans were building up a naval power in the sixteenth century. This first appeared in the Western Mediterranean at the siege of Malta (1565), to which the Sultan sent 150 ships carrying over 20,000 troops. In 1571 for the Lepanto campaign the Turks produced 200 galleys and 75 smaller ships. The fleet which they met—provided by Spain, Venice, Genoa and other Italian states—had the same number of galleys and six galiasses (the 'dreadnoughts' of that time). But the Christian victory was very decisive, and suggests that the Turks were markedly inferior in tactics and seamanship. In 1573 the Turkish government had 250 galleys ready for sea and the Venetians were glad to make peace as the Christian coalition had fallen to pieces, surrendering their claims on Cyprus to secure it. In 1574 the Porte offered Venice an

offensive alliance against Spain, the bait offered being the kingdom of Naples. The Venetians refused because they did not trust the promises of the Turk.

The Turks in Eastern Europe

Up to the end of the eighteenth century Turkey in Europe was of immense extent. The power of the Hapsburgs and of the Romanoffs was largely founded upon conquests from the Turk. Thus Austria gained Hungary in 1699, the Banat of Temesvar in 1718, and the Bukovina in 1775. Russia had no secure foothold on the Black Sea until Catherine II secured Cherson in 1774, the Crimea and other lands surrounding the Sea of Azoff in 1783, Oksakoff in 1788, Odessa and its hinterland in 1792. Even after the north coast of the Black Sea had been gained for Russia its exploitation depended chiefly on the Greek seamen and merchants of the Turkish Empire.

Possessing the Black Sea coast and the principalities of Moldavia, Wallachia and Bessarabia and the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Turks were dangerous neighbours of the three principal Eastern Powers, Austria, Poland and Russia, in the eighteenth century. It was the Turkish policy to exploit for the defence of the Turkish Empire the rivalries of these Powers; and it was due to the skill with which this policy was pursued that the Turkish power in the Balkans was saved—those provinces being coveted both by Austria and by Russia. It may be noted, for example, how the Turks backed Poland and Charles XII of Sweden against Peter the Great; while in 1788, when Catherine II planned to go to the assistance of the Greeks, she was checked by the unfriendly attitude of Austria, and the emancipation of Greece was thus delayed for 40 years.

English interest in Turkey dates chiefly from the rise of the Levant Company, which received its original charter in 1605, and a new charter in 1661. It traded chiefly with Aleppo, Smyrna, Constantinople, Egypt and Tunis. Pitt the Younger was the first English statesman who laid it down as essential that the Ottoman Empire should be maintained as against Russia. The security of the land-route

to India was his main object. It was the annexations of Catherine of Russia in 1783–8 (Crimea, Oksakoff, etc.) which caused him to take up this line. Up to then our great rival for India had been France.

CHAPTER IV

THE ENSLAVEMENT OF ITALY, 1494–1559, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

CARDINAL EVENTS

1494–5	Expedition of Charles VIII. Downfall of the Medici and of the Aragonese dynasty in Naples.
1499–1513	Rivalry of Louis XII and Ferdinand of Aragon. Second expulsion of the French. Naples remains Spanish. Medici restored in Florence, Sforza in Milan.
1515	Francis I wins Marignano and recovers the Milanese
1522–6	War between Charles V and Francis I for the Milanese and Genoa. Defeat of Francis at the battle of Pavia.
1527–9	War of the League of Cognac (France, Papacy, Venice). Sack of Rome (1527) and French invasion of Naples (1528).
1536–7	French attack on Savoy and Piedmont. Turin occupied.
1544	French attack on Lombardy. Francis accepts the Treaty of Crespy. France keeps Savoy and two-thirds of Piedmont.
1559	French claims abandoned at Cateau Cambrésis except that France keeps Turin, Saluzzo, Pinerolo.

THE wars of Italy (1494–1559) are extraordinarily intricate and monotonous, but they had most important consequences. They were the symptom of a great change in the character of international politics. They mark the beginning of a period in which the fortunes of

the Continent are decided by standing armies and trains of artillery. Practically Charles VII of France was the founder of the system. He was able, for the purpose of expelling the English from France, to impose the *taille permanente* (1439), which brought in 1,200,000 francs a year at the time of his death, and at the death of Louis XI about 3,900,000 francs. The beginnings of the French army were modest. Charles VII at his death had about twenty 'companies of ordonnance', each company consisting of 600 mounted men.[1] This force was more than doubled under Louis XI, who also had in regular pay at least 10,000 infantrymen (partly French halberdiers and partly Swiss pikemen), while Commines puts the figure at 'more than 25,000 men'. This burden on the country could only be justified by some startling exploit. Louis XI had hoped to annex a large part of the Burgundian inheritance. When he had failed in this it was only natural that some of the advisers of Charles VIII should recommend the Naples expedition.

Standing Armies

Ferdinand and Isabella followed the French example, justifying the policy by the crusade against Granada which ended in 1492. Both Castile and Aragon were poor countries, and the funds for paying the army had to be raised by extraordinary measures. The Catholic sovereigns, as we have seen, resumed the grants which their predecessors had made out of the royal demesne and they impounded a part of the revenues of the Crusading Orders. These resources could not suffice indefinitely; but the sovereigns were tempted to maintain their army when the wars of Italy began. For the Crown of Aragon possessed Sicily and had the best legal claim to the reversion of Naples. The French and Spanish armies came into collision in 1503–4 in the Regno, and in 1511–12 in Central Italy; and so commenced the duel between France and Spain which was waged over the future of Italy up to 1559. In 1516 Charles V inherited the Spanish kingdoms and with them the Spanish army. The gold and silver of the Indies, the taxes of the Netherlands, and the Spanish

[1] This is the estimate of Lavisse, *Histoire de France*, IV (2), pp. 94 ff.; others say fifteen companies.

army were his three great assets. He used the Spanish army all over Europe. It ceased to be predominantly Spanish so far as the rank and file were concerned. About one-sixth of his foot-soldiers were Spaniards, the rest Germans and Italians; but the Spanish regiments were the *corps d'élite* and the tactics and strategy of the whole army were those perfected by Gonsalvo de Cordova (1453–1515), called the Great Captain. The advent of these new armies soon put out of use the time-honoured tactics of the Swiss pikeman and the German Lanzknecht. Artillery became of extreme importance in all battles, though hand-guns were still too unwieldy to be of much practical value.

Results of the Italian Wars

The grand result of the wars of 1494–1559 was that Italy became politically dependent on the Spanish Empire. But in Milan, Naples and Sicily alone was there direct Spanish rule. The Medici were restored in Florence, the Sforza in Milan until 1535, when their line came to an end. The Este family continued to hold Ferrara, the Gonzaga Mantua, and the House of Savoy Piedmont. The Republics of Lucca, Genoa and Venice remained in being, and kept the forms of their free institutions; but Italians who desired a career enlisted in the Spanish service. We may note the cases of Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma (d. 1592), who was the most successful of the governors of Philip II in the Netherlands, and of Ferrante Gonzaga, who was one of the best administrators and generals of Charles V.

The effects of Spanish domination in Lombardy, Naples and Sicily were almost entirely bad. Milan was valued purely as a military outpost, and was kept under martial law, a military viceroy ruling with autocratic powers. The Lombards were heavily taxed to pay the expenses of the Spanish garrison; but the nobles and the clergy were exempted from taxation. The industries of Lombardy decayed owing to Spanish regulations; e.g. trade with France was prohibited; so was the export of raw silk, because the government hoped to stimulate a native weaving industry. There was considerable migration of Lombard manufacturers and artisans to France and Venice. Naples was pillaged by the Viceroys

and by royal favourites who were sent over to make their fortunes. Natives were allowed no share in the government. Spaniards did their utmost to make the native nobles and clergy unpopular so that the people might be left without leaders. The wretched condition of the populace in the city of Naples is shown by bread-riots in 1621 and Masaniello's revolt in 1646. Sicily was rather more prosperous owing to a large export trade in corn and silk. But Messina revolted with French assistance in 1675–8.

The Papacy

In a sense the Papacy was under Spanish protection; for Spain practically guaranteed the integrity of the Papal States and even allowed them to be enlarged by the absorption of the Duchies of Ferrara (1597) and Urbino (1631). The Papacy had indeed abstained from challenging the power of Spain after the Sack of Rome (1527) —an event which incidentally decided the future course of the English Reformation. Without Spanish support the Popes could hardly have kept the temporal power, for the Papal States were wretchedly governed. Papal taxation was heavy and the Popes did not understand the first principles of commercial policy. Thus they ruined agriculture by fixing a maximum price for corn. The Papal law-courts were so corrupt that the poor could get no redress for oppression. In the absence of any efficient police, brigandage flourished. A large part of the Pope's revenue was derived from the sale of sinecure offices, and hence the costs of government were enormous.

Genoa

Of the independent states Genoa was the most flourishing. Her harbour was the chief channel of the foreign trade of North Italy and her ruling families amassed wealth as financiers and merchants. They farmed the revenues of the Spanish monarchy and acted as bankers and money-lenders for the Spanish nobility and Hapsburgs. Genoa had a considerable merchant-marine, and this was protected by a fleet which was from time to time hired by Spain. Genoa was coveted by France and also by the Dukes of Savoy, but was protected against both by Spain.

Tuscany under the Grand Dukes of the Medici house was

tolerably well ruled and became in the seventeenth century a commercial centre of some importance owing to the development by the Grand Dukes of the seaport of Livorno (Leghorn). But most of this commerce got into the hands of English and Dutch settlers. The old staple manufactures of silk and woollen goods declined, perhaps because the manufacturers failed to keep pace with the times; and Tuscany became more and more an agricultural state, in which agriculture was still thoroughly old-fashioned. The country was heavily taxed, partly because the Grand Dukes were extravagant, also because Tuscany was required to contribute heavily to the expense of the wars of Spain. To some extent matters improved after 1737, when Florence passed under Austrian rule. The Archduke Leopold (1765–90) reformed the laws, lightened the burdens of the peasantry, abolished restrictions on internal trade and fostered a reform in agriculture.

Tuscany

Venice, with a little help from Spain and Austria, continued fighting the Turks at sea and on the soil of the Balkans up to 1718. She lost Cyprus in 1571, but kept Crete, and fought desperately from 1648 to 1669 to defend the island against the Turks. The defence of Candia by Francesco Morosini, 1667-9, is one of the most heroic episodes in European history. After that date Venice produced no more military or naval leaders of genius. But in 1683 she joined the Holy League formed by Austria for war against the Turk. Morosini was still at her disposal and he conquered the Morea (1683–7). These conquests were, however, lost in the next war with the Turks (1714–16). Of the Venetian Empire nothing remained but Corfu and a few other islands. Much of the trade which Venice had done with Northern Europe was trade in the products of her Mediterranean Empire; and it diminished as the Empire contracted. In the seventeenth century Venetian ships still carried goods to Northern Europe, and the overland trade with Germany was large. But this was a transit-trade in which Venice had to compete with Genoa and Leghorn and Trieste. One reason for the decline was that the Venetians levied enormous dues on foreign ships coming to their ports.

Venice

The Suppression of Free Thought

In one respect Venice was more free than any other state of Italy. She would not allow the Index of Prohibited Books or the Roman Inquisition to interfere with her own subjects; and she gave freedom of worship to foreign Protestants. Paolo Sarpi (1552–1623), the historian of the Council of Trent, was able under Venetian protection to criticize the Papacy, and also the Inquisition, and to ignore a sentence of excommunication (1607). Very different was the lot of free-thinkers who were protected by other Italian princes. The Grand Duke of Tuscany did not save from punishment the great scientist Galileo, whose only offence was a statement that some statements of Holy Writ were not to be taken literally. Galileo escaped lightly, thanks to the Grand Duke. But other men of original views were not so fortunate. The Inquisition burned the theologians Carnesecchi (1567) and Paleario (1570) and the philosopher Giordano Bruno, who had treated the immortality of the soul as an open question (1600). The Index was so energetic in Italy that the book-trade migrated to Switzerland and Germany.

The effect of the ecclesiastical censorship was that the Italian genius turned away from the dangerous fields of philosophy and even of literature. Tasso, the last great Italian poet, devoted himself to writing a religious epic and lived in dread of the Inquisition. He achieved a success in spite of these difficulties. But the Italian intellect turned more and more to the sciences, mathematics, medicine, botany, biology, mineralogy. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries medical and legal studies throve at Padua under Venetian rule: they attracted an influx of Englishmen to study Civil Law, like Francis Walsingham, or anatomy, like Harvey, the discoverer of the circulation of the blood. Giovanni Battista Vico of Naples and Muratori of Modena (b. 1672, d. 1750) were important in the development of philosophy and history; Galvani of Bologna (b. 1737, d. 1798) was a pioneer of electrical science. We may mention in passing the brilliant but short-lived Experimental Society of Florence (1657–66), which came abruptly to an end when the founder was made a cardinal.

THE GREAT GEOGRAPHICAL DISCOVERIES

CHAPTER V

THE AGE OF DISCOVERY AND EMPIRE-FOUNDING

CARDINAL EVENTS

1260–95	Travels of Marco Polo and his family.
1418–60	Henry the Navigator.
1486	Bartholomew Diaz rounds the Cape of Good Hope.
1492	Discovery of America by Columbus.
1497–98	Voyage of Vasco da Gama to India by the Cape.
1519–21	Magellan circumnavigates the world. Cortez in Mexico.
1531–5	Pizarro conquers Peru.
1577–9	Drake's voyage round the world.

WE have now to deal with the great geographical discoveries which were followed by the rise of four colonial Empires: Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, English. Up to the thirteenth century Europeans knew little of the world outside Europe and the shores of the Mediterranean. The explorations of the Vikings in North American waters and Greenland (982) were forgotten outside the Scandinavian lands.[1] But some interest had been excited by the travels of missionaries and merchants in Central Asia. In 1245–7 John de Plano Carpini, a Franciscan, journeyed to Karakorum and back as an envoy from

[1] The texts about Vinland are given, with translations, in A. M. Reeves, *The Finding of Wineland the Good* (Oxford, 1890). The Norse colony in Greenland is mentioned in Papal documents of 1448 and 1492, but it decayed rapidly after 1400 (Beazley, *The Dawn of Modern Geography*, III, 495–6).

Innocent IV to the Great Khan. In 1251–2 William of Rubruck went the same journey as the ambassador of Louis IX. Both these travellers wrote full accounts of their travels which are extant.[1] Even better known are the Voyages of Marco Polo, which record the observations made by himself and other members of his family in the years 1260–95.[2] These observations related to Central Asia, China, Java and Sumatra, India, Arabia. Much hearsay was mixed up in the narrative which Marco dictated in 1298, when he was a prisoner at Genoa. He was responsible for the general belief in the enormous wealth of China and the Islands. But in the fourteenth century it was accepted as giving a true account of the Far East; and in 1375 the Majorcan map-maker Cresquez used Marco Polo as his authority for the geography of Asia. Some knowledge of the interior of North Africa and of the East Coast down to Madagascar had been obtained by Mohammedan travellers. As to the general conception of the earth—all intelligent geographers from the twelfth century onwards knew that it was spherical in shape, and Roger Bacon was able to calculate the earth's circumference with fair accuracy. Therefore the discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries did not mean a revolution in scientific thought as is too commonly assumed. The effects were political and commercial.

Portuguese Explorations, 1418–1539

The beginnings of the great maritime discoveries were directed by Prince Henry of Portugal in 1418–60. He was the Grand Master of a Crusading Order and planned a great crusade against the Infidel in Africa. For this purpose he caused the West Coast of Africa to be systematically explored. The first considerable discovery was that in 1418–19 of the Azores, at that time uninhabited. About 1441 the explorers were allowed to embark in the slave trade, which proved lucrative to themselves and provided Portugal with cheap labour.

[1] Edited in one volume by C. Raymond Beazley for the Hakluyt Society in 1903.

[2] There is good reason for thinking that the work of Marco Polo was originally written in French. The best English translation is that of Sir Henry Yule (edited by H. Cordier, 1903).

By the time of Henry's death the coastline had been explored up to Cape Verde (1460). In 1486 Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope. But the commercial importance of this event was only realized when the land-traveller Pedro de Covilharu made his way *via* Egypt to the Malabar coast of India and discovered that it could be easily reached from Madagascar. This knowledge inspired the great voyage of Vasco da Gama in 1497–8. He discovered that Calicut on the Malabar coast was the central emporium of the spice-trade, and was in Mohammedan hands. He obliged the chiefs of the Malabar Coast to grant him a monopoly of trade. Hence began a new Holy War in the Far East, which by 1506 eliminated the Arabs from the Malabar trade. In 1508 a Portuguese trade factory was established in Ceylon. In 1512 Affonso da Albuquerque made Goa the head-quarters of Portuguese administration in the Far East. Under his direction the route from India to the Spice Islands was explored, and in 1512 the key position of Malacca occupied. Under the successors of Albuquerque the sea-route to Borneo and China was explored in 1576–7. The strategic points aimed at by the Portuguese were Socotra (1503), Ormuz (1507), Ceylon (1508), Malacca (1509), Quilera and Mozambique (1498). The Portuguese hold on these Eastern settlements was precarious. The trading-posts which they held were not suitable for white colonization, and Portugal had only a population of 1,500,000 souls. Goa was the only spot in the East where a considerable settlement was formed. Even her fleets were largely manned with foreign crews. Such emigrants as were available were largely diverted to Brazil, accidentally discovered by Cabral in 1500. Between 1532 and 1539 settlements were established at Rio de Janeiro, Pernambuco and Bahia. Slaves were brought over from Africa, and sugar plantations were established which secured a great part of the European trade in that article.

This new Empire gave Portugal a new significance in European history. The Portuguese had annexed at one stroke the most profitable part of the Mediterranean trade. They did not, of course, keep the monopoly of explor-

ation. After Columbus' voyage of 1492–3 Portugal and Spain came to an agreement in the Treaty of Tordesillas (1494) to accept the 'line' of Pope Alexander VI (370 leagues west of the Azores). This was intended to exclude the Portuguese from America, but had the effect of allowing them Brazil. But their monopolies were not seriously disputed until the Dutch Republic came into being at the end of the sixteenth century. In 1580, however, Portugal and her Empire were annexed by Spain and remained Spanish until 1640. The Spanish connection was disastrous; for the Portuguese possessions in East and West were attacked by the Dutch, and meanwhile the Portuguese navy and army had lost their efficiency for imperial purposes. Before 1640 the Dutch were completely masters of the Spice Islands, the most profitable market of the Portuguese Empire. The Brazilian settlers were not unprosperous but paid little attention to the home government. After 1640 the Portuguese Empire was chiefly important as a trade market, much coveted by the English, the French, and the Dutch. The Portuguese kept in their own hands the monopoly of the direct trade with Brazil, which was considered very lucrative, as Brazil paid for her imports very largely in the gold which her mines produced. But it is probable that the manufactured goods which the Portuguese sent to Brazil came mainly from Holland, France and England. England at all events attached some importance to the Portuguese market for her woollen cloths, and secured her access to it by the terms of the Methuen Treaty of 1703. The colonists were forbidden by the Portuguese government to manufacture anything but sugar; and the government took a tithe of the produce of the gold and diamond mines. One bad result of the Brazilian connection was that it made the monarchy independent of public opinion at home. The gold of Brazil (first discovered in the seventeenth century) was fatal to Portuguese liberty.

The Portuguese Empire

Christopher Columbus, the pioneer of the Spanish Empire, was very different from Henry the Navigator. He was not a religious enthusiast, not a scientific investigator; but a seaman who had learned the rudiments of map-making and

navigation. He knew that the world was spherical and argued that it should be possible to reach Asia by sailing westward. According to the best geographers of his time, if he steered along the tropic of Cancer he would come to Cipangu, or Japan. Columbus perhaps derived his knowledge of current theories from the Florentine geographer, Toscanelli, who had drawn up for the King of Portugal a report on the possibility of sailing westward to Asia. It is rather extraordinary that the Spanish kings took him up in the end (1492) ; for his project had been previously rejected by the Court of Portugal and also by Henry VII of England, who afterwards patronized John Cabot's voyage to Cape Breton Island and rewarded that explorer with a grant of £10 in cash and a pension of £20 and leave to try his luck on another voyage.

Christopher Columbus

Columbus, however successful as an explorer, was not the real founder of the Empire. Up to the time of his death (1506), the Spaniards were only acquainted with the West Indies and the adjacent coastline of South America. The settlers were mainly engaged in the fruitless quest for gold-mines ; the more industrious tried to establish sugar plantations and were permitted for that purpose to import negro slaves from Portuguese Africa. The age of colonial expansions begins with the accession of Charles V. It was in 1519–21 that Magellan, a Portuguese captain in Spanish service, sailed round the world. The same years saw the conquest of Mexico by Hernando Cortez. He had with him only a few hundred Spanish soldiers, but won his victories by the help of native tribes which were hostile to the rulers of Mexico, the Aztecs. His exploits are related in his own despatches of the years 1519–26. In return for his services he was created Captain-General of Mexico. He returned to Spain about 1540, complaining bitterly of the ingratitude with which he had been treated, though it is not clear that his complaints were justified. He died in 1547. Mexico, quite apart from her mines, became a flourishing agricultural and ranching colony, organized (thanks to Cortez) in great military fiefs. The Catholic Church was of

The Spanish Empire

Conquest of Mexico

course established and a Viceroy installed with an Audience or Council.

Meanwhile there had taken place in 1531–5 the Conquest of Peru by Francisco Pizarro, a grazier from the Isthmus of Darien, who had obtained a commission for the purpose from Charles V. His expedition consisted of three ships carrying less than 200 men; but he succeeded owing to the confusion in which Peru had been plunged by a war of succession. Pizarro was killed by a faction of his own followers in 1538, but the conquerors retained their hold on the country. The Viceroyalty of Peru included, besides Peru proper, Chili, Quito, New Granada, Panama, Venezuela.

Conquest of Peru

The progress of the Spaniards in other parts of America may be shown by a table of dates:

1534–5 Colonization of Buenos Ayres by Pedro de Mendoza.

1541 Conquest of Chili by Pedro di Valdivia, a follower of Pizarro, who had formerly been in the service of Cortez.

1538 Beginning of the colonization of Colombia, the northernmost of the Andean States, which was reputed to be the land of El Dorado.

1528–40 Exploration and partial settlement of California by the followers of Cortez.

From 1566 to 1588 the whole of Spanish America was ruled by the Viceroys of Mexico and Peru. Their gold and silver gave these two acquisitions an overwhelming importance in Spanish eyes. But the Argentine and Chile were more thoroughly settled; and in the eighteenth century, when the mines of gold and silver began to give out, the agricultural possibilities were realized and still more the possible profits of stock-breeding. Thus the Spanish colonial trade remained valuable; and one of the reasons why Spain still counted as a Great Power was that England, France and Holland desired to take part directly or indirectly in supplying the Spanish colonies with manufactured goods. This, however, is an anticipation. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Spanish Empire was regarded as a prize that might be

conquered, or as a preserve with which contraband trade might profitably be carried on.

Attacks by the French and English

The attack upon the Spanish position in the New World was opened by the French, who in 1540 founded their first settlement in North America, challenging the Spanish doctrine that this continent was included in the Papal award of 1494. A little later the Grand Admiral Coligni encouraged attempts to settle Rio Janeiro (1556) and Florida (1564–8). These and other enterprises were the work of privateers, many of whom were Huguenots. After them came the English seamen, of whom Drake, 'el Draconte', was the most dreaded. Particularly notable are his raids of 1572 on Nombre de Dios, Vera Cruz and Panama, his plundering of the Pacific coast in the course of his voyage round the world (1577–9), and his raids of 1585–6 on San Domingo and Cartagena. The object of such raids was usually either to seize the treasure which was being collected for the annual Plate Fleet or to intercept the Fleet itself. Efforts were made by the Spaniards to conceal the course followed by the Plate Fleet, but experience showed the raiders that it could usually be met either at the Canaries or at the Azores. Towards the end of the sixteenth century there arose in England a school of 'colonial' adventurers who owed their inspiration to Sir Humphrey Gilbert, the leader in the disastrous expedition of 1583 to Newfoundland. The efforts of this school were first turned to Virginia (Raleigh, 1585; Virginia Company, 1609) and New England (*Mayflower*, 1620). In 1608 or 1609 Quebec was founded by the French and in 1625 a British colony was established at Barbados as a commercial expedition; it flourished prodigiously after the introduction of the sugar-cane (1637); and in 1635 the French settled in Martinique and Guadeloupe. Thus the Spanish monopoly was crumbling at the very centre of the system years before Penn and Venables seized Jamaica for the Commonwealth (1655).

Cromwell had formed a design for a joint war of England and Holland against the Spanish Empire. But Spain was saved by the mutual jealousies of the new colonial Powers. Already in the reign of James I the English and Dutch were

on the worst of terms in the Spice Islands. This rivalry found expression in the Navigation Acts, 1651–60, and the First Dutch War (1652–4) fought at a time when political and religious considerations would naturally have led to a defensive alliance. The Second and Third Wars (1664–74) were the consequence of friction in India, in the Spice Islands, in Africa and in North America. Though the Dutch did well in Europe they lost their principal settlement in America (New Amsterdam), and thenceforth fell back upon the Spice Islands and West Indies. The capture of New Amsterdam gave England the opportunity of becoming the paramount power in North America, but until 1763 she had to fight almost continuously against France for this position; and the War of American Independence, coming immediately afterwards, had the effect of making the United States, rather than France or England, the most dangerous neighbour of the Spanish Empire.

The discovery of the New World and the opening up of Asia had some general effects of a far-reaching nature.

Results of the Discoveries

(1) The accumulation of wealth became easier and more rapid in the colonizing countries, particularly in those which manufactured for the colonial market. In seventeenth-century England and Holland, particularly after the Peace of Westphalia, the moneyed interest became influential in politics and the economic motive was apparent in the national policy of these countries and somewhat later of France, which attempted to imitate their methods.[1]

(2) As colonial trade depended on free access to the ocean routes, sea-power became a necessity of life to the colonial powers. Though it was principally France who challenged the naval ascendancy of England in the eighteenth century, France was seconded by the Dutch and Spanish fleets at most critical conjunctures up to the battle of Trafalgar.

(3) The influx of gold and silver into Europe had the effect of depreciating those metals, and consequently of raising

[1] The Dutch East India Company was founded 1602.
„ English „ „ „ „ „ 1600.
„ French „ „ „ „ 1664.
All these were monopolistic.

prices at a time when wages were still kept stationary by custom or by the action of trade-guilds or by state-legislation. The classes which were hard hit by the rise of prices were ripe for mischief, and no doubt their discontent contributed to the epidemic of civil wars in Continental Europe between 1540 and 1660. The period 1545–60 is that when the effect of the silver-mines of America became apparent.

The Dutch in the East

Before the Revolt of the Netherlands the Dutch, though subjects of Spain, had been carefully excluded from the colonial trade. But towards the end of the War of Independence they made determined attacks both on the Portuguese Indies (annexed to Spain since 1580) and on America. In the East the first step was the great voyage of the brothers Houtman, who explored the route to Goa and the Strait of Malacca, 1595–7. On their return a Dutch East India Company was chartered with exclusive rights of trade and power to acquire territory and raise troops. In 1606 a fleet sent out by the Company defeated the Portuguese squadron which guarded the Straits of Malacca and established settlements in the Spice Islands. The Spaniards prepared to send an Armada to the East, but this was destroyed off Gibraltar in 1607 by Admiral Heemskerk. In 1610 Dutch vessels got to China and opened the tea-trade. In 1616 the coffee-trade with Mocha was opened. In 1619 the Dutch and English Companies agreed to map out spheres of interest in the East Indies ; but in 1623 the peace was broken by the Massacre of Amboyna, and the English trade in the Spice Islands was suppressed. This action was the beginning of a dire feud, but hereafter the English confined themselves mainly to India. In 1610 the Dutch obtained permission to trade with Japan ; and in 1623 they took Formosa, which they lost in 1662. They were more successful in the great island of Java, where they were firmly established at Batavia as early as 1619. This became and remained their head-quarters in the East. In 1645 they partitioned Ceylon with the Portuguese and in 1651 founded Cape Colony as a port of call. In 1696 they got hold of a part of Celebes and in 1787 of a part of Borneo (valuable for the pepper trade).

From 1598 to 1616 Dutchmen were exploring the coast of

America as far north as Labrador and as far south as the Amazon. In 1621 was founded the Dutch West India Company which claimed the North American coast from Newfoundland southwards to Chesapeake Bay. The only effort at colonization was, however, in the New Netherlands (founded 1623). By 1635 the Dutch had acquired in the West Indies the islands of Curaçoa, Santa Cruz and St. Eustacius and most of the province of Pernambuco. Dutch power in Brazil came to an end in 1654 owing to the obstinate hostility of the Portuguese settlers. But they kept Guiana (Surinam) and other adjacent possessions on the mainland. They had great success as sugar planters in the West Indies, and were the first to discover the possibilities of this trade.

The Dutch in the West

CHAPTER VI

LUTHER AND THE REFORMATION

CARDINAL EVENTS

1517 Luther's ninety-five Theses.
1518 Zwingli's appointment at Zurich.
1521 Diet of Worms.
1527 Ecclesiastical Revolution in Sweden.
1529 Henry VIII of England summons the Reformation Parliament.
1536 Calvin's *Institutio Religionis Christianae.*
1540 Bigamy of Philip of Hesse.
1546 Death of Luther.

THE Reformation was a great and complex movement, assuming different forms in different parts of Europe, and not to be fully understood without reference to many processes of previous development which led up to it. But for our purpose the best way of appreciating its meaning is to begin with the career and character of its most famous leader, Martin Luther.

Martin Luther

Luther was born in 1483 and lived until 1546. He was the son of a man of humble origin who by 1491 had raised himself to the comfortable position of a town-councillor of Mansfeld and was able to give his son a good education in the Latin school at Eisenach and the University of Erfurt. The accounts which represent Luther as having spent his childhood in poverty bordering upon starvation are mythical: he had the upbringing of a middle-class youth in comfortable circumstances. In 1505 he became an Augustinian monk. In the monastery he began to study the Bible, because he was required by the rules of the House to

do so, and because his superior, Johann Staupitz, commended the Bible to him as the book in which he would find the solution of his doubts. From the Bible he passed on to a study of the works of St. Augustine and of the medieval mystics. And it was from these three sources that he derived the characteristic features of his theology. Appointed to lecture on theology at the Saxon University of Wittenberg, he became a learned theologian in the years 1508–15. The notes which he took for his lectures show that he was not an accomplished humanist; he was very weak in Greek and Hebrew. He arrived at his doctrine of Justification by Faith when he was lecturing on the Psalms (1513) and the Epistle to the Romans (1515–16). As early as 1513 his notice had been drawn to the abuse of Indulgences and he criticized it in his sermons, though he did not at that time question the doctrine of the *Thesaurus Meritorum* on which it was justified by orthodox theologians. As early as 1516 he deputed one of his pupils to defend the doctrine of Justification by Faith in a public disputation.

This evidence and more of the same kind shows that there was nothing accidental in Luther's revolt, which began in 1517 when the pardoner Tetzel was on his campaign for selling indulgences in Saxony. His first step was to publish ninety-five theses condemning Indulgences and the doctrines by which they were justified. Then followed the Leipzig Disputation of 1519, in which he had the courage to assert that even a General Council could err; and the pamphlet of 1520 addressed to the *Christian Nobility of the German Nation*, in which he demanded that the power of the Pope over the German State should be demolished, that the German Church should be ruled by a Council representing that Church, and that this Council should reform practical abuses, e.g. pilgrimages, monasteries and the excessive number of holy days. The reverence in which Luther was held at this time is shown by the fact that Albrecht Dürer painted a picture of him as St. John, the beloved disciple. Then came his celebrated defence of his doctrine before the Emperor and the Diet at Worms on 18 April, 1521. Tradition has improved a little on what he said. He did not actually wind up with the

declaration, 'Here I stand; I can no other; God help me, Amen.' But his speech aroused intense excitement within the Diet and all over Germany; and the climax of it was striking enough: 'I cannot trust the decisions either of Councils or of Popes, for it is plain that they have not only erred but they have also contradicted each other. My conscience is bound by the word of God, and it is neither safe nor honest to act against one's conscience. God help me, Amen.' The services which he rendered to his cause after 1521 were less dramatic, and before dealing with them we must estimate the significance of this first decisive period of his work.

Criticisms of Luther

The late Lord Acton's study of Luther [1] is a brilliant criticism of the beginnings of the Reformation. The gist of what he has to say is that Luther became a Protestant unexpectedly a little before the Diet of Worms. He was still a Catholic on 30 May, 1518, when he wrote to Leo X a very humble letter saying: 'I prostrate myself at your feet, placing myself and all that I am and have at your disposal.' On 3 March, 1519, in refusing to withdraw his objectionable works, Luther writes: 'I have never had the slightest wish to attack the power of the Roman Church or your Holiness in any way.' But he was at that time preparing to dispute the assertion 'that the Church of Rome is superior to all others'. On 10 July, 1520, he wrote: 'For me the die is cast and I despise Rome's displeasure as much as her favour. . . . If I can get a fire I shall publicly burn the whole Papal code . . . and make an end of the humility I have hitherto displayed in vain.' And on 18 August, 1520, he writes from Wittenberg: 'We firmly believe here that the Papacy is the personification of Anti-christ's throne. . . . I only owe the Pope the obedience due to Anti-Christ.' On 10 December, 1520, Luther publicly burned a Papal Bull at Wittenberg. Why this enormous change? Acton says that Luther had come to believe the Pope was anti-Christ, through reading in or about 1518 the tract of Lorenzo Valla on the temporal power. So far as theology was concerned there was no reason why he and his

[1] In his *Lectures on Modern History*, No. IV.

friends should not have remained in the Church. His friends would have remained in the Church if the German Catholics would have accepted the Confession of Augsburg as unexceptionable, which it was in point of theology. But the Catholics were thinking about the recovery of Church property. As for the Protestant princes—look at the Elector of Saxony with 'his zeal for indulgences and his collection of 19,000 relics'. The German princes wanted civil war and they looked to Luther as a cloak. After Augsburg the German Reformation was a political and not a religious movement. There is, of course, some truth in what Acton says. If all parties had desired peace and considered only how to preserve the unity of the Church, then the theological issues might have been adjusted.

Reasons for Luther's Influence

But why did Luther's doctrine command such sympathy in Germany and outside it? Though Lutheranism as a theology and a system of Church government did not spread very far, and had to compete even in Germany with rival forms of Protestantism, Luther supplied all Protestants with their most vital doctrines, Justification by Faith and the Right of Private Judgment. Why did these doctrines make such a sensation? Luther sometimes appealed to German nationalism, as in his address 'to the Christian nobility of the German nation'. He appealed to the princes by admitting the supremacy of the State over the Church, and by condoning the confiscation of Church endowments. But these were not the means by which he gained popular support. There were other and more weighty reasons for his general influence. In the first place he assailed gross and practical abuses, of which the sale of dispensations and indulgences was the most flagrant. Secondly, he preached a Biblical Christianity, and the Bible was widely read in the vernacular before he appeared in the field. In the years 1466–1518 no less than seventeen German translations of the whole Bible had been printed, and twenty-five translations of the Gospels and Epistles. Thirdly, Luther attacked the pretensions of the clergy, based upon their exclusive right of administering the sacraments; and there were in Germany many pious nonconformists who repudiated

the authority of the Roman Church and the ministrations of the clergy. Some of these dissenters maintained relations with the Hussites of Bohemia, and used the same catechism for the instruction of their children. Again the German mystics had in some respects anticipated Luther's teaching, and their opinions were widely disseminated in popular works, such as *Die Deutsche Theologie*, to which Luther was himself indebted.[1] Thus the ground was well prepared, and Protestantism might well have developed in Germany if Luther had never been born.

'Justification by Faith'

Without Luther, however, it is probable that the doctrine of Justification by Faith would not have been the cardinal doctrine of the reformers. This is his great contribution to the movement. He worked out his doctrine, as we have seen, in 1513–16, when he was lecturing as a Doctor of Theology. He held that Faith in the true sense is imparted by God and cannot be 'manufactured or imagined' by the human will or intellect. The man to whom Faith is granted becomes at once regenerate. Faith once received will be manifested in good works; but no man can attain to a state of faith by good works alone. The man who has received faith is justified, has received absolution from God; he does not need the absolution of any priest; still less does he need the sacrament of penance.

This doctrine as at first expounded by Luther was not heretical. It was Pauline and it was Augustinian It only became heretical when Luther made it clear that in his view Justification did not and could not come to the believer through any sacrament or through the mediation of any priestly authority. This he made clear in his tract *De Libertate Christiana*, published in October, 1521, on the eve of the Council of Worms. It was then possible to accuse him of the familiar medieval heresy that every true believer is a priest. He established his character as a heretic beyond all doubt at the Diet of Worms, where he refused to retract anything 'unless I am convicted by Scripture or right reason',

[1] He published it in 1516. Luther thought (though incorrectly) that his own theology was identical with that of the mystic Johann Tauler.

adding to his offence by the explanatory statement that he could trust neither in Popes nor in Councils, since they had often erred and contradicted themselves. The judgment of the visible Church was not to be accepted as the test of true belief.

Acton makes it a reproach against Luther that he never advanced materially beyond the position which he had taken up in 1521. Acton thinks that, if he had been a great man, he would have gone on to develop a whole system of religious philosophy. In fact, great leaders are usually men of few and strong ideas; but their ideas have the merit of offering a way out of difficulties which oppress the minds of their contemporaries. Luther offered to his contemporaries a way of escape from certain practical abuses of the ecclesiastical system which orthodox theologians had stated to be integral and essential elements of that system. To that extent he was an emancipator.

But Luther was not in favour of complete individualism and liberty of thought. He refused to give coercive powers to the pastors of his Church. But he held that the Christian ruler had a divine right to organize and superintend the Churches of his dominions. In 1532 he suggested to the Elector of Saxony that the ecclesiastical supremacy would be more effectively exercised if the Elector set up a Consistory, composed of lawyers and divines, to administer it. The powers exercised by this body were the normal powers of the Catholic bishop. The main principles of this Wittenberg system were accepted by the Lutheran cities and the other Lutheran princes. The result was the formation of 172 Lutheran state-churches, each with its Supreme Head. Luther did not admit the right of the ruler to dictate the faith of his subjects. Thus, in the tract *Von Weltlicher Obrigkeit wie weit man Ihr Gehorsam schuldig sei?* (1523), he wrote: 'No one can command or ought to command the soul except God Who only can show it the way to heaven.' 'The thoughts and mind of man are discernible only by God.' 'Faith is a voluntary matter which cannot be forced.' And again: 'Heresy is a spiritual matter that cannot be hewn down by iron, nor burned by fire, nor drowned by water.'

But he believed that the ruler ought to support that Church which the conscience of his subjects took to be true. It has been argued that this secular supremacy over the Lutheran Churches had a blighting influence, which may be true. It has also been suggested that Luther supported the supremacy of the princes as a matter of policy, to secure their help against the Emperor. This again may be true, but there is more reason to think that he was thinking chiefly of the danger from separatist sects, such as that of the Anabaptists. There was a real danger that the Protestant party would be shattered into fragments if these sects were not repressed.

Luther's Second Period

In the years 1521–34 Luther had several opportunities of allying his cause to that of other movements, political, social and religious, as the following list of dates shows:

1522 The Zwickau Prophets.
1523 The Rising of the Free Knights of the Empire under Sickingen.
1525 The Peasants' Revolt.
1530 Zwingli at the Conference of Marburg.
1525–35 The Anabaptist movement.

The Anabaptists

As to the first and last of these Luther had little choice. The Zwickau Prophets and the Anabaptists preached doctrines which spelled social and moral anarchy. Further, their doctrines were in some respects a caricature of Luther's own teaching; and this made it the more necessary that he should dissociate himself emphatically and irrevocably from such teachers. Calvin wrote of the Anabaptists: 'They pretend to be spiritual; but they are devils who attempt to pervert all humanity and to throw it into such horrible confusion that it would be better that men should become brute beasts or wolves than to have such a mixture.'[1] The case of the Knights was rather different. Their leader, Sickingen, was a Lutheran and had been ready to protect Luther at the Diet of Worms. But the grievance which led the Knights to rebel was political. They complained that they had no representation in the Diet, that they were being

[1] An astonishing account of the Anabaptist Republic of Münster is given in Ranke's *Reformation*, Bk. VI, c. 9. Luther was horrified.

robbed of their ancient privileges (e.g. the right of private war) or forced into subjection by the great princes. The object of their rising was to plunder the ecclesiastical princes, who, they imagined, would not be protected by the lay princes. They hoped for Luther's support in this pious object. He would have been worse than foolish if he had acceded to the request.

The Peasants

There remains, however, the case of the Peasants. Their grievances were very real, and most of their demands were moderate enough in substance to deserve examination and discussion. Their main demands were that serfdom should be abolished, that their services and dues should be defined instead of being assessed at the arbitrary will of the lord, that their rights of common should be restored, that the game-laws should be abolished and that fishing should be free. They asked for the right to elect their own parish priests; but they were willing that this, like all their other demands, should be withdrawn if proved to be contrary to Scripture. The two chief princes of the Protestant party, Frederic of Saxony and Philip of Hesse, were in favour of dealing leniently with the insurgents. But except in Hesse and in Electoral Saxony the risings were stamped out with merciless severity and without the slightest attempt to remedy genuine grievances. Luther not only acquiesced in this policy; he exhorted the princes to be severe. In May, 1525, he published a tract against the peasants. They had no right to demand emancipation. The freedom promised in the Gospel was a spiritual freedom, and serfdom a salutary institution. 'The ass shall have blows and the people shall be ruled by force.' He publicly exhorted the princes 'to stab, smite and slay all ye can', and said that the peasants were worthy of death 'for having covered their terrible sins with the name of the Gospel'. These words are the more remarkable because, a month earlier, before the rising had become formidable, Luther had publicly rebuked the princes as being ultimately responsible for the distress of the peasants. 'We need thank no one on earth for this foolish rebellion but you, my lords. . . . In civil government you do nothing but oppress and tax to maintain your pomp and pride, until the poor common man neither

can nor will bear it any longer. . . . Some of the demands of the peasants are right, as the demand to choose their own pastors.' Luther had no sympathy with the demand for the abolition of serfdom. 'The Gospel is concerned with spiritual not temporal affairs' is his answer to the plea that 'Christ has freed all'. Clearly Luther lost his head when the situation became critical. He could not have saved the peasants, but he might have done something to secure better treatment for them after their defeat.

Luther's lack of Statesmanship

Luther was not a statesman. He had no talent for organization; that is shown by the dismembered condition of the Lutheran communion. He had no talent for compromise. That is shown by his quarrel with Zwingli, which should have been capable of adjustment seeing that he and Zwingli were agreed in looking to Scripture as the ultimate source of doctrine. If he had come to terms with Zwingli in 1529 the Protestant cause in Germany would have been strengthened, and the victory of the Protestant princes over Charles V might have come much earlier; as it was, those towns and states of South Germany which had embraced the Zwinglian confession held aloof from their co-religionists in the North. A year later Luther saw what an error he had committed, and was willing to reopen negotiations. This time it was the Zwinglians who held back; a compromise was finally arranged in 1536 with Bullinger of Zurich, but it was tepid. From 1530 onwards the direction of the policy of Lutheranism passed more and more into the hands of Melanchthon, who was more cautious than Luther and more disposed to compromise. But the preaching and the writings of Luther made the Protestant party and maintained its enthusiasm at white heat. Furthermore, it was Luther who, after 1530, infused a fighting spirit into his followers. Up to 1530 he had steadily preached the doctrine of non-resistance. At the end of that year he abandoned it, being convinced that Charles V intended the extirpation of Protestantism. He approved of the formation of the armed League of Schmalkalde and pinned his hopes for the future upon Philip of Hesse, the brilliant general of the League. It was to keep Philip on the Protestant side that Luther

committed in 1540 one of the most dubious actions of his life—the condonation of Philip's bigamous marriage.

Luther died in 1546. His place at the head of the party was taken by Melanchthon, who survived until 1560. Melanchthon left his mark upon Lutheranism. He was the leading theologian of the University of Wittenberg, in which nearly all the Lutheran pastors were trained. He made Lutheran theology more systematic, and he cemented the alliance between Lutheranism and the New Learning, being himself an accomplished Greek scholar. Melanchthon represented the party in all the conferences which were held during the years 1530–46 for the purpose of coming to terms with the Roman Catholics. He also gave a great impulse to the cause of secular education by improving the theory and practice of teaching in the Lutheran schools. In spite of the efforts made by the Jesuits to effect a corresponding reform in the schools of the Catholic South, the Protestant States of Germany gained a virtual monopoly of the higher studies.

Melanchthon

CHAPTER VII

THE REFORMATION OUTSIDE GERMANY

UP to the Peace of Augsburg in 1555 Germany was the focus of the Reformation movement. Ecclesiastical revolutions took place in Sweden (1527) and in Denmark (1536); in each case the essence of the change was the substitution of a royal supremacy for that of the Pope, the confiscation of a large proportion of the endowments of the Church, and the official introduction of a vernacular Bible to be used in the services of the Church. By degrees the Swedish and Danish Churches became Lutheran; but in the first instance they were reformed by the Crown for purely political motives. The Scandinavian Churches produced no great teachers of reformed doctrines. In England under Henry VIII and Edward VI there was a Reformation of very similar character, though eventually Elizabeth succeeded in keeping the English Church, both in liturgy and in doctrine, distinct from the reformed confessions of the Continent. Finally in Southern Germany, in France, in England, in Scotland, and in Poland this period saw the growth of a Protestant opposition which aspired to capture the government of the state. Polish Protestantism, which first appeared about 1523, was a growing force up to 1564, when the King of Poland brought in the Jesuits to effect a reaction by preaching in the churches and teaching in the schools. The Jesuits also were responsible, after 1555, for the repression of Protestantism in South Germany. These were the two spheres in which the Order rendered most signal service to the Counter-Reformation.

Up to 1531 Zwingli was the only religious leader outside Germany who challenged comparison with Luther and Melanchthon. Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531) was the founder of the Swiss Reformation. He was a humanist and a disciple of Erasmus who became a priest in 1506, devoted himself for ten years to the critical study of the Scriptures and in 1515 announced his conviction that 'Popery has no foundation in Scripture'. In 1518 he was appointed one of the parish priests of Zurich, and made his mark as a preacher of Biblical Christianity, and became by degrees a political force. The government of the city, which had already arrogated to itself the control of religious policy, was on his side. A number of the other cantons clung to the old religion and made it their policy to stamp out all innovations in their own territories (1524). Zurich, on the other hand, set about radical reforms, suppressing monasteries, abolishing the mass, clearing pictures and images out of the churches, and setting up a synodal form of Church government (1524–5). Zwingli was the leader in these reforms, *de facto* the head of the city government as well. The Church of Zurich began an active propaganda outside the territories of Zurich, and this led to war with the Catholic cantons. Zwingli aspired to make Zurich the head of the Protestant interest in Switzerland, to conquer the Tyrol from the Hapsburgs, and to draw into the League a number of free imperial cities which had embraced Protestantism, especially Constance, Strassburg and Basle. The Hapsburgs in alarm did their best to stir up the Catholic cantons against Zurich. Zwingli, on the other hand, entered into negotiation with the Lutheran princes, and tried to bring about a comprehensive union of Reformers; but this plan fell through owing to theological differences mainly connected with the doctrine of the Mass (Conference of Marburg, 1529). He also endeavoured to put compulsion on the Catholic Cantons to tolerate the new teaching. All these plans came to the ground with the disastrous battle of Kappel (1531), in which Zwingli was killed. Zurich had to renounce her ambitious policy, and the Swiss Protestants remained disunited; while the Counter-Reformation riveted the Catholic Cantons more firmly than ever to the old faith. But the

Ulrich Zwingli

Zwinglian theology remained influential, and Zwingli's scheme of Church government had points in common with that of Calvin. In 1549 the Zwinglian and Calvinist Churches of Switzerland came to an agreement on matters of theology which gave to Protestant Switzerland a religious though not a political unity.

French Protestantism

The French movement towards Protestantism can be discerned as early as 1512 in the writings of Jacques Lefèvre, the leading humanist of Paris. His commentary on the Pauline Epistles, published in that year, anticipated in some points Luther's Doctrine of Justification, and also challenged the crude popular form of the dogma of Transubstantiation. He had the distinction of counting among his pupils John Calvin, who studied at Paris in 1531–2. In 1536, the year after Lefèvre's death, Calvin published his *Institutio Religionis Christianae*, a book which betrayed the influence both of Lefèvre and of Luther, but was none the less an original production of far-reaching importance. In virtue of the ideas expressed in this work Calvin became the prophet and the organizer of a new and more militant Protestantism. 'But', says Acton, 'he wrote with a view to show that there was nothing in the Protestant religion to alarm the government and that the change it demanded was in the Church, not in the State. He dealt more largely with theology than with practical religion, and did not disclose his ideas on the government of religious society.' He rewrote the *Institute* when in exile at Strassburg, 1538–41, to expound his views of the proper relation of Church and State.

John Calvin

The importance of Calvin's career may be measured by the fact that his doctrine became within a generation of his death the dominant form of Protestantism in France, Scotland, England, the Dutch Netherlands and in Western Germany. He owed something, no doubt, to the fact that French was his native language. But he owed more to his own gifts of clear thinking, luminous phraseology and statesmanlike prevision. He had little that was new to say on the subject of theological doctrine, except that he added to Luther's definition of Faith its logical corollary the theory of Pre-

destination. But he had a clear-cut theory as to the proper relation of Church and State. The Church, he says, consists of the whole body of the Elect. In order that the Church may render due obedience to God it must be completely autonomous, and it must have coercive authority over its own members. The power of the lay ruler is ordained by God, and Christians are bound to render obedience unto Caesar, but only so long as Caesar commands nothing that God has forbidden. Here we have a re-assertion by a Protestant leader of the medieval theory of Church and State. The theory was illustrated by the reforms which Calvin effected at Geneva through his *Ordonnances Ecclesiastiques* (1541), and by the constitution of the Huguenot Church in France. At Geneva the supreme power in matters ecclesiastical belonged to a Consistory which supervised the faith and morals of the city. This body maintained a most rigorous discipline which was enforced by an elaborate system of espionage and by inquisitorial methods. The severest penalty which it inflicted was excommunication, but it had the right of handing over obstinate offenders to the municipal authorities to be imprisoned or even capitally punished. The power of the Consistory was exercised in a manner which seems to us highly tyrannical, and the death-penalty was demanded in some cases for slight offences. But the circumstances at Geneva were unusual. The city was often in danger of an attack by the Duke of Savoy or by Spain or by France ; and within the city there was a powerful minority (*Mamelukes* or *Libertines*) which chafed against Calvin's system and would gladly have assisted in making a Revolution.

Church and State

It was a fundamental doctrine with Calvin that the laity ought to participate through their elected representatives in the government of the Church. He is the founder of the Presbyterian system, which he defended not on grounds of political theory, but because he found it in the primitive Christian Church. At Geneva two-thirds of the members of the Consistory were laymen, so that the lay element appeared to be uppermost. That was not really the case, for some of the lay members were nominated by the ministers and could be trusted to vote with the ministers.

Characteristics of Calvinism

who thus held a permanent majority of votes. Outside Geneva there was a general impression that the Presbyterian system was inconsistent with episcopacy. It is true that the Genevan Church had no bishops ; but Calvin was prepared to authorize the retention of bishops in other Churches, e.g. in that of England, especially if every bishop was provided with a council of elected ministers and elders to guide his policy. This was the ideal of the English Presbyterians under Elizabeth.

But Calvin's ideal is most clearly realized in the French Protestant Church. Here we find every parish ruled by a minister with the assistance of *Elders*, who help him to supervise the moral conduct of the parishioners, and of lay *Deacons*, who look after the sick and poor. The Minister, elders and deacons form the *Consistory*, the ecclesiastical council and the court for enforcing the penances of backsliders. The minister is elected to his office by the Elders ; the Elders and the Deacons are elected by the parishioners. In 1559 it was provided by a General Assembly of the Huguenot Churches that in every province there should be a Provincial Synod, composed of representatives of the parochial consistories, and that the Provincial Synods should send representatives to a General Synod entitled to speak for all the churches of the kingdom. In these synods, as in the parochial consistories, the laity were represented. This is the system which John Knox established in Scotland after the fall of Mary Stuart ; and from that date up to the Restoration the General Assembly of the Kirk was, much more than the Parliament of Scotland, the organ through which the general will of the people was expressed. So long as the General Assembly was allowed to control ecclesiastical affairs the political ideal of Calvin was realized in Scotland.

The political effects of Calvinism are summarized by Acton in the words : ' It checked the reigning idea that nothing limits the power of the State.'

EUROPE IN 1519

CHAPTER VIII

THE AGE OF HAPSBURG ASCENDANCY, 1519–1598 [1]

CARDINAL EVENTS

1515	Battle of Marignano: Francis I recovers Milan.
1525	Overthrow of Francis I at Pavia by Charles V.
1555	Peace of Augsburg establishes the principle *Cuius regio eius religio* in Germany. Abdication of Charles V.
1559	Peace of Cateau Cambrésis marks the end of the Wars in Italy.
1567	Beginning of the Netherlands revolt.
1598	Peace of Vervins.
1609	Twelve Years Truce in the Netherlands.
1618–48	Thirty Years War.

THERE is not much romance about the Hapsburgs, who, though insatiably ambitious, were in general slow-moving, cautious and conservative statesmen. But for more than a hundred years they took the lead in European politics, and the other powers were largely occupied in forecasting and defeating their grandiose schemes. Their policy supplies us with a clue to the mazes of international statecraft for rather more than a hundred years. We must first notice the curiously fortuitous rise of the Hapsburgs to greatness. The Emperor Frederic III (d. 1493) outlived all the other partners in the family heritage and bequeathed it intact to his son Maximilian. Maximilian married the heiress

[1] The inclusion of this chapter from the earlier of the two versions of the manuscript involves some repetition of matter also treated in other chapters, but is necessary to complete the work. (*Editor.*)

of the Netherlands (1477), which were duly inherited by their son Philip (1482). Philip married the heiress of Aragon and Castile, and Sicily and Naples (1496), and their son Charles succeeded in due course to the Netherlands (1506), the Spanish kingdom with Sicily and Naples (1516), the Hapsburg possessions (1519), and the Empire (1520). By 1521 Charles had become the ruler of Mexico, thanks to Hernando Cortez; by 1535 he was also master of Peru, thanks to Francesco Pizarro. From the Indies and the Netherlands he derived a larger revenue than any other sovereign of his times; from Spain and the Netherlands he got ships sufficient to defend the New World and to carry its trade; from Spain and Germany he drew inexhaustible supplies of troops. As ruler of Sicily and Naples he was in a position to dictate to the Pope, whose influence still carried weight in the Catholic world; and he had ample opportunities, which he used with great skill, of extending his power over North and Central Italy.

Resources of Charles V

This great inheritance was divided by Charles V at his abdication between his brother Ferdinand and his son Philip (1555). Ferdinand took the Empire and the hereditary German lands as his portion; and with these he united the Crowns of Bohemia and Hungary, both of which were offered to him in 1526, after Louis II of those kingdoms had fallen in battle against the Turks. These were not very valuable possessions at the time. Bohemia was riddled with heresy and the Turks were in possession of three-quarters of Hungary. But these two crowns gave the Hapsburgs a stake in Eastern Europe which they afterwards turned to good account.

From 1555 to 1598 the attention of Europe was riveted upon the doings of Philip II, and it was not until he had died that Europe realized how greatly the power of Spain had declined in his time. For though his Great Armada failed in 1588, he had destroyed the Turkish navy at Lepanto in 1571; though he had lost the Dutch Netherlands he had annexed Portugal with all her colonies (in 1580); and Spain in 1598 still seemed immeasurably stronger than France, which had only just emerged from her Wars of Religion.

The Spanish Branch

But in the seventeenth century, when the decline of Spain was evident, it also became evident that the Austrian Hapsburgs were a formidable power. Ferdinand II proposed to overthrow the Protestant states of the Empire, to make himself Emperor in fact as well as in name, to hand back to the German Church a large part of the lands which she had lost in the Reformation period, and to threaten the Protestant powers of the North—Denmark and Sweden. The Spanish Hapsburgs showed a great readiness to second some at least of these designs, because of the Spanish Netherlands and Franche Comté, and now the alarm was raised that Europe would soon be at the mercy of a Hapsburg coalition. Richelieu, with the help of Gustavus Adolphus and the great Swedish minister Oxenstierna, set himself to avert this danger, and in the attempt made France again, what she had been under Charles VIII, the first military power in Europe.

The Austrian Branch

Merely to catalogue the projects of the Hapsburgs in these two eras—which we may call the Spanish and the Austrian eras respectively—would be a considerable business. But it may be convenient to indicate the main principles of Hapsburg policy, and the main adventures of the dynasty in each era. Its principles were :

Hapsburg Policy

(i) To maintain the Catholic cause against the Protestants. This object was fanatically pursued by two Hapsburg rulers, Philip II of Spain and Ferdinand II of Austria. It was more moderately pursued by Charles V, who was prepared to make a compromise (the 'Interim' of 1547) with the Lutherans, and by Maximilian II of Austria, who actually granted a privilege to the Utraquists of Bohemia.

(ii) To keep the Papacy well under control, limiting the Pope's right to interfere with the churches of the Hapsburg dominions.

(iii) To prevent by all possible means the expansion of French influence on the Continent, especially in Italy and the Empire.

(iv) To defend Europe against the incursions of the Turks.

The varied adventures of Charles V in pursuit of these objects are best treated under two heads: (1) his struggle with the French in Italy; (2) his struggle with Protestantism in Germany.

Adventures of Charles V: (1) Italy

(1) The root of his troubles in Italy was that the French, from the time of Charles VIII, were pressing their claims to Milan and Naples. In the year 1500 Ferdinand of Aragon had offered a compromise under which the French were to have Milan and the northern half of the Regno (Treaty of Granada). But that arrangement did not last. In 1504 Ferdinand turned the French out of the Regno. In 1512 he employed the Venetians, the Pope and the Swiss to turn the French out of Milan. But in 1515 Francis I of France signalized his accession by the victory of Marignano and the recovery of Milan.

Milan, however, became a prize of the first importance to Charles V when he had succeeded to Spain (1516) and the Empire (1519). For it was by way of Milan and the Alpine passes that he proposed to move his Spanish armies to Germany whenever they were required for the defence of the Empire. The Italian War of 1522–5, which ended with the Spanish victory at Pavia, left Francis for the time being a prisoner of his rival, and made Milan a Hapsburg outpost in Northern Italy. In the years 1526–9 Francis tried his luck in Italy once more. His general, Lautrec, took Milan, and very nearly succeeded in taking Naples, which he invested by land and sea. But the issue was decided by the treachery of the Genoese admiral, Andrea Doria, who deserted the French and offered his services to Charles V at a critical moment of the siege. The French army was annihilated on the retreat, and Milan had to be evacuated. These disasters obliged the King of France to change his Italian policy. Henceforth his object was to hold one or two of the strong places of Savoy, so that in case of need he might invade Lombardy and prevent the passage of Spanish troops. This policy was pursued by his successors with the result that the small State of Savoy became an important makeweight in the game of international politics.

The most important consequence of this duel between the

Hapsburgs and the Valois was the enslavement of Italy.

The Enslavement of Italy

The kingdom of the Two Sicilies was annexed to the Spanish crown until the Treaty of Utrecht; from 1735 to 1860 it was ruled by a branch of the Spanish Bourbons. This kingdom was no worse off under the Hapsburgs than it had been under the Houses of Anjou and Aragon in the Middle Ages. Florence lost her republican form of government in 1530 and passed under the rule of the Medici. Cosimo I, who in 1569 assumed the title of Grand Duke of Tuscany, was the one Italian sovereign who did not become absolutely dependent on the King of Spain, but after his death Florence became hispaniolized. The smaller states of the North could only escape from the control of Spain by throwing themselves into the arms of France, which cultivated when possible the friendship of the Este of Ferrara and the Gonzaga of Mantua. Venice was still a considerable sea-power in the sixteenth century and helped to win the battle of Lepanto. She kept her independence because the great powers could not agree about her fate, but her commerce steadily decayed, even in the Mediterranean, owing it is said to her protective tariffs. If she still remained rich that was due to the agricultural prosperity of her mainland provinces. Milan was ruled by a Viceroy of Spain.

Why Italy ceased to be the focus of European civilization is not quite clear. The Roman Inquisition stamped out freedom of scientific and philosophic thought by its persecution of such men as Giordano Bruno and Galileo. But it did not interfere with art or poetry. Probably the reason why these decayed was that, with the collapse of political and religious freedom, the ruling classes of Italy became dilettanti, though it is possible that the decay of material wealth, especially in Venice, was to some extent responsible for the change.

Charles V was concerned with the Reformation both in its religious and in its political aspect.

(1) As Emperor, and also as King of Spain, he was bound to oppose any changes in public worship, in doctrine or in the constitution of the Church, unless these changes were authorized by the Pope or by a General Council. Hence in matters of this kind he required his

(2) Germany

German subjects to conform to established usage until and unless a Papal Council should grant their petition for reform. Thrice in his career he deviated from this rule, but only under dire necessity. In 1532 he granted a secret truce to the Protestants (the Peace of Nuremberg), which was to hold good until a Council met. In 1544 he granted another truce of the same kind. In 1548, being in a rather stronger position, he endeavoured to impose upon Germany his own scheme of compromise (the Augsburg *Interim*) to hold good until a Council should provide a final form of settlement which he and the Pope could accept.

(2) As Emperor he was deeply concerned to defend the endowments of the German bishoprics and monasteries against the princes and his political rights as head of the German Church, of which he was officially the protector. He nominated a large number of bishops and abbots who held their lands directly from himself; and the German clergy were the mainstay of the Empire, as they had been in the days of the Ottos. Now the German princes and free cities invariably claimed, when they accepted the new doctrines, the right to suppress monasteries, to evict Catholic bishops, and to appropriate ecclesiastical lands. There is no doubt that the spoils of the Church were the aim and object that induced many princes to accept Protestantism. At the accession of Charles V they were for most purposes already sovereign in their own lands. Now they proposed to arrogate to themselves the ecclesiastical supremacy, and Luther told them that it was their right and duty to do so.

Charles V and the Lutherans

There were thus two questions on which all negotiations between the Emperor and the Lutherans came to grief: first, the demand of the Lutherans for toleration of their religious beliefs and forms of service; and, secondly, the demand of the princes that they should be allowed to do as they pleased with ecclesiastical endowments lying in their territories. In each case the difficulty of a settlement proved insuperable. The religious doctrines of the Lutheran Church were stated in the most moderate form in 1530 (Confession of Augsburg) when the Lutheran theologians contended in effect that they did not

differ from their opponents on theology but merely with regard to certain traditions and abuses. Charles V was perhaps willing to negotiate on the basis of this document; but his own party would not allow him to do this and there was never a time in the future when the prospects of a religious compromise were so good as they had been in 1530.

The question of Church endowments was raised in the same year. Legally the appropriators had no case, and the Catholics would have liked to demand restitution from the Protestant princes without any form of trial. But this step would probably have led to rebellion, and Charles already had war with the Turks on his hands. He preferred therefore to leave the offenders to be dealt with one by one in the imperial court of justice. This court became very active in 1534, calling to account some of the most important of the Protestant princes and cities. Its activities were not responsible for the first organization of the Lutherans in the armed League of Schmalkalde which was formed in 1531 to protect the Protestant faith from persecution; but later the main purpose of the League was to defend the secularizations. The Catholic princes of the South retorted in 1536 by forming the Catholic League for the express purpose of compelling the Protestants to disgorge the lands of the Church. From that moment Germany was divided into two religious camps, both awaiting a favourable moment for the declaration of war. War would have broken out in 1544 if Charles had not purchased a truce by suspending the operations of the Imperial law court. He needed the truce to finish off a war with France; but as soon as peace was signed with France (Treaty of Crespy, September, 1544) he began to plan a war against the German heretics. In the final trial of strength between Charles and the Lutherans there were two rounds. In the first (the Schmalkaldic War, 1546–7) the Lutheran League was defeated owing to the desertion of Maurice, Duke of Saxony, the youngest, ablest and most unscrupulous of its leaders. At the end of the war Charles seemed to be master of the whole of Germany (Interim of Augsburg, 1548). But in the second round (1552) the Lutherans turned the tables on Charles, with the help of Henry II and of Maurice of Saxony, who

deserted back to the Protestant cause. The Emperor was forced to fly from Germany and to conclude the Treaty of Augsburg under which:

(1) He recognized the right of every secular prince to choose between the Catholic and Lutheran religions and to impose on his subjects the religion of his choice.

(2) He allowed the Protestant princes to retain all lands of the Church which they had seized before 1552 and which were not held directly from the Empire.

This was the first compromise of a lasting kind which was arranged between Protestants and Catholics in any European country, and it held good up to 1618, although in those sixty-six years there were innumerable disputes about its interpretation. It is strange that the Hapsburgs should have been forced to lead the way in toleration, but it was a toleration for princes, not for their subjects, and only one variety of Protestants had the benefit of it.

Failure of Charles V

The consequences of the policy of Charles V in Germany were humiliating. He felt the humiliation so deeply that he would take no part in the peace negotiations, and left his brother Ferdinand to arrange the Treaty of Augsburg and to sign it. Perhaps the results would have been different if he had not committed some obvious mistakes. One was that he remained absent from Germany for nine critical years (1521–9), during which a number of the princes embraced Protestantism and protected it in their dominions with impunity. Secondly, in the years 1532–43, though fully aware of the dangers of the German position, he temporized with the Lutheran princes. Thirdly, after his unexpected victory in 1547, he moved too fast with his policy of reaction, irrecoverably offending the moderate Lutherans and forcing them to rally to the side of their rather unscrupulous and unworthy princes. There are obvious explanations of these mistakes. Up to 1544 he was continually on the defensive against Francis I, and engaged in wars which he could not well direct from Germany. Spain claimed a large part of his attention, because he always considered that Spain was the most important part of his dominions. After 1544, when he

was free to concentrate his mind on German problems, he allowed himself to underrate the strength of his opponents, and the amount of genuine Protestantism which existed among the populations of North Germany. He has been ridiculed for devising a form of religious compromise which satisfied neither party and trying to impose it on both. And it is true that the Interim of Augsburg was a failure. But so in the long run was the alternative solution which his Protestant opponents put forward and which was adopted in the Peace of Augsburg. If the Interim led to the defeat of Charles, it is equally true that the shortcomings of the Peace of Augsburg led to the Thirty Years War. Charles V had acted on the medieval assumption that it was impossible for two religions to subsist peacefully side by side in the same body politic. In 1544 this was probably true of Germany because both the Protestants and the Catholics were confident of their ability to win a civil war.

Verdicts on Charles V

Catholic historians have argued that Protestantism was the cause of the disruption of the Holy Roman Empire; and it is quite true that the Protestants wished to diminish the power of the Emperor, the Diet and the Imperial law court. Protestants stood for the sovereignty of the territorial prince. They claimed for themselves the right of making alliances with foreign powers hostile to the Empire when the interests of their religion or of their princes were at stake. But in fact the Protestants only followed the example of all ambitious German princes in pre-Reformation days. They did not invent the principle of territorial sovereignty; all they did was to extend it a little further than it had been extended in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

Protestant historians, on the other hand, have accused Charles of fighting against the spirit of the age. In a sense this is true. He was endeavouring to coerce a minority which proved to be just too strong for him. But in doing this he did not sin against the moral law as he understood it; on the contrary, he endeavoured to do his duty as a good Catholic. He miscalculated the odds, but they were pretty evenly balanced until the scale was turned against him by the genius of Maurice of Saxony.

We must now turn from Charles V to his son, who inherited from him the Spanish portion of the Empire. Philip II was a black and enigmatic figure. Contemporary witnesses are not agreed about his appearance, some saying that he was well-favoured and princely, others—perhaps less partial—that he was thin and undersized, with rickety legs. There is the same disagreement about his mental characteristics. Was he an honest bigot, or a hypocrite who used religion as a stalking-horse? Was he a *non plus ultra* of duplicity or simply a man of routine who used the current methods of statesmanship? One thing is certain: he showed little originality. He imitated his father's policy in Spain and the Netherlands. Another certainty is that, whether from pride or piety, he was prepared to make great sacrifices, as Charles had made them, for the sake of religion. And we must notice that on various occasions his supporters and subordinates resorted to murder in order to further his schemes: the Netherlands leader Montigny was murdered in 1570, the Spaniard Escovedo in 1577, William the Silent in 1584, and a dark mystery surrounded the end of Philip's son Don Carlos in 1568.

The Adventures of Philip II, 1527–98

Three sides of Philip's policy are interesting, his relations with England, with France, and with the Netherlands. As he was not Emperor, he devoted himself almost exclusively to improving the position of Spain in Western Europe. This was his main preoccupation; for though he obtained by right of inheritance the crown of Portugal in 1580 and with it the Portuguese Empire in Brazil, Africa and the East Indies, he may be said to have followed the example of his father in paying little attention to the development of the Spanish Empire in America.

In 1554, under his father's direction, Philip contracted his marriage with Mary Tudor. The hope of Charles V was that Philip would be allowed to govern England in the name of his wife. This was not permitted, and in consequence Philip spent little time in England. But he found England useful as an ally in his first war with France, 1557–8, and for nearly twenty years after that war he cherished the hope of using England as a tool in his Con-

(1) Relations with England

tinental policy, even though it had become certain that England would not return to Catholicism. It was owing to this delusion on Philip's part that Elizabeth was able to check the progress of the Counter-Reformation in Scotland and defeat the intrigues of Mary Stuart and the English Catholics. If Philip's policy had been guided solely by religious motives, he would have supported Mary Stuart when she was a Queen in Scotland and when she was a prisoner in England. But up to the beginning of 1585, when the wars of religion had reduced France to utter confusion, Philip regarded Mary Stuart as an instrument of French policy, and therefore had no real desire that she should sit on the throne of England. After Mary's execution the case was altered ; for Philip could then claim the succession on the grounds that James VI was a heretic, that Mary Stuart had bequeathed her rights to Philip, and that he was of Lancastrian descent on his mother's side.

(ii) Relations with France

While Philip's English designs were dynastic from beginning to end, his relations with France reveal a strange mixture of religious and political motives. Religion brought the Valois and Hapsburgs together ; political prudence bade them mistrust one another. In the war of 1557–9 he was resisting the last French attempt to recover Naples and was also taking vengeance on Henry II for the assistance given to the Lutherans. In the years 1560–7 his relations with France were friendly, and he married a French princess. He was believed to have in mind a coalition of the Catholic powers against the heretics, and the Huguenots of France were panic-stricken. In fact, though he made overtures in this sense to Catherine de' Médici, the Regent of France, nothing came of them. She did not trust Spain, nor the Guises who stood at the head of the French Catholics. In 1567 Philip commenced the long war against Protestantism in the Netherlands. This very nearly involved him in a war with France, for Coligny persuaded Charles IX that it would be dangerous to let the Protestants of the Netherlands be extirpated, and it was only the Massacre of St. Bartholomew which prevented the despatch of an army of French Huguenots to the Netherlands. In 1582 France actually did intervene.

The Duke of Anjou, at the invitation of William of Orange, became the 'Defender of the Liberties of the Netherlands', though he soon forfeited support by his reckless seizure of Antwerp, known as the 'French Fury', in 1583.

It was not unnatural that Philip should encourage the Guises to make war on Henry III (1580), though Henry III was a Catholic king, while there is even better excuse for the ten years war against Henry IV, 1588–98, for though the new king allowed himself to be converted he gave not only toleration but privileges to the Huguenots. Yet Philip in this phase of his relations with France gave prominence to the interests of his own family. He proposed that his eldest daughter, or one of the Austrian Hapsburgs, should have the Crown of France. This arrangement was so repugnant to the Catholic League that a majority made their peace with Henry IV (1593–4) on discovering what Philip really wanted. It is due to Philip's policy that the Spanish Hapsburgs were regarded as the arch-enemies of France for sixty years after Philip's death. The feud was only healed by the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659.

(iii) Relations with the Netherlands

The third of Philip's enterprises was the attempt to destroy the liberties of the Netherlands and the Protestant party in those provinces. The epic of the revolt is one of the most exciting in all history, for although the rebels received help at different times from France, from England and from the German Protestants, they saved themselves principally by their own exertions, and founded a state which at once took rank with the chief maritime and colonial powers. The causes of the Revolt were partly religious and partly political. The emphasis in Motley's narrative is laid on the religious quarrel; modern writers have stressed the political grievances of the noblesse with whom originated the resistance to Philip's system. From 1559 to 1572 the centre of the agitation was in the Southern Provinces (now Belgian), where the greater part of the population remained Catholic from first to last. But in the later stages of the Revolt the Dutch provinces, which were Calvinist, bore the main brunt of the struggle, and after 1585 were deserted by the Belgian provinces.

The political grievances of the rebels were :

(1) The centralized administrative system, which the States-General were not allowed to control, constantly overrode the medieval liberties of the provinces and cities.

(2) The nobles of the provinces were allowed little influence in the government, since Philip preferred to rely on upstarts (e.g. Granvella) and foreigners.

(3) A considerable part of the Spanish army was quartered in the Netherlands, at the expense of the provinces, and to overawe the discontented.

The religious grievances were that Philip introduced a more effective Inquisition than had previously existed (1560) and required the Netherlanders to obey all the decrees of the Council of Trent (1564).

In 1565 William of Orange, Horn and Egmont demanded redress of the political grievances. These three represented the views of the greater nobles. In 1566 an association of the lesser nobles (' the Beggars ') demanded that the Inquisition should be abolished. The action of the Beggars was followed by religious riots in the towns, in which much damage was deliberately done to images, shrines, painted windows and other ornaments in the churches. But these excesses were condemned by Orange and all moderate men.

Policy of the Duke of Alva

Philip then sent Alva with a considerable force to terrorize the Netherlands. Alva was well fitted for the task, since he had governed Hapsburg Italy by methods of terror for over twenty years. But he exasperated the Netherlands to madness by his measures of repression, 1567–73. He set up a special tribunal, commonly known as the Council of Blood, to deal with political offenders ; at the end of his governorship he boasted that in six years he had executed 18,600 persons, but his successor Requesens gave the figure of 6,000. In all the principal towns garrisons were established and citadels were built. To pay the expenses of his system he instituted a new and unpopular system of taxation on all transfers of land and all sales of movable goods, 5 per cent. on land, 10 per cent. (the ' Tenth Penny ') on movables. Alva's system broke

down in 1572 when the Northern Provinces rose in revolt. He sacked a few Dutch towns, but the rebels began to cut the dykes, and also equipped a fleet of privateers ('Beggars of the Sea'), who defended the coast towns and swept all Spanish shipping out of the North Sea and the Channel. This was the beginning of Dutch sea-power.

Policy of the Duke of Parma

The object of the Spanish governors who followed Alva in the Netherlands was to pursue a policy of compromise. But even in 1573 it was clear that the Northern Provinces, which followed William of Orange, their Stadtholder, would be content with no terms which did not concede religious liberty, the withdrawal of Spanish troops, and the restoration of the political liberties of the provinces. Thenceforward Philip's aim was to conciliate the Catholics of the Southern Provinces by political concessions, and to reduce the Northern Provinces by brute force. The Southern Provinces were brought to terms in the years 1579–85, through the tact and skill of Alexander Farnese, Duke of Parma; their principal stipulation was that foreign troops should be withdrawn. The Northern Provinces were in great danger for a time after the murder of William of Orange (1584), but were rallied by William's son, Maurice, afterwards Prince of Orange, who became Captain-General of the United Provinces with supreme command of the military and naval forces. His efforts were seconded by a great statesman, John van Oldenbarneveld, who took the lead of the patriotic party in the States-General. The result of the war of independence remained doubtful until 1592. But in that year died Parma, the ablest of Philip's governors, and the Dutch Republic was saved.

Dutch Naval Expansion, 1593–1607

The Republic did not obtain a peace with Spain until 1609. But in the interval it made considerable inroads into the Spanish Empire. In 1593 Dutch vessels began to trade with the West Coast of Africa. In 1595 they began to explore the East Indies. In 1601 the States-General authorized the establishment of an East India Company. Between 1602 and 1606 Dutch navigators explored the Spice Islands. In 1606 a Dutch fleet encountered the main squadron of the Spanish Viceroy of the Indies in the

Straits of Malacca, and in 1607, off Gibraltar, Dutch admirals destroyed an expeditionary fleet which the Spanish Government was despatching to the East Indies.

The Dutch were at this time much more skilful than the English in tapping the trade of the Spanish Empire. Their East India Company organized the defence of the Spice Islands most skilfully and established a system of trade-posts through which they got into their hands the whole of the valuable spice-trade. The English East India Company, founded in 1600 to compete with them, never succeeded in finding and exploiting so valuable a market. The Dutch showed equal astuteness when, in 1626, they selected New Amsterdam (now New York) as the site of their chief settlement in North America. It was due to their resourcefulness that sugar-planting was established on a sound commercial basis in the West Indies. The British colonists could make nothing of this industry. Finally, in 1651, the Dutch recognized the strategic value of the Cape of Good Hope and colonized it in order to make it an efficient port of call for victualling and refitment.

CHAPTER IX

THE WARS OF RELIGION

CARDINAL EVENTS

1531	War between Zurich and Berne.
1534–5	The Anabaptists in Münster.
1546–7	War between Charles V and the League of Schmalkalde: Battle of Mühlberg.
1555	Peace of Augsburg.
1559–60	Civil war of Scotland.
1562–98	Wars of Religion in France.
1572	Revolt of the Netherlands against Alva.
1609	Twelve Years Truce in the Netherlands.
1618–48	Thirty Years War.
1635	Peace of Prague.
1648	Treaty of Westphalia.

WARS of Religion are the characteristic feature of European politics for about a century from 1531. They afford us an inspiriting record of the battle of minorities against heavy odds, fighting for toleration. But the admiration of their courage must be chastened by our knowledge of what some of them did (in Scotland and Holland and France) when they succeeded; and what the rest would have done in like case. The series begins with the war between Zurich and Berne in which Zwingli fell (1531) and with the remarkable rising of the German Anabaptists in 1534–5 when Münster was captured by a band of fanatics who expelled all unbelievers, set up a communistic republic, and defended themselves for a year and four months against the Bishop of Münster and his friends. Then follow:

(1) 1546–7. The war between Charles V and the

League of Schmalkalde, in which Charles was the victor as the result of one battle.

(2) The so-called War of Liberation in 1552, in which Charles was defeated without any battle at all and obliged to concede terms to the German Protestants (the Peace of Augsburg, 1555).

(3) The War of the Lords of the Congregation against Mary of Guise and Mary Stuart, 1559–60.

(4) The intermittent and interminable wars of religion in France, 1562-98.

(5) The Revolt of the Netherlands, 1572–1609.

(6) The Thirty Years War, 1618-35.

(7) The last revolts of the Huguenots, 1621-9.

(8) The Civil Wars in England, 1642–51.

Causes of the Wars

The root cause of these great struggles was the belief of Catholics all over Europe that it was intolerable to be asked to jettison a multitude of time-honoured customs, that it was impious to tolerate organized heresy, and that it was impossible for any state to prosper and to remain strong if its inhabitants were divided in religion. The first of these considerations appealed most strongly to the Catholic laity; the second to the Catholic clergy; the third to Catholic statesmen. In their hearts most Protestants thought as the Catholics did on the subject of toleration. They were not prepared to grant toleration when they were in the majority, though they consistently claimed it when they were the weaker party.

International Plans

During these wars there were statesmen on both sides who desired to disregard differences of nationality and to unite all the Protestant parties or all the Catholic Churches for the purpose of conducting a Holy War. None of these projects lasted for long, but some of them seemed likely at one time or another to succeed.

(1) Cromwell's project for an alliance between Henry VIII and the Lutheran princes in 1540.

(2) Alva's plan, 1565, for an alliance of France and Spain against the Protestants. This was afterwards taken up by Philip II and the Catholic League in France, 1578–98.

(3) Coligny's plan of 1571 for an alliance between England, France and the Protestants of the Netherlands. It was this which led to the Massacre of St. Bartholomew.

(4) The plan consistently advocated by Francis Walsingham, one of the ministers of Queen Elizabeth, for placing England at the head of a Reformation party in Europe. This plan which was the result of Walsingham's (mistaken) conviction that Spain and the Valois were already united in a league to crush the Protestants, was resisted by Burghley and Elizabeth, who would only give occasional help to the Protestants of France and the Netherlands.

(5) The alliance of the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs for the purpose of crushing the Protestants of Germany. This was a war in which Spain had no interest except to suppress heresy. This alliance dates from the year 1619, and its purpose is well explained in a letter from Spinola, the general commanding in the Spanish Netherlands, to Philip III, dated 30 October, 1619: 'If you do not [intervene in Germany] it is quite possible that the House of Austria may be turned out of Germany bag and baggage. If the Protestants succeed in doing this, they will then join the Dutch in an attack upon [the Spanish Netherlands]. . . . If all the German and Dutch Protestants were to unite in attacking us after a victory in Germany, it would be hopeless for us to attempt to resist them.'[1]

(6) The Plan of Gustavus Adolphus. Whatever may have been his private and personal motives for intervening in the Thirty Years War he certainly represented it to the Swedish Diet as an enterprise undertaken in the interest of the Protestant religion, and it was on that basis that the Diet agreed to the war.

[1] Reade, *Sidelights on Thirty Years' War*, I, 251.

(7) The plan for a Federation of England and Holland, and for an alliance of all the Protestant powers under England, 1653–8. This revival of the plan of Walsingham and Leicester was the fundamental idea of Oliver Cromwell's foreign policy.

Reasons for their failure

One reason why these plans failed was simply that religious considerations could not overcome national and dynastic interests or destroy the old political factions in European States. An effective Catholic League in Europe was out of the question so long as the old rivalry of the Hapsburgs and the Valois continued. When Philip II intervened in the French Wars of Religion he did so in the hope of making France a dependency of Spain. When Philip III combined with Ferdinand II (1619) to suppress German Protestantism, Catholic France, under the direction of Cardinal Richelieu, felt bound to adopt a policy of alliance with the Protestants, to foster the divisions of Catholic Germany and to finance the armies of Gustavus Adolphus. On the Protestant side we find Elizabeth demanding, as the price of her assistance, that the Huguenots shall place Havre (1562) in her hands, and that the Dutch should similarly make over Brill and Flushing (1585) as 'cautionary towns'. Brill and Flushing were held until 1616, seven years after the Dutch had come to terms with Spain; and would have remained English much longer, perhaps indefinitely, if James I had not agreed to restore them on much more moderate terms than Elizabeth had imposed. Gustavus Adolphus in 1632 made it clear that he would only conclude peace if the Emperor, in addition to restoring the Protestant princes, would make over Pomerania to Sweden.

Again, it has to be remembered that the Protestant party in all the countries where it had to fight for existence was driven to make alliance with other factions whose motives for attacking Catholicism or for attacking the established government were thoroughly secular and materialistic. In particular the Protestants obtained support from the old aristocracies whose consequence was diminished, or whose ambitions were disappointed by the rise of the new monarchies with their standing armies, their large revenues, and their

fixed policy of strong and centralized administration. There are many instances of this tendency.

(1) The Protestant princes of the Empire were anxious to be free from the control of the Emperor and the Diet, and to exercise complete sovereignty over their own territories; one special inducement being that, when this object was attained, they could appropriate and dispose of the endowments of the Catholic Church.

(2) The nobles of Scotland made common cause with the reformers partly to get rid of the French advisers who surrounded Mary of Guise and to claim for themselves a fair share of power; partly to secure themselves in the possession of the Church-lands which they had been busily appropriating ever since the Reform movement began. The nobles of Scotland, for example, insisted on maintaining in the Reformed Church the titles of archbishop, bishop, abbot and prior (1572), in flat contravention of the wishes of the Reformers, in order that they might benefit by this 'Tulchan' system, as it was derisively called after a trick used in milking cattle. The monasteries were destroyed; but the fate of their lands seems to be an unwritten chapter of Scottish history.[1]

(3) The success of the Revolt of the Netherlands was largely due to Orange and the 'Beggars', a faction of the nobility, whose original quarrel with Philip II was that he had infringed the liberties of the provinces and governed it through foreign ministers. Orange himself only became a Protestant after he had broken with Philip II and gone into exile in Germany (in 1567).

(4) The leaders of the Huguenots, except Coligny, who was a religious enthusiast, were partly competitors of the Guises, partly provincial nobles and gentlemen who, besides claiming religious toleration, desired a more constitutional form of government. At the Estates-General of 1561 they claimed the right to worship in their own fashion as one of the privileges of noble birth. These nobles could have done little without the support of the Protestant middle-classes; but the direction of the movement fell into the hands of the nobles.

[1] See however the *Register of the Privy Council of Scotland*, Vol. I of the Second Series, Introd. cvii–clxxvi (by Maitland Thomson).

(5) Of the Catholic League in France Lord Acton says: 'It was constituted out of three distinct elements: first Guise and his partisans, who had carried on the civil wars and were the Catholic portion of the aristocracy; then the Parisian democracy, who had acted with the others against Coligny and the Huguenots, who cherished a strong municipal spirit . . . ; lastly, Philip II of Spain, who gave a million crowns.'[1]

The Brighter Side of the Wars

In spite of this mixture of motives the Wars of Religion produced some men of fine character and disinterested aims—men such as the Admiral Coligny; the Regent Murray, of whom Hume Brown says[2] that he indubitably did more than John Knox to ensure the success of the Scottish Reformation; William the Silent; and Gustavus Adolphus. These men were all on the Protestant side, fighting against heavy odds. No Catholic layman has quite the same moral or intellectual stature, though there is some greatness in the inflexible persistency of Philip II, and Wallenstein, in spite of his rather sordid ambitions, showed a remarkable firmness at the most critical period of the Thirty Years War, in 1632, when a single false step on his part might have ruined the tottering Catholic cause in Germany. Of great ecclesiastics there were many on both sides. Ignatius Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit order, was as great a master of statecraft as John Calvin; in purity of motive and devotion to the cause of religion Cardinal Pole and his fellow-Catholic Reformers need not fear comparison with any of the Protestant divines, Melanchthon, Knox, Beza or Melville. If the Protestant divines organized new national Churches, their Catholic opponents achieved a remarkable counter-reform in the Catholic Church, eliminating many of the grosser abuses which had provoked the Reformation. Of course in estimating both the laymen and the ecclesiastics of the period one is struck by a certain hard intolerance. It is taken for granted on both sides that any opponent of note is a heresiarch and a centre of infection, a pest that must be extirpated. Both sides preached the doctrines of the New Testament; both

[1] *Lectures on Modern History*, p. 165.
[2] *History of Scotland*, ii, 142.

acted on the doctrines of the Old Testament. Luther in a remarkable passage of his *Table Talk* shows himself aware of this discrepancy, and excuses it on the ground that the law is the guide for the statesman; it shows him how to reprove the sinner, which we are not told in the Gospels. That was the opinion of the Catholics also.

There were a few advocates of toleration. Montaigne advocated toleration in a spirit of pure scepticism; it is absurd that men should wrangle about questions on which no certainty was possible. L'Hôpital, the first and wisest minister of Catherine de' Medici, queen and regent of France, laid down the general doctrine that the freedom of the individual's conscience ought to be respected; the ruler ought to protect all forms of worship from persecution. The heirs of his ideas were the party called *Politiques*, and Henry IV, who ended the French wars of religion. William of Orange bequeathed to his family a tradition of practical toleration which remained sharply opposed to the bigotry of Dutch Calvinist divines, except in the crisis of 1618–19, when the aged statesman Oldenbarneveld was executed on a charge of treason and the Arminian party which he had protected was repressed.[1] In the Dutch Republic a great part of the people did not at first accept Calvinism and would have been persecuted but for the influence of William the Silent.

Toleration

The results of the religious wars may be briefly summarized.

(1) In Germany the *modus vivendi* was established in the Peace of Augsburg. It broke down at the beginning of the Thirty Years War owing to infractions of its terms by both parties, but was re-established under the Peace of Westphalia.

Results of the Wars of Religion

(2) In France the Edict of Nantes was issued in 1598. In its original form it was a most unsatisfactory settlement, only to be excused on the ground that nothing less would have been accepted by the Huguenots at the time when it was drafted. But the objectionable features of the Edict were cancelled by Richelieu in the Peace of Alais (1629), which he imposed after two Huguenot revolts. After this time the

[1] See below, p. 193.

Huguenots ceased to be a political menace and the revocation of the Edict by Louis XIV (1685) was a piece of gratuitous bigotry which brought its own punishment.

(3) In the Netherlands, after the whole of the seventeen provinces had revolted, there was a breach between the Walloon Provinces (forming the Union of Arras) and the Northern Provinces (forming the Union of Utrecht) in the year 1579. The Union of Arras held by the Catholic religion and returned to the allegiance of Philip in the same year. These provinces were known henceforward as the Spanish Netherlands. The Union of Utrecht continued the war against Spain by land and sea up to the year 1609, when a twelve years truce was concluded. In this truce the Dutch Republic was recognized as an independent State under the title of the United Provinces. The final peace with Spain, the Treaty of Münster, was only signed in 1648 ; it was one of the treaties which composed the great peace-settlement of Westphalia.

(4) The Thirty Years War ceased to be a war of religion after 1635. For in that year Ferdinand II of Austria offered tolerable terms to all the Protestant princes except the House of the Palatinate, waiving the Edict of Restitution by which he had ordered the restoration of the more recently appropriated ecclesiastical lands. These terms were accepted by most of the princes concerned ; and thereafter the Thirty Years War became an international conflict, Sweden and France fighting against Spain and Austria, partly on German soil, partly in the Netherlands. At the Peace of Westphalia, 1648, the Protestant princes, in common with all the other princes of the Empire, received some additional concessions. The Emperor conceded to all the princes of the Empire the right of managing their own foreign relations, subject only to the condition that no treaty should be concluded which threatened the Emperor or the Empire or the terms of the Peace of Westphalia. Another concession was that the Diet should not have the power of passing any measure concerning religion unless it was unanimously accepted. The effect of these terms was that the Empire ceased to be a state and became a loose federation of about three hundred

sovereign powers. As already mentioned, the principle of *cujus regio ejus religio* was reaffirmed. All Catholic and Protestant minorities were guaranteed such rights of religious worship as they had enjoyed in 1624.

Some wider consequences of the wars may be noted, such as the general reaction against the theological spirit, which marked the beginning of the scientific era and may in part be ascribed to the influence of the religious struggle. In Colonial affairs France had her attention diverted from the New World. Cartier discovered Canada in 1536 and a colony was established as a private venture in 1540; but the Canada company was not actually founded till 1599. Champlain's voyages of discovery were made in 1603 and 1608. There was nothing more of note till Colbert's time after 1660, and French inactivity may no doubt be in part attributed to preoccupation with European affairs. Upon the Spanish Empire the religious wars had a more disastrous influence; for Spain as a colonial power this was a period of rapid and remarkable decline. Germany suffered in its prosperity; we have ghastly accounts of the effects of the war in Bohemia, Bavaria and the Palatinate, which had been several times devastated. For example, we are told that in Bohemia only 6,000 villages out of 35,000 were left standing; but the latter figure is incredible. Still harder to believe are the statements that the population of the Empire shrank from 16 millions to 6 millions; or that one-third of the land of the Empire went out of cultivation. The decline of the Rhineland towns and of Augsburg and Nuremberg is a more certain fact. But this was probably due to the shift of trade-routes, and the decay of Italian industry. Germany developed manufactures very slowly in the seventeenth century. This was partly due to want of capital; but political subdivision and the badness of internal communications may have had something to do with it.

CHAPTER X

THE AGE OF THE DUTCH

CARDINAL EVENTS

1618–19	Political Crisis over Arminianism and Synod of Dort.
1652–4	First Anglo-Dutch War. John de Witt Pensionary.
1665–7	Second Anglo-Dutch War.
1672	Invasion of Holland by Louis XIV and beginning of Third Anglo-Dutch War. Fall of John de Witt and rise of William III.
1688	Expedition of William III to England and beginning of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance.
1747	Revival of Stadholdership.
1781–3	Fourth Anglo-Dutch War.

THE New World had not made the Dutch what they were intellectually and morally. But it gave them wealth and maritime power out of all proportion to their territory and numbers. Wealth and maritime power raised them after 1648 to the position of a great state, so that the period 1648–1713 might with some justice be called the Age of the Dutch rather than the Age of Louis XIV.

Naval Achievements

The first proof that they gave of their quality in this period was their resistance in the First Anglo-Dutch War, 1652–4, when their trade was threatened by the First Navigation Act and by the English claim to exercise the right of search. The Dutch admirals fairly divided the honours of the war with Admiral Blake, their principal opponent, whom they beat soundly in at least one encounter—the battle of the Downs, 1652 ; and at the battle of the Texel in 1653 they broke the blockade by which Eng-

land tried to starve Holland into submission. Although the Dutch had to sign in the end a disadvantageous treaty, they escaped lightly and honourably from the consequences of their daring declaration of war.

In the Second War, 1665–7, the result was again honourable. The Dutch were attacked with the object of destroying the supremacy of their East India Company in the Spice Islands. They began the war with a hard-won victory in the Four Days Battle (June, 1666). They ended it by sailing up the Medway and destroying sixteen of our ships (1667). They lost New York, but they kept the English colony of Surinam, and they extorted from us a modification of our Navigation Act.

In the Third War, 1672–4, they beat the united fleets of France and England in the battle of Southwold Bay—an achievement which saved Holland and ruined the plan of campaign which Charles II and Louis had concocted for the destruction of the Republic.

Defence of Holland, 1672–3

But more spectacular still was the resistance of the Dutch to the invasion which Louis XIV had launched upon them in April, 1672. They were taken by surprise; their outlying provinces were overrun before any resistance could be organized, and the province of Holland was only saved by cutting the dykes. The Dutch were again threatened with a descent of the combined English and French fleets upon their coast-line; but they managed to keep the supremacy at sea, and held out until Spain and Austria sent armies to their relief in the autumn of 1673. After which William of Orange built up the first of his three great European coalitions, and forced upon Louis XIV a peace in which the Dutch surrendered not an inch of territory (Treaty of Nymwegen, 1678).

The English Alliance

From this time the fortunes of the Dutch and England are more and more closely united; and it must be owned that during our period of most intimate alliance (1688–1713) we were more disposed to dwell upon the faults of the Dutch than their virtues. Whenever the war against Louis XIV went amiss, our fashion was to blame the Dutch. Hence our historians are not very willing to

admit that in the first five years after the Revolution our navy would have been at the mercy of that of Louis XIV but for the help which we received from the Dutch at the battles of Beachy Head (1690) and La Hogue (1692). It is from the second of these battles that we are accustomed to date the recovery of that maritime supremacy which we had lost at Elizabeth's death. But a good third of the fleet which beat the French was composed of Dutch ships of war. We also received substantial help from the Dutch navy in the War of the Spanish Succession.

Dutch Civilization

We have now to notice the remarkable reputation of Holland in this period as the great European asylum for men of science and men of letters who were persecuted, or could not get an audience elsewhere. The University of Leyden, founded 1574, was the finest school of humanism in Europe for one hundred years. Lipsius and Scaliger, Salmasius and Vossius all taught there. Leyden and Amsterdam were the two chief homes of the Continental printing trade (cf. the Elzevirs of Leyden). Amsterdam had a university from 1632; but the two most famous thinkers that Amsterdam harboured were foreigners and self-taught men—Descartes, the founder of modern philosophy, who lived there from 1629 to 1649, and his successor Spinoza (1632–77). Rotterdam was the refuge of Pierre Bayle, author of the *Dictionnaire Historique et Critique*. The greatest native writer, Hugo Grotius, wrote his great work in exile.[1] He was a supporter of Oldenbarneveld, who was proscribed in 1619 for his stand on behalf of the liberties of the province of Holland against the authority of the Confederation and the Stadholder. Oldenbarneveld was done to death by a judicial murder. Grotius was sentenced to imprisonment for life, but was enabled to escape by the help of devoted friends.

Political and Religious Parties

It was the weak point of the Republic that political and religious parties fought out their quarrels with the utmost violence. In religion there was a violent feud (as there had been at Geneva) between the 'Precisians' and the 'Libertines' or Remonstrants, though both parties were professing Calvinists. The Preci-

[1] For an account of the *De Jure Belli et Pacis* see below, p. 269.

sians wished to enforce uniformity of religion by pains and penalties. Their opponents, originally led by the famous Arminius, held that the Church must not be allowed to dictate to the State. This conflict was most acute in the years after 1610, and ended with the condemnation of Arminianism at the Synod of Dort in 1618. It will be remembered that Arminianism was the doctrine of Archbishop Laud in England.

In Dutch politics the dispute was between the Orangists, who desired a more centralized form of government under a hereditary ruler, and the advocates of the sovereignty of the provinces. This quarrel was at its height in the years 1650–72, when John de Witt was controlling the government of the province of Holland. The conflict of the two parties ended abruptly with the murder of John de Witt in 1672 in the crisis of the French invasion. William of Orange was accused of conniving at the murder; not unnaturally, as John de Witt had done everything possible to exclude him from the Stadholdership. Certainly William III never attempted to punish the murderers. Closely connected with this quarrel was that between the advocates of colonies and maritime power on the one hand and the advocates of military power and a Continental policy on the other. They may be called the parties of Opulence and of Defence.

The Dutch Constitution

The Dutch Constitution was rather extraordinary. Strictly speaking, it had no head. William the Silent was merely the elected Stadholder of five of the provinces and as such Captain-General of the forces. His son Maurice was Stadholder in 1609 of five provinces; two others were subject to Maurice's cousin William Lewis. His successors were Stadholders in six out of the seven. The whole of the fleets belonged to Holland and Zealand and the office of Admiral of these Provinces was conferred by them usually on the leading member of the House of Orange. Generally speaking the minor provinces were content to accept as a leader whoever was elected Stadholder of Holland. In theory the direction of common affairs belonged to a Council of State (twelve members elected by the provinces) and the States-General, which was also representative, composed of thirty to forty members. The decisions of the States-General

were of no effect unless unanimous, and every member was bound by the instructions he received from his constituents—i.e. from the provincial estates. This extraordinary system could only be worked if one man dominated the executive, another the States-General, and these two were in agreement. The leading man in the Council would naturally be the Stadholder. The leading man in the executive was usually the principal representative of Holland. This representative was the man who held for the time being the office of Advocate or (later) Pensionary of Holland. John van Oldenbarneveld led the Estates of Holland from 1586 to 1619 and was at first the ally, afterwards the enemy of Maurice of Orange. John de Witt, Pensionary 1650–72, tried to exclude William III from the office of Stadholder at first for the sake of placating England. Another important figure was Fagel, Pensionary of Holland under William III until 1688. Heinsius succeeded Fagel and held office till 1720. After the Treaty of Utrecht (1713) the importance of Holland in European politics steadily declined.

(1) The House of Orange lost the Stadholdership at the death of William III and it was not revived until 1747.

Decline of Holland, First Period, 1713–40

After 1713 the provinces were divided and the policy of the Republic was spiritless—a policy of neutrality. Army and navy were allowed to go to ruin. One reason for this tameness was that the Dutch thought they had been betrayed by Bolingbroke in 1711 when he opened negotiations. The Dutch could have allied themselves with Peter the Great, who visited Holland in 1696 and in 1716–17, and would have protected their Baltic trade. But the Republic feared foreign entanglement.

(2) After 1740 the Dutch began again to take a share in foreign policy. The Stadholdership was revived in favour

Second Period, 1740–8

of William of Orange (1747). He was married to a daughter of George II and his party favoured an English alliance. This policy prevailed when the Austrian Netherlands were attacked by France (1744) and conquered (1746). But even after this revolution the Republic was too weak both in military preparations and in finance to be of much use to England in the War of the Austrian Succession.

The English government did not consult the Dutch in the negotiations which led up to the Peace of Aix la Chapelle.

(3) During the Seven Years War Dutch trade suffered because the English navy exercised the right of search relentlessly against Dutch ships and would not allow them to trade with the French West Indies. To some extent the loss of sea-borne trade was counterbalanced by the power of Amsterdam as the great banking and financial centre of the Continent. But the Dutch were enraged with the English and a French party began to spring up in the Republic.

Third Period, 1756–63

(4) During the War of American Independence Great Britain tried to prevent the Dutch from trading with the colonies. The climax came in 1778 when a large Dutch convoy, protected by warships, was seized in the Channel and taken to Portsmouth. The Dutch joined Sweden, Denmark and Russia in the League of Armed Neutrality (1780), and Great Britain declared war on Holland. In this war Holland lost for the time being her West Indies and her Indian factories. Only one naval battle was fought, and that was drawn (Doggerbank, 1781), but in 1784, the Dutch, having been deserted by the French, had to make a humiliating peace with Great Britain. They gave up Negapatam (Carnatic) and granted the British free access to the Moluccas. In this war the Dutch had only twenty battleships, most of which were old. The Orange party, under the Stadholder William V (1766–88), had foreseen the need for armaments on sea and land, but had not been able to convince the States-General. After the war the country was divided into three factions—(*a*) Orange, (*b*) Patricians of the cities, (*c*) ' Patriots ', who were a Francophile party. In 1786 the Estates-General virtually deposed William V and he was only able to keep his position owing to the armed intervention of Prussia in 1787.

Fourth Period, 1775–83

These political disasters left the Dutch very wealthy—with a great carrying trade—and a flourishing colonial empire in the Spice Islands, the West Indies and South America. The Navigation Acts were not fatal to the carrying trade, the wars of the Spanish Succession and American Independence

only interfered with one branch of it. But the political energy of the Dutch evaporated after 1713. They did not make themselves a strong enough naval power to count for much in diplomatic negotiations. They became weary of the effort to defend themselves by land against France. These faults of policy might have been redressed if the Orange Party had held its own. But the Constitution was so constructed that only a Stadholder who was great and successful could unite the country.

CHAPTER XI

THE GREAT STATES AND THEIR POLICY (FRANCE; THE AUSTRIAN HAPSBURGS; SAVOY)

CARDINAL EVENTS

1589–1610	Henry IV, King of France.
1624–42	Ministry of Richelieu.
1648	Peace of Westphalia ends the Thirty Years War in Germany.
1659	Peace of the Pyrenees ends the War between France and Spain.
1713	Peace of Utrecht ends the War of the Spanish Succession.

THE personal factor in the politics of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is obviously most important. Thus between 1560 and 1603 the fortunes of three great kingdoms, Scotland, England and France, were vitally influenced by the personality of three women, Mary Stuart, Elizabeth, Catherine de' Médici.

The Personal Factor in European Politics

In England, in Denmark, in Sweden and in a number of the German states the state religion was changed at the fiat of the sovereign. To a large extent national policy was influenced by the marriage-alliances of the great ruling houses, and by their relationships one to another. We may take as an example the great importance of the Spanish and French marriages of Philip II, the French marriage of Charles I of England, the Spanish marriage of Louis XIV. Notice also the political influence of the family tie between the Spanish and Austrian Hapsburgs in the Thirty Years War.

Still the absolute sovereigns of this period could not afford to neglect altogether the views of their subjects; and they were often sincerely patriotic. The best sovereigns had a clear view of the policy which national interests demanded, and generally subordinated their personal and dynastic ambitions to the interests of the nation. The policy, therefore, of the great powers, and even of some of the small powers, had more continuity and calculation than we might expect *a priori*. It would be difficult to imagine rulers more unlike than Charles VIII, Louis XII and Francis I. Yet all three pursued the same policy, of resisting the expansion of Hapsburg power in Italy. Equally different from one another are Henri IV, Richelieu and Mazarin; yet these three again were preoccupied with the same problem of foreign policy—how to destroy the Hapsburg family alliance and to weaken the Empire.

National Policy

The history of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries becomes much simpler if we envisage clearly the fixed principles of the policy of each great power. These do not explain the whole course of international politics, but they make the study of these politics simpler and more interesting. Let us illustrate this with reference to three states—France, Austria and Savoy.

An examination of French policy must begin with the question of Frontiers. On the south there are three gateways in the barrier of the Pyrenees: (1) the gap of Roussillon and Cerdagne affording access to the Ebro valley, and more important to Catalonia, a province always disposed to rebel against the Hapsburgs; (2) the Pass of Roncesvaux; and (3) the coastal gap at Fuentarabia, the gap through which Soult was pursued by Wellington. The last two of these routes were controlled by the kingdom of Navarre, which was up to 1479 a hybrid state extending southwards to the Ebro and northwards almost to the gates of Bayonne. Ferdinand of Aragon made a bid for the whole of the Navarre inheritance when he married Germaine de Foix (1505). But Lower Navarre with Béarn remained French, passing to the Bourbon family by the marriage of Jeanne d'Albret with Antony of Bourbon, the father of

The French Frontiers

Henry IV ; and the strength of this bastion was increased in the reign of Louis XIII, who acquired the pass of Roncesvaux itself up to the crest of the ridge. The pass of Roussillon and Cerdagne was held for a time by Louis XI and Charles VIII (1462–93), reverted to Spain when Charles VIII wanted to clear the decks for his Italian campaign, but in 1659 was retroceded under the Treaty of the Pyrenees and became permanently French. This was the final settlement of the Pyrenean boundary between France and Spain.

The question of the eastern frontier was much more complicated. On the north it was a question of providing for the defence of Paris and the heart of the kingdom against a sudden inroad from the Netherlands, or from the Empire through the gap of Metz. In the centre it was important to interpose a wedge of French territory between the Duchy of Savoy and the Free County of Burgundy, because this was the usual route by which the troops of the Spanish Hapsburgs were brought northward either to strengthen the army of the Netherlands or to co-operate with the Austrian Hapsburgs inside the Empire. Finally in the extreme south-east it was desirable to control the passes which connected Dauphiné and Provence with the plain of Lombardy. It was desirable to do this whether France pursued a policy of intervention in Italy (as she did from 1498 to 1559, and again in the time of Richelieu), or whether she merely stood on the defensive to prevent an invasion of Southern France from Italy such as that which the Constable of Bourbon undertook in 1524.

The policy of France on the eastern frontier was therefore to attempt to get possession of :—

(1) The French-speaking Netherlands.
(2) Metz, Toul and Verdun.
(3) Bresse, Bugey and Gex.
(4) The Alpine Passes.

Frontier Policy of France

The first objective was pursued by Louis XI, by Coligny and Henry III and by Louis XIV ; the latter succeeded in pushing forward the north-east frontier to the line of Courtrai—Lille—Maubeuge. The three ecclesiastical principalities of Metz, Toul and Verdun, which held the Metz gap and were independent of and

much more important than Lorraine, were obtained by Henry II in reward for the help which he gave to the Lutheran princes in 1552, and were confirmed to him by the Treaty of Cateau Cambrésis. It was also very desirable to round off these acquisitions by securing the Duchy of Lorraine, the province of Alsace and the passage of the Rhine at the Free City of Strassburg, which would naturally be used by Austrian armies in any war with France. Louis XIV annexed Alsace (the principal gain secured by Richelieu) under the Treaty of Westphalia, and later he acquired Strassburg, which at that time (1684) was not part of Alsace, but a Free City of the Empire. He also got possession of Lorraine for a time, but surrendered it in 1659. The Duchy of Lorraine did not become French until 1766, when it was acquired under the terms of a peace with the Hapsburgs. Much earlier than these events Henry IV got the coveted wedge between Savoy and Franche Comté (Bresse, Bugey and Gex) under a treaty concluded with Savoy in 1601. As for the fourth objective—the Alpine passes—it should be noted that France held Saluzzo, 1548–88, Pinerolo 1631–96, and that Richelieu took an active part in the War of the Mantuan Succession (1629) simply with the object, in which he failed, of establishing a French protectorate over Montferrat.

General Foreign Policy of France

Through the Middle Ages England had been the traditional enemy, and the wars with England had distracted attention from the eastern frontier. After the expulsion of the English the eastern frontier became and remained of engrossing interest, first owing to the rise of the French House of Burgundy, which built up a powerful and wealthy state partly on French and partly on Imperial territory (1363–77), and later on account of the substitution of the House of Hapsburg for the House of Burgundy. This not only increased the menace to the frontier, since Charles V controlled the resources of the Empire after 1519; it also meant that Spain was joined to the Netherlands and the Empire and that France was threatened with encirclement. The Italian campaigns of Francis I were an attempt to break through the circle. It was a costly expedient for France, and Spanish influence was more strongly

rooted than ever in Italy at his death. Henry II prepared to break through the Hapsburg ring in Lorraine, and in 1559 definitely abandoned the French claims in Italy, which he could do the more cheerfully as the crowns of Spain and the Empire were no longer united. But during the Wars of Religion Spain intervened so much in French politics (nominally to support the Catholic League) that Henry IV and after him Cardinal Richelieu regarded Spain as the chief enemy; the outbreak of the Thirty Years War, which led in 1619 to a renewal of the Hapsburg family alliance, gave evidence that the danger was not unreal. The King of Spain expected to get new territories on the western frontier of the Empire, at the expense of the Elector Palatine. This was the cause of Richelieu's interest in the war; of his intervention in the Valtelline[1] to defend the Grisons against Spain, 1625–6, and in the Mantuan Succession War (1630–1); of his alliance of 1631 with Gustavus Adolphus against the Empire. Circumstances compelled Richelieu to become the champion of the German Protestants. But what he had hoped for, and did try to bring about in 1631, was an alliance of all the princes of the Empire, Protestant and Catholic, against the House of Austria. Apparently he did not object to the Empire remaining strong and united so long as it was not a Hapsburg possession. But since the general league of Germany could not be organized, and Austria's possession of the imperial title could not be challenged, Richelieu and his successor Mazarin seem to have made it their policy to diminish the imperial prerogative as much as possible. That at least was the result obtained by the Treaty of Westphalia. Simultaneously the two Cardinals carried on, after 1635, a war against Spain with the object of expelling Spain from the Netherlands and the Free County. It was in the operations of 1635–58 that the generals and the army were trained and equipped for the future conquests of Louis XIV.

The Treaties of Westphalia (1648) and of the Pyrenees (1659) closed the most brilliant chapter in French foreign

[1] The Valtelline, or valley of the Adda, runs through the territory of the Swiss canton of the Grisons and was on the line of communication between Milan and Austria.

policy. Spain was a declining power, while the Austrian Hapsburgs were content, if left to themselves, to be regarded as an Eastern power. France was secure on both her frontiers. Here for the time being we will leave French policy, examining that of the Hapsburgs in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries before we return to consider the age of Louis XIV.

The Austrian Hapsburgs

The modern history of the Austrian Hapsburgs dates from Ferdinand I, the brother of Charles V. From 1519 to 1564 Ferdinand was confronted with two great problems—(*a*) the menace of the Turk, which chiefly affected the hereditary lands of the Hapsburgs; (*b*) the menace to the Empire, which he administered for Charles V, arising from the territorial ambitions of the German princes, the rise of German Protestantism and the ill-will of France. *Mutatis mutandis*, every subsequent ruler of Austria down to 1806 was torn in two opposite directions by two sets of problems and responsibilities, the one Austrian and the other Imperial.

At first we are inclined to wonder that the Hapsburgs clung so tenaciously to the imperial title. It seemed to be worth little after 1555; it was certainly worth much less after 1648. No doubt the Hapsburgs were partly influenced by family pride. They could not bear to surrender a distinction which had become *de facto* their hereditary perquisite, and which gave them precedence over all other sovereigns. But there was also the common-sense consideration that in various ways their position would be weakened by abandoning the Empire. The Empire would not fall into abeyance; the Electors would see to that; the Catholic Church and the Free Cities were interested in maintaining it; so too were many of the weaker princes who needed the protection of the imperial court of justice. The obvious candidate for the dignity, if the Hapsburgs retired, was Bavaria, the second in importance of the Catholic states. But between Bavaria and the Hapsburgs there was a rivalry of old standing, which showed itself unmistakably in the Thirty Years War and again in the Wars of the Spanish Succession and the War of the Austrian Succession. At all times the Bavarians were dangerous neighbours of the Austrian Tyrol; they had it in

their power to cut the communications between Austria and the possessions of the Spanish Hapsburgs in Italy; they could prevent Austrian troops from marching to the defence of the extensive Austrian possessions along the Upper Rhine and Upper Danube. There would be little chance of obtaining German help against the Turks, such as was rendered in 1683 at the siege of Vienna, if the Empire were to fall into the hands of Bavaria.

Ferdinand II was so much impressed with the importance of the Empire that he made great efforts to make his prerogative a reality after the Bohemian insurrection had given him his pretext. He may have begun the war for religious motives; but when he put Wallenstein's army into the field (1625) he certainly proposed to aggrandize the Hapsburgs in North Germany, and in particular to secure a *dominium maris Baltici et Teutonici* by the occupation of Mecklenburg and Pomerania and the mouths of the Elbe and Weser. This design was defeated largely through the stubbornness with which the Swedes clung to Western Pomerania, Bremen and Verden throughout the war; but the last chance of realizing it was sacrificed when Ferdinand got rid of his best general, Wallenstein (1634).

Ferdinand II, 1619–37

After Westphalia Leopold I (1658–1705) turned his back on the Empire. He would gladly have avoided his other responsibilities in the Near East, but circumstances were too strong for him. The Turks, under the great Vizier Mohammed Kiuprili and his son Ahmed Kiuprili, took the offensive in Transylvania and Western Hungary (1661–83) and threatened Austria with invasion. Under the pressure of this menace Leopold unwillingly allowed the formation of a formidable standing army which at the end of the reign numbered more than 100,000 horse and foot. This army was commanded by generals of ability, in particular the Italian Montecucculi († 1681) and Prince Eugene of Savoy. The crisis lasted up to 1683, when the siege of Vienna was raised by John Sobieski. But before it was at an end Leopold was dragged into Western politics again by his fears of Louis XIV, with whom he had long tried to live at peace. He became convinced that the safety

Leopold I, 1658–1705

NORTHERN EUROPE
after the Peace of Westphalia 1648
Brandenburg Prussia Gains
Saxony Gains
Bavaria Gains
Swedish Gains
French Gains
Spanish Hapsburgs
Austrian Hapsburgs
DENMARK
SWEDEN
Danzig
DUCHY OF PRUSSIA
Stralsund
EASTERN POMERANIA
Lübeck
Hamburg
R. Elbe
R. Vistula
Bremen
BRANDENBURG
Berlin
Frankfort
POLAND
REPUBLIC OF HOLLAND
R. Ems
R. Weser
Breitenfeld
Lützen
SAXONY
Dresden
SILESIA
SPANISH NETHERLANDS
R. Rhine
Frankfort
White Hill
BOHEMIA
Prague
Mainz
PALATINATE
Nuremberg
Verdun
Metz
Paris
Toul
Strassburg
Augsburg
BAVARIA
Munich
AUSTRIA
R. Danube
Vienna
KINGDOM OF HUNGARY
FRANCE
FRANCHE COMTÉ
SWISS REPUBLIC
T—Y—R—O—L
STYRIA
CARINTHIA

of the Hapsburgs could only be secured by fighting and beating Louis. Therefore he joined the Allies in 1674, but his armies were roughly handled by Turenne. He thought that he had done enough when he signed the Treaty of Nimeguen (1679), and, although in 1689–97 he was again opposed to Louis, he devoted himself in the years 1684–98 to a continuous warfare against the Turk. This war made him master of Hungary and left Austria one of the great military powers. Probably Leopold could have advanced further; but he preferred to hold his hand in order that he might be ready to assert his rights in the Spanish inheritance. A year later (by the Second Partition Treaty, 1699) he acquired a greater stake in this question, since his second son the Archduke Charles was now designated heir to Spain and the Indies. The interests of Austria were wholly western from that date up to 1711, when Charles succeeded unexpectedly his elder brother the Emperor Joseph I. That event made Charles ineligible for the throne of Spain but did not prevent him from securing a substantial share of the Spanish inheritance at the Treaty of Utrecht.

The Treaty of Utrecht is momentous in Austrian history. Austria became the sovereign of the old Spanish Netherlands and of Milan, and (in 1718) of Naples and Sicily. The Austrian possession of Sicily and Naples was brief and only lasted till 1735; but even without this kingdom the Hapsburgs were deeply implicated in the politics of Western Europe. The Treaty of Utrecht meant a sharp breach of the old friendly relations with Spain which had caused so much bad blood between Austria and France. On the other hand, Austria was now more than ever committed to acting as a barrier against French designs of aggression on the Rhine or in Italy. This is why we find Austria regarded as the arch-enemy of France in the reign of Louis XV up to 1748, and also in the first phase of the war of the French Revolution against Europe. Charles VI was by no means unwilling to pose as a Western sovereign: witness his efforts to develop the commerce of the Austrian Netherlands by means of the Ostend Company, and the relaxation of the Austrian effort in the Balkans after the Peace of Passarowitz

New Orientation under Charles VI

(1718). But it was only in the time of his daughter Maria Theresa that the Austrians were compelled to devote themselves entirely to wars in Central and Western Europe.

Austrian policy was complicated in the eighteenth century by the rise of Russia and Prussia as great powers, and by the decay of the kingdom of Poland. The Hapsburgs began to fear Russia from the moment when Peter the Great intervened in the Balkans (1709). They regarded the Balkans as their own rightful share of the Turkish inheritance. They not only resented Russian intervention in the Balkans, but were anxious that Russia should not conquer Constantinople or establish a protectorate over the Sultan. Neither could they submit to see the south of Poland absorbed by Russia; at the least they desired to hold the northern glacis of the Carpathians. Frederic the Great was not so serious a danger —at least not after 1763, when his title to Silesia had been recognized. But the Hapsburgs were jealous of Prussia's influence in the Empire, and the ambitious design of Joseph II to annex Bavaria was perhaps inspired by the hope that in this way the balance of power within the Empire might be redressed in favour of Austria.

Piedmont-Savoy is worth studying as an example of those small European states which made a considerable career by pursuing a consistent and well-considered policy.

Piedmont-Savoy

The Counts of Savoy in the Middle Ages were more interested in the politics of France and Germany than in those of Italy; and in the fifteenth century were closely connected with the Royal House of France. The second wife of Louis XI and the mother of Francis I were both princesses of the House of Savoy, and Savoy was virtually a protectorate of France. But the Counts possessed a great asset in Piedmont, an Italian province through which ran the passes of the Great St. Bernard, Little St. Bernard, Mont Cenis, Mont Genèvre, Casteldelfino and Col d'Argentière. Piedmont was also larger, more populous and more fertile than Savoy; so that in the sixteenth century it came to be regarded as the most important possession of the House of Savoy. In 1536 Francis I seized both Savoy and Piedmont in the right of his mother Louise of Savoy. In 1559 the

House of Savoy regained its possessions from France with the help of Philip II of Spain; but she had to pay heavily for this help, and Emmanuel Filibert (1559–80), who had actually served as a Spanish general, made it his first object to make Piedmont and Savoy strong against attack either from the south or from the north. For this purpose he founded a standing army which was the greatest asset of his successors. He forbade the building of castles by the nobles and took away their feudal privileges, so that henceforth they could only find a career in the royal service. He freed them from feudal military service but encouraged them to enter the standing army.

Charles Emmanuel, 1580–1630

Charles Emmanuel (1580–1630), though he married a daughter of Philip II, held to his father's balancing policy, though his method of balancing was to pass rapidly backwards and forwards from France to Spain and back to France. His object was to round off Savoy by getting hold of Geneva[1] and Piedmont by obtaining the marquisates of Saluzzo and Montferrat. The first was a free bishopric of the Empire which in the past had often been held by nominees of his house; the second, a troublesome enclave in his territory, furnished a road from France to the neighbourhood of Turin; the third was a strategic base useful if Lombardy was to be attacked, or the southern frontier of Piedmont to be defended. At the back of his mind Charles Emmanuel had vaguer and larger designs; he hoped that either the Huguenots or the Guises might buy his help in the Wars of Religion by ceding Provence, Dauphiné and the Lyonnais. These plans were frustrated by a Huguenot general who defended Dauphiné in 1591 and 1598, and seized Saluzzo in 1592; and by Henry IV, who overran Savoy in 1600. However in 1601 the Duke obtained Saluzzo in exchange for Bresse and Bugey. The bargain showed remarkable foresight, for Bresse and Bugey were the most prosperous provinces of Savoy and Saluzzo offered only a strategic advantage. But Charles Emmanuel

[1] He hoped that Spain would give him Geneva as part of his wife's marriage portion; and in 1602 he tried to seize it by a night attack.

argued that it was essential to the welfare of Savoy that wars between France and Spain in Italy should be made impossible.

In 1618 Charles Emmanuel formed a wilder plan. He was offered by Christian of Anhalt the imperial crown in the event of the Hapsburgs being overthrown. He was negotiating hard with the Evangelical Union in 1618, and they were offering the choice between the Imperial and Bohemian Crowns. The Imperialists on the other hand thought that Charles Emmanuel would be the best Generalissimo for the Spanish armies on the Rhine. In 1620 when both these prospects had been cut off he was trying to secure for himself the title of 'King of Savoy' from Emperor Ferdinand II. In 1625 he was at war with Genoa and hoping to secure that city by the aid of the French. In 1627 he had the chance of putting forward his pretensions to Montferrat with good hopes of getting them allowed by Spain, since the next heir to Mantua, Charles of Nevers, was practically a Frenchman. But Richelieu intervened and the Duke came to terms with France. In 1629 Savoy and Spain again invaded Montferrat, to which Richelieu replied by occupying Savoy and invading Piedmont. Charles Emmanuel died in 1630 before the war was ended by the Treaty of Cherasco (1631), which gave to the House a substantial slice of Montferrat.

The gains of Charles Emmanuel were quite eclipsed by those of his great-grandson Victor Amadeus (1675–1731), at whose accession Savoy was completely under the influence of Louis XIV. In order to emancipate himself from the regency of his mother, Victor Amadeus contracted a French marriage at the age of twenty and pretended to regard himself as a protégé of France. But in 1690 he abruptly ranged himself on the side of the League of Augsburg. The Allies had promised him a monthly subsidy of 30,000 crowns and the restitution of Pinerolo. These in themselves were insufficient inducements. He may have been offered compensation on the side of France; for he invaded Dauphiné in 1692. He may have thought that the time had come for turning Louis out of Casale (which Louis had seized in 1681). This is more probable. At all events in 1696, finding it impossible to evict the French from

Victor Amadeus, 1675–1731

Piedmont, he signed the secret Treaty of Turin by which he received Pinerolo and Casale (the latter to be dismantled and handed over to the Duke of Mantua) together with Nice, Villafranca and Susa. Victor Amadeus professed to be aggrieved because the King of Spain had refused to give him the government of the Milanese in perpetuity. In the secret treaty he promised that, if the Allies refused to suspend operations in Italy, he would join Louis XIV in conquering the Milanese and would hand over Savoy to France in exchange for the Milanese. This treaty reveals a sudden extension and reorientation of the policy of the House of Savoy. Victor Amadeus could afford to make large demands because Louis XIV was anxious for peace. The demands were not satisfied in full because the Allies hastily concluded peace when they learned of the defection of Savoy.[1] But Victor Amadeus emerged at the Treaty of Ryswick (1697) with his independence assured.

In the lull between this treaty and the recommencement of war in 1701 Louis XIV made new overtures to Victor Amadeus. The Duke wanted the Milanese; and was much annoyed to find that Louis intended to give this to the Duke of Lorraine in exchange for his Duchy. Louis XIV offered Victor Amadeus the Two Sicilies in exchange for Savoy-Piedmont and Nice. But as Victor Amadeus was not tempted Louis proposed to let him have the Milanese in exchange for Savoy and Nice. These negotiations were still in progress at the death of Charles II of Spain, and Victor Amadeus thought himself entirely uncommitted. In 1701 he found the position of Louis so strong that he signed a treaty with Louis, the effect of which was to grant free passage through his dominions to French troops, and to secure him the supreme command of French armies in Italy, and a considerable subsidy in return for the services of a part of his army. But he did not like the treaty because it offered him no *douceurs* of territory. For the next two years he negotiated with the Austrian claimant; finally he obtained a promise of Montferrat,

[1] Well they might; for they could no longer continue the war in Italy after his defection and Louis XIV was therefore able to increase his main army in the Netherlands by 30,000 men.

Vigevano and any conquests that he could make in Dauphiné and Provence. This he accepted. The first result of his change of sides was that Piedmont became the main battle-ground in North Italy. It was overrun by the French in 1705; but in 1706 Eugene brought up an imperial army, raised the siege of Turin and drove them out. None the less in 1710, after the death of the Emperor Joseph I, Victor Amadeus hesitated again; he would not attack Louis XIV until he got new assurances from Vienna as to Montferrat and took no personal part in the campaigns from 1708. Still, on the whole he was true to the Grand Alliance and received his reward at the Utrecht settlement. He got Montferrat and Vigevano; he also got Sicily. This was an unearned increment which Victor Amadeus owed to England. England was anxious that Sicily should not go either to Austria or to France, and favoured Victor Amadeus because he had no fleet. He was also given the reversion of the Crown of Spain, in the event of the line of Philip V becoming extinct. Decidedly he was the spoiled child of this peace-conference. But he had greater hopes in his heart; he thought that he should be able to conquer Milan and Naples in the near future. His hopes, however, were frustrated by Elizabeth Farnese, Queen of Spain, and her minister Alberoni. Their attack on Sicily in 1718 had to be dealt with by England; and immediately afterwards the Quadruple Alliance insisted that Victor Amadeus should take Sardinia in exchange for Sicily. He resented the compulsion, but it is probable that he gained by the change, as the Piedmontese were excessively unpopular in Sicily.

CHAPTER XII

LOUIS XIV AND HIS SUCCESSORS

CARDINAL EVENTS

1661	Death of Mazarin. Personal Rule of Louis XIV begins.
1667–8	War of Devolution. Place of Aix-la-Chapelle.
1672–8	Dutch War. Peace of Nimeguen.
1685	Revocation of the Edict of Nantes.
1688–97	War of the League of Augsburg. Peace of Ryswick.
1702–13	War of the Spanish Succession. Peace of Utrecht.
1715	Death of Louis XIV.
1733–5	War of the Polish Succession.
1740–8	War of the Austrian Succession. France opposed to Austria.
1756–63	Seven Years War. France in alliance with Austria.
1775–83	War of American Independence.

IN following the fortunes of the Hapsburgs we have seen the policy of Louis XIV of France as it were from the outside. We now turn to examine this remarkable reign from the French point of view, taking first the course of foreign relations, then Louis's religious policy, and afterwards the general characteristics of his period.

Foreign Relations

Up to 1668 Louis regarded the Hapsburgs as his main enemies. In that year he thought that he had made himself secure from them. On the one hand the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle ended in his favour the War of Devolution (so called from the ' right of devolution ', on which he had based an extravagant claim to territory in the Spanish

Netherlands) by giving him twelve strong fortresses, though it did not give him Franche Comté. On the other hand he reached an agreement with the Emperor Leopold I as to their line of action in an eventuality which seemed about to occur, the ending of the Spanish line of the Hapsburg family by the death of the heirless Charles II of Spain. This was a secret treaty for the partition of the Spanish dominions by which Louis was to take the Spanish Netherlands, Franche Comté, Sicily and Naples, Spanish Navarre and the East Philippines, but nothing else in the Indies.

Louis now turned his attention to Holland. This Protestant Republic had joined with the English and Swedes to press Louis to make the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle, and had thus checked his progress. He had therefore grounds for his hostility, but the new war was really the work of Louis's great minister Colbert, and the outcome of a tariff war with the Dutch which Colbert had caused. Colbert succeeded Fouquet as Finance Minister in 1661, and in 1669 became Secretary of State for the Navy, Commerce and the Colonies. At the beginning of the reign (1661–6) Colbert restored the equilibrium of the finances, without increasing taxation, by keeping a strict control over tax-collectors and farmers of taxes, by improving the system of accounts so as to prevent waste or peculation, and by a partial repudiation of the debt. Between 1667 and 1683 he built a formidable navy. In 1664 he made an ambitious attempt to stimulate colonial trade by founding two monopolistic companies, one for the West Indies, the other for the East Indies. The first of these came to grief by 1674. The second traded at a loss till 1682, when Colbert threw open the East Indian trade to all French subjects, but left to his Company the monopoly of transport between France and the East Indies. This East India Company became practically a state concern and was used extensively in the eighteenth century as an instrument of state policy in India. Colbert took energetic measures to found new industries at home, and was successful in naturalizing the industries of lace-making and silk-weaving. But he did much harm to older industries by his paternal regulations, which were intended to secure good workmanship,

Colbert's Reforms

particularly in the case of the cloth-trade. He also injured the corn-growers by prohibiting (1669–83) the export of grain. His intention was to safeguard France against famine; but the effect was to diminish the area of the corn-lands. He also tried to protect national industries by means of tariffs; but the chief effect of this policy was the tariff-war with the Dutch. The expensive land operations in the Dutch war ruined all Colbert's maritime and colonial plans; and at the Peace of Nimeguen (1678) Louis XIV found it expedient to make concessions to Dutch trade. The originality of Colbert has been overrated, and many of his pet measures failed of their object. But he was the first minister since Sully who had practised economy in financial administration. And he was the first European statesman who gave the best of his attention to developing commerce.

The Dutch War brought the Empire and Spain into action against France. From 1674 it became for Louis a war against the Hapsburgs, which was successful up to the end of 1675 because he had the services of Condé and Turenne. But in that year Turenne died and Condé retired. The Peace of Nimeguen (1678) registered successes over the Hapsburgs; France secured another slice of the Netherlands and Franche Comté and Freiburg. But the terms arranged with the Dutch were a confession of failure—Maestricht was restored to them and Colbert's hostile tariff given up.

Louis XIV's Ministers

The finances of the kingdom were already beginning to be embarrassed before the death of Colbert, as a result of the wars upon which Louis XIV embarked after 1673. After his death they were largely managed by Colbert's nephew Desmaretz, first as a subordinate, and from 1708 as Controller-General. But the state of the finances could not be remedied without a retrenchment of military expenditure. In the last two years of the reign it was impossible to pay in full the interest on the outstanding debt. After Colbert, Louis's most influential adviser was Louvois (1662–91), the son of Le Tellier, who became Secretary for War under Mazarin in 1643 and reorganized the French army; Louvois became his father's colleague in 1662. From 1668 the son took the lead in military affairs and the father acted

as his assistant. Louvois was an expert in his own department, but he was jealous of Colbert and encouraged the King to embark on ambitious enterprises in order to make himself indispensable. He was a good organizer, though he contributed nothing to the art of war. The chief technical improvements were those introduced into military engineering by Vauban, who became commissary-general of fortifications in 1677. Vauban built a double line of great fortresses to defend the eastern frontier from Dunkirk to Besançon. He also perfected the art of besieging fortresses by means of parallel trenches and mortar-fire—'Ville assiegée par Vauban, ville prise.' It is difficult to say how much influence Louvois had upon the King's policy. Saint Simon has no doubt that Le Tellier and Louvois instigated the Dutch War of 1672–4, but Colbert, as we have said, was at least equally responsible. Louvois may, however, be blamed for the spirit of Louis's policy in the years 1679–88, which we may call years of ὕβρις. This period was marked by a series of acts of aggression :

(1) Work of the Chambers of Reunion from 1679 ; Claim to Alsace, 1680 ; seizure of Strassburg, 1681.

(2) Breach with the Pope by the Declaration of Four Articles asserting the independence of the Gallican Church and also the Conciliar theory, 1682.

(3) Seizure of Luxemburg, 1684. (Louis took advantage of the attack of the Turks on Vienna.)

(4) Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, 1685. Bombardment of Genoa, 1685 (because Genoa built galleys for Spain).

(5) Seizure of Avignon and occupation of the Electorate of Cologne, 1688. Seizure of the Palatinate to enforce a claim of the Duchess of Orleans.

This is the traditional policy run mad.

Saint Simon also tells the barely credible story that Louvois brought about the League of Augsburg War (1688) because he felt that his influence with the King was on the wane. 'He vowed that he would kindle a war in which the King should not be able to do without him.' In another place he says : 'It was by cleverly working on the King's pride that

Louvois contrived to involve him in so many wars and thus established his own boundless authority.' As regards the League of Augsburg War he is probably half-right and half-wrong. Louvois was responsible for the acts of aggression which led up to the war of 1688 ; but it is open to question whether he desired to bring about a new war. Louvois was of opinion in 1688 that France was not yet ready for a long war or a general war ; but he did suggest a lightning attack on the Emperor which should compel the Empire to keep out of the anti-French coalition. This was the policy which Louis adopted in September, 1688. It was a double mistake. Holland was the really dangerous enemy, not the Empire ; and it was the attack on the Empire that exasperated Europe and led to the general war which otherwise might still have been avoided.

It turned out for another reason to be the greatest of the mistakes which Louis made before the death of Louvois. It resulted in William of Orange's landing in England and starting the Revolution by which he became King and brought England into the war against Louis. Louis had not foreseen this event, although he had anticipated that England and Holland might come to blows, and had warned the Dutch (September, 1688) that he would regard an attack on James II of England as an attack on himself. This action made the Dutch all the more willing that William should undertake his expedition as the only means of detaching England from the side of France. Louis could not intervene, or thought he could not, because he was already involved in a war against the Empire. He acted when it was too late, and did not act decisively enough. That was in 1690, when William was absent in Ireland and England only defended by the Anglo-Dutch fleet. Louis won the naval victory of Beachy Head, but in 1693 the combined English and Dutch fleets met one-half of the French fleet off La Hogue, and gained a victory, destroying twelve French vessels. It was not an overwhelming defeat, but it alarmed Louis XIV. He gave orders that for the future the French fleet should stand on the defensive, to protect the coasts and ports, and while attacking the commerce of the Allies, should avoid their battle-ships. These tactics were bound to be

ineffective. The sovereignty of the seas passed to the Allies and they retained it till 1713.

At the Peace of Ryswick (1697), Louis had to recognize William as King of England and to make other concessions. In the meantime Louvois had died (1691). The ministry of war passed to his son Barbezieux; but there was no first minister after Louvois. Louis himself settled all plans of campaign and all foreign policy. For the mistakes committed in the last twenty-four years of his reign, he must take responsibility.

It might be inferred that after 1693 Louis XIV was indifferent to colonies. In 1674, as we have seen, he put in no claim to the Spanish Empire. As the vacancy of the Spanish throne [1] approached, he made further agreements about the future of the Spanish Empire

The Spanish Question

[1] THE SPANISH SUCCESSION



1. The Electoral Prince claimed as great-grandson of Philip IV.

2. The Emperor Leopold I claimed: (1) as the grandson of Philip III; (2) because he had married the second daughter of Philip IV, and his daughter, Maria Antonia, had surrendered her right to him. He, however, passed on his claim to his second son, the Archduke Charles.

3. The Dauphin claimed through his mother, Maria Theresa, the eldest daughter of Philip IV. Louis XIV, on marrying her, had renounced all claims she might have on Spain, but held that the

which seemed to show the same indifference. In the First Partition Treaty (1698) made with William III, the Spanish Colonies were assigned to the least powerful candidate, the son of the Elector of Bavaria. The death of that candidate made necessary a second Partition Treaty (1700), in which they were, on the proposal of Louis himself, assigned to the Austrian Archduke Charles, the third claimant. But what were the motives of Louis XIV in making these treaties? One motive was certainly to delay the outbreak of European war. He needed a breathing-space. He had in 1697 accepted very disadvantageous terms at Ryswick in order to get this breathing-space. In 1698 he probably thought it worth while to renounce the Spanish Colonies in good faith to get a breathing-space. But in 1700, when the question of the Spanish Succession came to a head, the case was different. Charles II of Spain had shown his determination to provide, if possible, a single successor to the whole of the Spanish dominions. He had replied to the First Partition Treaty by nominating the Bavarian candidate as his successor. Would he not be anxious to defeat the Second Treaty in a similar fashion? Could he not be trusted to nominate a French successor? Assuming that this could be arranged, was not the wise course for the King of France that of signing the Second Partition Treaty in order to pacify the English and the Dutch and then awaiting future developments? This much is certain, that the ministers of Charles VI thought the Second Treaty a stratagem on the part of the King of France to open the eyes of the Spaniards to the danger in which they stood. The Spanish Council of State unanimously petitioned Charles II to nominate, as his heir, Philip of Anjou, Louis's grandson (the younger son of his son, the Dauphin). They acted without pressure from Louis or his ambassador. But they made their choice of a successor on the simple ground that no candidate but a French candidate had the slightest chance of holding his own against England and the Empire. Louis accepted the offer made to his grandson on

renunciation was void because: (α) her dowry had never been paid; (β) the renunciation had never been confirmed, either by the Cortes, or by the Parlement of Paris.

the ground that the Emperor had not accepted the Treaty of 1700, and was not likely to accept it. Therefore war with Austria was inevitable. If France must fight Austria, France had better fight for the whole rather than the half of the Spanish inheritance. That was his ostensible reason and it was good in law. His real motives may, however, be deduced from certain measures which he took as soon as his grandson was on the throne of Spain. He sent French squadrons to protect the Spanish colonies. He obtained for French merchants the right of engaging in the Spanish colonial trade. He caused the Asiento monopoly to be made over to a French trading company. It was the fear of seeing the trade of the Spanish colonies monopolized by France that made the commercial classes of Holland and England so resolute for fighting the war to a finish.

Louis's decision to accept the Crown of Spain for his grandson must be reckoned among his greatest blunders. But it was not in fact so foolish as might be supposed in the light of the actual results. For if he refused the Spanish Crown, it passed by the will of Charles II to the Archduke or, failing him, to the Duke of Savoy. The Emperor had not accepted the Second Partition Treaty, and perhaps would not do so. If Louis accepted the crown of Spain it was not at all certain that England or Holland would fight. But he did his best to provoke Holland by seizing the Barrier Fortresses (6 February, 1701). This act of violence brought both the Dutch and the English round to the side of William III at a time when he was in despair. To crown all he recognized the Old Pretender as the lawful successor of James II of England. This was an open breach of the Treaty of Ryswick, by which he had promised not to question William's title to the English crown either directly or indirectly. His ministers advised him not to take this step. But he was guided by the Dauphin and the other Princes of the Blood who said that it would be dishonourable not to recognize James Edward at once. Louis had no intention, he told his counsellors, of supporting the Pretender's claims by force of arms. But William III exploited to the utmost the breach of international law. There was nothing

Mistakes of Louis XIV

very criminal in the repudiation of the Second Partition Treaty. But it was the result of a miscalculation. Louis had not expected that either England or Holland would fight. He went into the war with forces which were not equal to the task that in fact confronted them. He was insufficiently provided with Allies. The Elector of Bavaria, the most important of them, was ruined by the Blenheim campaign (1704), and became a fugitive from his own dominions. Savoy and Portugal deserted to the Allies in 1703. Spain had to be defended against the Allies by French armies. At sea the English and Dutch navies had the upper hand throughout the war, so that the Allies could land troops in Spain when they pleased. Since Colbert's death Louis had paid no attention to sea-power ; and such ships as he still had (eighty vessels of the line) were scattered in small squadrons. Like Napoleon, he staked everything on his main army in the Netherlands.

French Generals in the Spanish Succession War

The French Army had the superiority in numbers, but it was not well handled. The French allowed Marlborough to take the initiative in the Netherlands. They were outmanœuvred in the Blenheim campaign of 1704, in the battles of Ramillies in 1706, and Oudenarde in 1708. It was only in 1709 that Marlborough met in a great battle a pair of generals—Marshal Boufflers and Marshal Villars—who were something like his match. Why were such men not employed more often and earlier in the critical positions ? The reason is that Louis XIV pinned his faith on Marshal Villeroy and Marshal Vendôme. Villeroy was a personal friend of Louis and in every way attractive, but as a soldier he was a laughing-stock even in 1695, when it was said that he rendered incomparable service to the King—of England, and he crowned his career by losing Ramillies (1706). Vendôme was a great-grandson of Henri IV, eccentric, dirty, drunken. Saint Simon describes him : ' Audacious, impudent and domineering ; wedded to his own ideas with an obstinacy which no experience had been able to cure ; intolerant of restraint or contradiction, and impatient in the presence of any one superior to himself . . . perfectly unscrupulous, devoid alike of truth, honour and principle. . . . A general

whose slack discipline has won the hearts of the common soldiers while at the same time the senior officers tremble before him.' Vendôme won some victories in Italy, and was sent for in 1706 to replace Villeroy in the Netherlands, but lost Oudenarde through indolence. He tried to throw the blame upon the Duc de Bourgogne, the eldest son of the Dauphin, who held a command under himself. Early in 1709 Vendôme was superseded. He was, however, allowed to go to Spain

in the following year, where he won the decisive battle of Brihuega. Villars was undoubtedly the hero of the war on the French side. At the beginning he was only a Lieutenant-General, but was made a Marshal in 1702 for the victory of Friedlingen. In 1706 he saved Alsace from being overrun by the Allies after the battle of Blenheim. In 1709 he received the supreme command in the Netherlands when the position seemed desperate. In that year at Malplaquet he saved

France from invasion; and he again rendered her the same service in 1712, when he defeated the Austrian general, Prince Eugene, at Denain. If the merits of Villars had been earlier recognized, the war might have been considerably less disastrous.

Religious Policy of Louis XIV

Louis XIV was always interested in ecclesiastical affairs, and just because he treated the Papacy rather cavalierly was inclined to vindicate his orthodoxy by a drastic suppression of heretical views. In matters of theology he thought very much as the more ignorant of the Catholics of France. He held fast to the view that a state divided in religion was bound to fall. It seemed to him irrelevant that Protestants and Catholics were in fact living peaceably side by side. He thought it disastrous that a large part of French commerce and industry should be in the hands of Protestants. He believed that every Protestant was at heart a rebel and a republican. He professed to believe that the Edict of Nantes had been intended only as a truce, giving the Huguenots a time of grace in which to repent of their errors. But he was slow in taking action. He was urged by his clergy as early as 1675 to take in hand the extirpation of heresy. But at that time he was not prepared to do more than cut down the privileges of the Protestants, by preventing the establishment of new churches, by forbidding Protestants to keep any but elementary schools, by excluding Protestants from membership of the trade-gilds.

Persecution of Protestants

From 1679 to 1685 he employed methods of half-persecution, in the belief that the great majority of the Huguenots were but loosely attached to their faith. He suppressed the special courts of law which decided cases affecting members of both religions, and he attempted to convert Huguenots by the method of quartering dragoons in their houses, the notorious *dragonnades*.

In 1685 came the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, which ordered:

(1) The destruction of Protestant churches and the cessation of Protestant worship.

(2) The banishment of Protestant pastors who were not willing to be converted.

(3) The galleys for any Huguenot who attempted to leave the kingdom.

One result was the flight into exile of about 200,000 Huguenots, many of them men of wealth and position, though few of them, in spite of the Edict of Nantes, had ever been allowed to hold public office; another was that all the Protestant powers came into the League of Augsburg in 1686 to defend their religion and obtain satisfaction for the Huguenots. We may here make an interesting comparison with the Irish legislation of William and Mary. In 1691 all Irish Catholics were excluded from office and Parliament. Popish schools were suppressed, and all Roman Catholic Bishops and regular clergy were banished.

It would be a mistake to suppose that the Revocation was a purely political matter. For some years before 1685 Louis had been falling under the influence of a clerical party. The influence of that party was brought to bear on him through his confessors, especially Père La Chaise from 1675 to 1709, and Père Le Tellier from 1709 to 1715. These two Jesuits were in fact ministers of state in ecclesiastical matters.

Persecution of Jansenists

They were responsible not only for the attack on the Huguenots, but also for the intermittent persecution of the Jansenist clergy in the last ten years of the reign. The Papacy was reluctant to pry into the private opinions of the suspects too minutely. The Jansenists, 'a dreary ardent crew', were defended in the celebrated *Lettres Provinciales* of Pascal (1656–7). But Louis and his confessors succeeded in extracting from Rome two Bulls—*Vineam Domini*, 1705, and *Unigenitus*, 1713—which made the business of detection easier. The famous community of Port Royal (founded 1637)—a stronghold of Jansenism—was closed in 1708 and demolished in 1710. At the time of his death the King was preparing to indict for heresy, before a Council of the French Church, no less a person than Cardinal Noailles, the Archbishop of Paris.

Character of Louis XIV

The judgment of posterity on the central figure of all these remarkable transactions has been largely influenced by the memoirist Saint Simon, who was not only opposed to Louis but thought meanly of him as a man.

Saint Simon, who knew him well, says that after the death of Mazarin in 1661 Louis resolved to govern without a first minister, and to govern himself, 'which, though he never realized it, he was incapable of doing'. His flatterers took full advantage of his decision on this subject. 'His natural talents were below mediocrity.' But he had a mind which was capable of improvement, and he could assimilate the best ideas of other people. 'Glory was his passion, but he also liked order and regularity in all things.' He was naturally prudent, moderate and reserved; always master of his tongue and his emotions. Will it be believed that he was also naturally a just, good-hearted man?

All his faults, says Saint Simon, were produced by his surroundings. He was neglected in his childhood. 'He was hardly taught how to read and write, and grew up ignorant of the best-known events of history.' Of the laws of his own country, of the personal careers of the men of his time, he never knew a word. His ministers, for their own ends, taught him to mistrust the higher nobility. He hated superiority of birth just as much as he hated superiority of intellect. His weakest point was love of flattery, and in this he was indulged to the top of his bent by everyone about him. The coarser and the clumsier the flattery, the more he enjoyed it. Louvois persuaded him that he was more accomplished in the art of war than any of his great generals. His campaigns were his favourite topic of conversation. His mind was continually occupied with small details, such as the uniform and the drill of his soldiers. He imagined that he could give instruction to the most skilful experts in their own particular subjects. His ministers turned this failing to good account and kept his attention engaged with a mass of details, while they got their own way on more important matters. He prided himself on being accessible to everyone, but everyone saw him in public. There was little chance of any private conversation or of talking to him for more than a few minutes at a time. But when he could be approached privately he was very ready to listen, very anxious to get at the truth, and even patient when he was refuted. This Saint Simon knew from personal experience. But this open-mindedness

was only superficial. He was opinionative, and he thought himself inspired. The account which Saint-Simon gives of the King's self-esteem is confirmed in all kinds of ways, e.g. by the advice which he gave to his grandson Philip V of Spain : 'Listen to advice, consult your ministers, but decide for yourself. God, who has made you a King, will give you the necessary wisdom, provided your intentions are good.' Unfortunately he sometimes took the advice of his confessor for the voice of God, e.g. in a question of taxation (1711). We may also note the sort of infatuation by which he was seized in the interval between the Dutch War and the War of the Grand Alliance (1678–89) ; and again in the years 1700–1, when the question of the Spanish Succession was on the tapis.

Louis never liked Colbert, whom he suspected of independence, and Louvois only held his own by allowing the King to suppose himself really responsible for every step that was taken. The King's manner of asserting his independence in routine business was peculiar. He made it a rule to reject about one in twenty of the proposals which each minister laid before him. It was impossible to guess beforehand which proposals would be so treated, for it was purely a matter of chance. Yet the King took the greatest pains to collect advice, and spent a large part of his working-day in presiding over the three different Councils in which matters of importance were decided—the *Conseil d'Etat* for high policy, the *Conseil des depêches* for home affairs, and the *Conseil des finances*. His general rule was to attend one of these on each day in the week (Sundays not excepted) ; he met the *Conseil d'Etat* three days in each week. In all matters of business he was punctual and diligent. His life was carefully mapped out hour by hour, and his routine was invariable. Saint-Simon says that 'with the help of an almanack and a watch you could tell at a distance of 300 leagues exactly what he would be doing'.

But Louis XIV was popular with most classes of his subjects until the period of great disasters began ; and in the eighteenth century Voltaire looks back to his reign as a sort of golden age. Louis XIV was in his opinion a great reformer.

Voltaire's Opinion of Louis XIV

In the last years of Mazarin the Government was full of every kind of disorder; but his personal administration marked a great improvement. Though he was a despot he paid regular attention to any complaints and to any proposals for reform that were laid before his Council by any of his subjects; so that there was a real understanding between King and people. He made Paris a civilized capital, well lighted, well cleaned and well policed. He gave Colbert a free hand in working out a new economic system which, Voltaire was certain, would be more and more praised as the spirit of true philosophy gained ground in France. He completed the Louvre; he built the palaces of Versailles, Trianon, Marly, the chapel of the Invalides and the College of Saint Cyr. He was also, according to Voltaire, a great legislator; for Voltaire gives him the credit of Colbert's reforms of civil law, criminal law, commercial law. His military reforms were considerable, for he gave to each regiment a distinctive uniform; he reorganized the King's bodyguard; he armed all his infantry with the bayonet; he reformed the artillery; he created (in 1688) the militia. He raised the strength of the fighting forces, military and naval, to such a point that in the end he had 450,000 men serving in the fleet and the army. Voltaire is erroneously of the opinion that the navy was kept at full strength in his time and was only allowed to decline when Fleury was in power. 'Voilà en général ce que Louis XIV fit et essaya pour rendre sa nation plus florissante.' Voltaire admits certain faults and errors of omission or commission, especially the persecution of the Huguenots, to which he has devoted an eloquent chapter. But he declares that Louis made France a united country. 'The spirit of faction which had possessed the citizens from the time of Francis II became a spirit of rivalry in the service of the sovereign.' None the less Voltaire does not pretend to praise Louis XIV for the policy of aggrandisement. The age of Louis XIV was, he tells us, an age of public disasters which succeeded one another almost without intermission. But events of this kind are in the long run erased from the register of history. The details and the means of policy fall into oblivion; good laws, good

institutions and the monuments of the sciences and arts are immortal.

What did Louis XIV do for science and letters? The Académie Française had been founded by Richelieu (1634).

Science and Literature

In 1666 Louis was persuaded by Colbert to found an Academy of Sciences similar to the English Royal Society. The most distinguished members of this Academy were the Danish physicist Roemer and the Dutch physicist Huyghens and the Italian astronomer Cassini. All three were brought to France by Colbert, who gave them pensions. Voltaire has to admit that all the great scientific discoveries of the century were made by the natives of other countries. The case is clearer as regards literature. Bossuet and Fénelon, Corneille, Racine, Molière, all received more or less of patronage from Louis XIV. But Voltaire has of course to admit that royal patronage counted for very little in this literary Renaissance; it was the result of a long and gradual improvement of the national taste and the national language. Boileau sums up the inspiration of the age in his *Art Poetique* (1674). The poet should tell the truth only, but not the whole truth. He should not be realist or romantic. Comedians should not be too humorous. Molière ought not to have written for the masses. 'The proper study of mankind is Man', not the individual. Good sense, observation, avoidance of detail, are the requisites of the poet; the imitation of the technique of antiquity is his method.

The internal history of France in the reigns of Louis XV and XVI was the working-out of the problems left behind by Louis XIV; but it is best treated as the prelude to the French Revolution, and, as we are to stop short of that great upheaval, it will be proper to omit here its immediate antecedents. We must, however, follow out the results of Louis's reign in international, and especially in colonial, affairs.

Results of Louis XIV's Reign

England did not use her golden opportunity of the War of the Spanish Succession to crush the French colonial Empire. India and North America were almost totally neglected. Hence after the Peace of Utrecht there still remained the foundations upon which a

Revival of French Colonial Plans after 1714

French colonial Empire could be reared. No doubt the French would have been well advised to concentrate their attention upon Canada, and to subordinate all other considerations to the defence of Canada. For it was the one foreign possession of France in which a French population took root and throve. But every age has its delusions. The French were persuaded that the most profitable trade was trade with tropical and semi-tropical colonies. Hence in the years 1717–21 France went mad about the Mississippi scheme of John Law, a Scotsman who obtained control of the French finances. Law had a theory of the value of paper money which caused a disastrous financial crisis. It was connected with his Compagnie de l'Ouest or Mississippi Company, which was founded in 1717 and discredited in 1721; the year after the curiously similar South Sea Bubble in England. Law's hope of saving France from bankruptcy by the systematic development of her colonies failed; but the French kept their faith in the future of the Mississippi valley and of Canada. Later in the century they fixed their attention upon the sugar islands of the West Indies, upon the Spanish colonies, and upon the French factories in India. The fears of the English and Dutch were not realized when the Bourbons gained the Spanish throne. The French were angling for a privileged position in the colonial trade with Spain; but in the first two Family Compacts, or agreements of the French and Spanish Bourbons, in 1733 and 1744, they failed to secure this. Although it did not become entirely or mainly colonial in the eighteenth century, French policy had acquired a decidedly colonial colour. North America was not wholly neglected. The French ministers supported La Gallissonière in his plan of establishing a cordon of French forts along the Ohio and the Mississippi valleys. Dupleix formed grandiose plans in India (1730–53).

All these projects failed, along with the plan for exploiting the Spanish Indies, and for the same reasons. They were wrecked for want of sufficient means. France dissipated herself and squandered her resources over too wide a field. The crisis came in the Seven Years War (1756–63). It found France not equipped for a war in

Causes of their Failure



R.V. Barbishire, Oct. 4, 1908.

the New World, with the result that the English practically expelled the French from North America and India. France had not given to the Spanish Crown the help which it felt entitled to expect for the defence of the Spanish colonies. Spain suffered heavily in the Seven Years War through her alliance with France and therefore did not feel called upon to give France the trading privileges which France had expected. In the Third Family Compact of 1761, during the war, France was promised full liberty of import and export from all the Spanish dominions. After the war Choiseul worked hard (1763–6) to get this promise carried out. He was still under the delusion that Spanish America would become the great market for French manufactured goods. These mistakes were largely due to the persistent belief of French statesmen that the mastery of the New World was to be obtained by battles in Europe. France thought that she could conquer India and America on the plains of Germany. This was a miscalculation. England could not be conquered in Germany because England never locked up her main resources in Germany. She kept her fleet free for colonial enterprises—particularly in the Seven Years War. She annexed French colonies as a set-off to the disasters which she and her allies experienced on the Continent. For England the Continental wars of the eighteenth century were costly but remunerative diversions.

The War of American Independence

The War of American Independence, 1778–83, besides being the turning-point in the history of America, was the next round in the struggle between France and England. What were the objects of France in this war?

(1) There was supposed to be a danger of Great Britain offering independence to the colonies as the price of an offensive alliance against France. This was a favourite plan of the American general Gates.

(2) The open alliance (Second Treaty of Paris) was formed in February, 1778, when the fortune of war had definitely turned in favour of the colonists. (General Burgoyne was captured in 1777.) Up to this date France had merely given covert assistance



THE AMERICAN COLONIES IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

to the Americans—selling munitions to them from the public arsenals and allowing the passage of volunteers (e.g. Lafayette, afterwards famous in the Revolution).

(3) One immediate result was that France obtained a treaty of commerce with a promise of most-favoured-nation treatment. This might have been very valuable after the war if the Americans had allowed their commercial operations to be controlled by sentiment. But this did not happen.

(4) France may have hoped to recover Canada, when she made her offer. But the colonists stipulated in the treaty that France should renounce all pretensions to territorial rights in North America, thus foreshadowing the Monroe doctrine.

(5) The United States guaranteed the French possessions in America, but this was not a very valuable pledge.

That France went into the alliance with some misgivings is evident from the fact that the defensive treaty was to come into force eventually, not immediately, 'in the event of war being declared between France and Great Britain'. But since the Treaty of Commerce recognized the independence of the colonies, Great Britain treated it as amounting to a declaration of war (March 1778).

In April, 1779, Spain joined the side of America and France. Spain had sixty ships of the line, and it was thought that the united fleets of France and Spain could cover an invasion of England. But in the summer of 1779 D'Orvilliers, who commanded the joint fleet, failed to force an action in the Channel, and therefore the despatch of the army of invasion from St. Malo and Dunkirk could not take place. In the Armed Neutrality of 1780, Russia, Sweden, Denmark and Holland combined to assert the rights of neutral shipping. Holland was actually drawn into the war against England; and the English were compelled to recognize the independence of the revolted colonies; but France was little benefited. At the Peace of Versailles (1783) she was disillusioned by the Americans, who negotiated direct with England and did not allow themselves to be used as instruments of French policy.

France gained nothing by the war except the restitution of the West Indies which she had lost during the war. America made peace first and thus England was in a strong position when negotiating with France and Spain. Further, the war had brought France to the very edge of bankruptcy.

The colonial policy of France in the eighteenth century was combined with a Continental policy of the old sort, of which the leading events were three wars with which we shall deal in the next chapter: the War of the Polish Succession (1733–7), the War of the Austrian Succession (1741–8), and the Seven Years War (1756–63).

Continental Policy

The first two of these were purely European in their aims and were intended to weaken the Austrian Hapsburgs. By neither of them did France gain advantages. In the third war France joined Austria, not with any long views but because afraid of the combination of England and Prussia. She was afraid that if she rejected the Austrian advances she would be left isolated. When it appeared that the Tsarina Elizabeth was prepared to join the coalition against Frederic the Great, France thought that the chance of crushing England and Frederic together had arrived. But France made the great mistake of giving a blank cheque to Austria without receiving any correspondent advantages. The French plan was made to appear worse than it actually was through the audacity of Pitt, and the war, which, as we have seen, sealed the fate of French colonial ambitions, saw also the collapse of French military prestige. The defeats of Rossbach in 1758 and Minden in 1759 were fatal to the reputation of the French arms. Thus the sequel to the age of Louis XIV saw disasters on all hands and, abroad as well as at home, prepared the way for the breakdown of the old régime.

CHAPTER XIII

EASTERN EUROPE

CARDINAL EVENTS

1386	Union of Poland and Lithuania.
1527	Religious Reformation in Sweden.
1611–29	Baltic conquests of Gustavus Adolphus.
1613	Romanoff dynasty established in Russia.
1630–48	German War of Gustavus Adolphus (d. 1632) and his successors.
1654–60	Charles X of Sweden: Wars with Denmark and Poland.
1699–1721	Great Northern War: Charles XII (d. 1718) and Peter the Great (d. 1725).
1762–96	Catherine the Great of Russia.
1772	First Partition of Poland.

IN this chapter we have to deal with several States and their rivalries, the most important of which concerned the Baltic. In this the first element was the problem of the Sound, the narrow entrance to the inland sea. The control of this entrance was, as we shall see, disputed between Denmark, which held both sides until 1660, and Sweden. It had a bearing on the further problem of the Baltic Provinces and their ports. These were Stettin on the Oder, Danzig on the Vistula, Elbing, Memel on the Niemen, Riga on the Dvina, Reval, Narva on the Gulf of Finland. They formed the outlets for all the countries bordering on the Baltic; but their contact with the outside world was dependent on the right to pass through the Sound. Thus the Sound question affected all the Baltic powers.

Poland is the first of these to demand attention. The Poles proper are a Slavonic race with no Tartar or Finnish

admixture. In the early Middle Ages the Dukes of Poland were drawn into the sphere of Western Europe, and from the year 1000 Catholic Christianity prevailed in Poland. The Polish monarchy was founded in the year 996, but it never succeeded in destroying the old aristocracy. The Kings of Poland were usually dependent on the Empire before the Great Interregnum.

Poland

In 1386 the union of Lithuania and Poland under the Jagellon dynasty marks the beginning of a new era. It was brought about by the marriage of Queen Hedwig with Ladislas Jagellon of Lithuania. This meant the conversion of Lithuania to Christianity. It also meant the overthrow of the Teutonic Knights in Prussia (Battle of Tannenberg, 1410; Treaty of Thorn, 1411). In 1466 West Prussia was conquered from them and they were obliged to do homage for East Prussia. Thus Poland acquired the mouth of the Vistula and a footing on the Baltic. Her trade began to develop; and the University of Cracow, established in 1400, became a school for the whole of Eastern Europe. The Lithuanians seem to have taken the lead in this movement, and their ambitions were very extensive. In 1399 the Grand Duke of Lithuania, though only a vassal of the Crown of Poland, tried to destroy the Tartar power in Russia, but was heavily defeated. The plan, however, of annexing Russia was taken up by Polish princes in the fifteenth century and again in 1610–12. The Lithuanians belonged to the Greek Church—hence many tears in the future.

Union of Lithuania and Poland

Poland received her peculiar Parliamentary Constitution from Ladislas Jagellon in 1413 at the time when Lithuania was incorporated in Poland, and the constitution of the Senate and Diet was fixed in 1453. The Lower House, representative of the lesser nobility, eventually became more influential than the Senate of great nobles, and it played an important part in Polish history because of the right of *liberum veto*, an individual veto on all proceedings which its members acquired. At the time when Poland and Lithuania were united Latin Christianity was made the religion of the united state; with the result that the lower

Constitution of Poland

classes in Lithuania became permanently disaffected and looked to the princes of Moscow as their natural protectors. But those Lithuanians who were willing to accept the Pope's supremacy were allowed to retain their Greek ritual and were known as Uniates. The great privileges of the Polish nobility reached their highest point in the legislation of 1496, which tied the peasants to their villages and made noble birth an indispensable qualification for office. In the reign of Sigismund the lord's rights of justice over his peasants were extended. The reign of Sigismund Augustus II (1548–72) is important in the history of the Churches. Poland had fallen under the influence of the Reformation after 1551, mainly because Polish students resorted in great numbers to the Protestant universities of Germany. Sigismund Augustus called in the Jesuits to preach against the heretics (1562), but he did not venture to persecute them seriously. The Jesuits prevented heresy from gaining the day. They obtained, with the help of the Crown, the control of all higher education in Poland. Polish Protestantism broke up into a number of small sects, some of which held wild opinions. An Italian heretic, Fausto Sozzini, gathered round him the first adherents of the Socinian heresy (*c.* 1580), which had its headquarters eventually in Transylvania.

Poland and Sweden

Up to 1600 Poland was the one power that counted in the North-East. In 1572 the native line of kings came to an end and the Polish Succession produced a considerable stir, the successful candidate being Henry of Valois, who became Henry III of France in 1574. He was succeeded by a native ruler in Poland, Stephen Bathory (1575–86). But on his death the votes of the electors hovered for a time between Russia and Sweden. The crown fell to the Swedish candidate Sigismund Vasa (1586–1648), who was also the heir-apparent of Sweden. This opened up interesting possibilities. For Sigismund, to comply with the demands of the Polish electors, became a Catholic; yet he retained his rights to the Crown of Protestant Sweden, and duly succeeded to it in 1593. But, inasmuch as he tried to make Sweden a province of Poland and tolerated Catholic worship in Sweden, he was deposed (1599)

and the crown of Sweden passed to his Protestant kinsman Charles, the father of Gustavus Adolphus. This was the beginning of a long feud between Poland and Sweden, in which the Catholic branch of the Vasa family had the support of the House of Austria.

Gustavus Adolphus

At the accession of Gustavus Adolphus (1611) Sweden had just begun a career of conquest by overrunning Ingria and Carelia (acquired 1617) and embarking upon a war with Poland for the possession of Livonia. These were the first steps towards a *dominium maris Baltici* which would cut off both Russia and Poland from their natural harbours. Sweden was also endeavouring to free her commerce from the burden of the Sound Duties imposed by Denmark, and for that end was developing the port of Gothenburg, which however would not be secure until the Danes were expelled from Scania. In 1613, by the Peace of Knärod with Denmark, Sweden recovered Kalmar and Elfsborg; and four years later in the Peace of Stolbova Russia ceded Ingria and Carelia. 'Now this enemy cannot launch a boat on the Baltic without our permission,' Gustavus told the Estates. From 1620 to 1629 Gustavus was occupied with the wars of Poland by which he was secured in the possession of Livonia and the port of Elbing. Such was the preparation for his intervention in the Thirty Years War.

The German War, 1629–32

From the Swedish point of view the German war of 1629–32 was defensive. Gustavus told the Swedish Diet in 1629: 'The Papists are on the Baltic; they have Rostock, Wismar, Stettin . . . in their hands. Rügen is theirs and from Rügen they continue to threaten Stralsund. The occupation of Pomerania was more than a war-measure, It gave to Sweden the important commercial haven of Stettin. But Gustavus's plans expanded after the victory of Breitenfeld. He proposed a Corpus Evagelicum of German Protestants with himself as the head; and this design was put into execution after his death by Oxenstierna (League of Heibronn, 1633–4), though owing to the faint-heartedness of the Protestant princes it did not last long. Sweden would have been glad to end up the

SCANDINAVIA AND THE BALTIC REGION IN THE SEVENTEENTH AND EIGHTEENTH CENTURIES

war at any time after 1634 if Ferdinand would have conceded Pomerania. But she had to continue till the bitter end to gain any territorial concessions, and at the Peace of Westphalia only got Western Pomerania with Stettin; Bremen and Verden, however, gave her command of the mouth of the Weser.

The Epigoni

The successors of Gustavus were Christina (1632–54), Charles X (1654–60), and Charles XI (1660-97). These years were on the whole uneventful and inglorious. Sweden remained the Ally of France and was thus enabled to make peace with Poland, keeping Livonia (1660). She was used by Louis XIV (in 1675) as a stick to beat Brandenburg, and lost the battle of Fehrbellin and would have lost Western Pomerania but for the help of Louis at the Peace of St. Germain (1679). But Sweden cleared the Danes out of Scania in 1658 and so became master in her own house. Under Charles XI the finances were restored by wholesale proscriptions of noble families, and by the resumption of the royal demesnes. The Diet was persuaded to invest Charles XI with absolute powers of taxation and legislation (1682), a decision only explicable by the intense hatred which the Estates of the clergy, burghers and peasants had for that of the nobles. These vast powers were used by the King to build up a great fleet and a great army. He did not live to make use of these weapons, but he certainly had in view the *dominium maris Baltici*. The navy at his death included thirty-eight ships of the line; the army numbered 63,000 men, of whom 25,000 were mercenaries guarding the Baltic Provinces.

Charles XII of Sweden (1697–1718)

These were the resources of Charles XII at his accession.[1] Three years later, at the age of eighteen, he had to face a coalition of Denmark, Poland and Russia, the aim of which was to strip Sweden of her conquests. He met the danger brilliantly, surprising Copenhagen from the sea and extorting the Treaty of Traventhal;

[1] Voltaire's *Charles XII* is an early work, but founded on such a mass of documents, and fortified to such an extent by the oral communications of men who were involved in the events of the period, that it has never really been superseded.

then beating the Russians at Narva. He was justified in regarding Poland and Russia as his mortal enemies. But the steps which he took to punish his enemies were almost those of a madman. He did marvels with his small army, but he set it the impossible task of conquering two large kingdoms. Some critics have suggested that he might have succeeded if he had struck direct at Moscow immediately after Narva. That was perhaps his best chance; he would very possibly have occupied Moscow; but he would still have been far from having Russia at his mercy. There is no doubt that Peter was badly frightened in 1707 when he offered Marlborough a very large bribe if he would arrange a peace between Sweden and Russia. The Allies too were alarmed and sent Marlborough across Europe to find out if the terrible King of Sweden was in the pay of Louis XIV and was likely to overrun the Empire. But in 1708 Charles plunged into his great design of invading Russia simultaneously from the north and west; and then immediately the Swedish bubble was pricked. Charles was overwhelmingly defeated at Pultava in 1709, and had to take refuge in Turkish territory. 'For more than five years he dictated the foreign policy of Sweden . . . as a prisoner of the Sultan in Turkey. During all that time he preserved the same unquenchable spirit and unchanging purpose.' He was not entirely friendless. Augustus of Poland was ready to make peace and Frederic I of Prussia offered terms of alliance. Both these sovereigns were afraid of Peter the Great. Peter himself was afraid of Charles and would gladly have secured himself by a peace. But Charles would have nothing to do with any of them and would not resign a foot of territory to make a friend. The powers of the Grand Alliance used all their influence to prevent Sweden being evicted from her mainland provinces in Germany.

Charles hoped for a long time that the Turks would help him on a great scale and in England at all events it was firmly believed by St. John that he was concocting a league with Louis XIV. As a matter of fact he never negotiated with Louis XIV, holding that a member of the Empire could not loyally do this, but he gave the Grand Alliance to under-

stand that he would make trouble for them in every possible way, unless they did something to help him.

When the Peace of Utrecht had been signed Charles XII was no longer able to work upon the fears of the Allies. England was still friendly to him but unable or unwilling to do much on his behalf. After a dramatic return to Sweden and several more campaigns, he was killed at the siege of a frontier fortress. At the end of the Northern War, under the Treaty of Nystad (1721), Russia annexed Livonia, Esthonia, Ingria and Carelia. Hanover got Bremen and Verden ; Prussia got Stettin and the mouth of the Oder.

The Rise of Russia

The main result of these wars was that Russia rose to the rank of a great European power. Augustus II recovered Poland by the grace of Peter, who from 1717 took the official style of Protector of Poland and maintained a Russian army of occupation in the kingdom. On the death of Augustus (1733) the nationalist party set up a Polish king, Stanislas Leszczinski, the man whom Charles XII had nominated in 1704, and Stanislas had the support of his son-in-law the King of France. But the nationalist movement was suppressed by Russian armies, and the Saxon dynasty got a new lease of life (under Augustus III) until 1764, when a Polish king was set up whose chief credential was that he had been a lover of Catherine II.

It is worthy of note that Russia's connection with Western Europe was due far more to her interest in Poland than to the boasted reforms of Peter the Great. Of these little survived the Tsar except the standing army, the Baltic fleet, the civil service and the police-system (including the secret police). But Russia had also considerable influence over Sweden in the eighteenth century and indeed up to 1771 usually controlled the Swedish Diet through a party of the nobles who were in Russian pay. It was on the cards that Sweden might go the way of Poland ; but from this fate she was saved by the counter-revolution which Gustavus III (1771–92) effected in the first year of his reign. His new Constitution, established by a *coup d'état*, restored to the monarchy most of the powers of which it had been deprived by the Constitution of 1719. This *coup d'état* destroyed

Russian influence in Scandinavia; and it was followed by military and naval preparations which made Sweden safe against attack. In 1789 Gustavus went a step further and changed the limited monarchy into a semi-despotic government. He failed in his project of regaining some of the provinces lost in 1721, but he convinced Catherine II that he was an enemy to be respected.

Brandenburg-Prussia

The rise of Russia gave new importance to the state of Brandenburg-Prussia, which had been quite insignificant up to the age of Louis XIV, and seemed of less consequence than Saxony before Frederic the Great made his début. Saxony and Brandenburg were both deeply interested in the future of the Baltic countries and of Slavonic Europe; for the Elector of Saxony held the Crown of Poland from 1697 up to 1764, and the Elector of Brandenburg had been the Lord of East Prussia since 1618. Both Brandenburg and Saxony were on bad terms with Sweden, because the Vasa kings, by virtue of their interests in Pomerania and Livonia, were able to restrict the trade of Poland, of Brandenburg and of East Prussia with the Baltic. But in the eighteenth century the Electors of Saxony chose to be the clients of Russia, while the Hohenzollern preserved their independence. One of the reasons why Frederic the Great is considered a German national hero is that in the Seven Years War he was defending Brandenburg and East Prussia against the armies of the Tsarina Elizabeth. Frederic II after 1762 did his utmost to live at peace with Russia. But he was the principal instigator of the Partitions of Poland which involved Russia more deeply than ever in the affairs of Central Europe. Before dealing with the first of these Partitions we must review the earlier history of Prussia.

Prussia, 1640–1786

In the eighteenth century Prussia took the place which Sweden had held in the seventeenth, of the aspiring military state which hopes to rise by acting as the make-weight in European politics. When Gustavus Adolphus was at the height of his power the Elector of Brandenburg, George William, occupied a pitiable position. He shared with the Elector of Saxony the headship of the Protestant interest, since Elector Joachim II had embraced

THE RISE OF PRUSSIA

the new religion in 1539; and he was brother-in-law both to Gustavus Adolphus and to Frederic, the Elector Palatine. But he was horribly afraid of giving offence to the King of Poland, from whom he held East Prussia, and he was profoundly annoyed with Gustavus for annexing Pomerania. He had gone into the war on the Protestant side, because he would have been obliged to disgorge much Church land under the Edict of Restitution (1629); but he thankfully accepted a peace with the Emperor, when the latter offered to waive the Edict in his case (1635). Then he had to pack up and remove his court to East Prussia to avoid the wrath of the Swedes. He lived rather miserably from 1635 to 1640 at Königsberg, leaving his electorate to be guarded by imperial garrisons.

Out of this slough Brandenburg was extricated by the Great Elector Frederic William (1640–88). He released himself from the Thirty Years War by a separate peace with Sweden (1641). He raised a creditable army of 24,000 men which made him a desirable ally even for a great power. Considering that he helped neither side in Germany he came out well at the Peace of Westphalia, under which he got Eastern Pomerania (but without Stettin), and the bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt and Minden, but he was bitterly disappointed that Sweden kept Western Pomerania, and bore her a grudge ever after. He took the side of Poland against Charles X of Sweden, and was rewarded by being released from the homage due for East Prussia.

The Great Elector

The nucleus—the German nucleus—of the Hohenzollern inheritance lay in the valleys of the Elbe and Oder. The aim of the Great Elector was to enlarge his German dominions so as to control the entirety of these two basins and also to establish a firm foothold in Westphalia and on the Rhine. It was an ambitious programme. It involved the annexation of Vor-Pommern, Mecklenburg, Schleswig-Holstein, and it had to wait for realization till the eighteenth century; indeed, some parts of it were only realized in 1870. But it is creditable to the Elector that he devised a programme which in the end proved feasible. His diplomacy after 1648 was tortuous, unedifying, unsuccessful. He was against Louis XIV in the Dutch War of 1672–8; on the side of Louis,

1679–84; on the side of Louis's opponents, 1685–8. His colonial ambitions were also frustrated. He tried to found a navy towards the end of his life, and in 1681–5 established West African colonies on the Gold Coast which came to nothing. But he started a policy of developing the resources of his German territories which bore fruit:

(1) He encouraged the immigration of Dutch farmers and persecuted Protestants from France and the German Catholic states.

(2) He himself led the way in works of agricultural reclamation, draining marshes and breaking up the waste.

(3) He began to centralize and modernize the government of his dominions.

Of his successor Frederic I (1688–1713) we need only say that, by joining the allies against Louis XIV in the War of the Spanish Succession, he obtained at the Treaty of Utrecht the promise of Upper Gelderland and the title of King in Prussia. The second King, Frederic William I (1713–40), was the antithesis of his father. Frugal, impatient of ostentation, averse to foreign fashions and customs, he was also rough and eccentric, possibly with a strain of madness. Hence he was caricatured by Macaulay,[1] who relied on Voltaire, who relied on Frederic II for information. He was almost illiterate. Carlyle says that his Rescripts 'for spelling, grammar, penmanship and composition resemble nothing else extant; are as if done by the paw of a bear. . . . A man who would not have risen in modern Political Circles.' He comments on his 'explosiveness, impatience, excitability; his conscious dumb ignorance of all things beyond his own small horizon'. Yet he thinks him essentially wise. He might have added that the great Frederic must have been a trying son.

Frederick William I, 1713–40

Frederic William completed the structure of Prussian bureaucracy by setting up the General Directory of Finance, War and Demesnes; incidentally he got rid of the provincial Estates and of the elective magistrates in the chartered towns. He raised the army to 90,000 men. He paid great attention

[1] In his essay on Frederick the Great.

to agriculture—the nursery garden of the army; he tried to save the smallholders from extinction; he even ordered the nobles to commute the customary services of the peasants—but in this he failed. He promoted immigration. He did his best for popular education by founding some thousands of elementary schools; but he had no use for the higher education, and was quite prepared to purge the Universities. Thus he expelled from Halle the eminent philosopher Christian Wolff, on the ground that metaphysicians were a godless lot.

He has been criticized by historians because he could never bear to use his very efficient army in the field and because he was loyal to the Emperor Charles VI, who showed him no gratitude at all. But like his English contemporary Walpole, he made possible the victories of those who came after him, and in particular of his son Frederic.

Frederic the Great

The career of Frederic the Great falls into four well-defined periods:

1740–6 The Silesian Adventure.
1746–56 First Period of Reforms in Prussia.
1756–63 Seven Years War.
1763–86 Victories of Peace.

Thus, although he had plenty of fighting in his time, it was crowded into thirteen years of his long reign. And the long peace of twenty-three years which he enjoyed at the end of his life was a busy period, in which he did some of his best work.

Frederic's Campaigns

As a soldier Frederic must be judged by what he did in the Seven Years War. In the war of the Austrian Succession he was learning his trade, and won his victories mainly through the fighting quality of an army which his father had collected and Leopold of Anhalt-Dessau, 'the old Dessauer', had trained. Even in 1744 and 1745 Frederic was more than once badly outwitted by mediocre Austrian generals. Circumstances helped Frederic. He came out of the war with the prize of Silesia because he was adroit enough to make use of the achievements of France and Bavaria, who had borne the burden and heat of the day. There is no need to dwell upon the moral ques-

tion. He never apologized for his bad faith in this war, and he was severely punished in 1756–63, owing to the resentment which his conduct aroused in Maria Theresa, usually a prudent and moderate politician. But if heroism can ever palliate moral turpitude, he must be held to have purged his offence after 1756. If he had failed, he would have lost much more than Silesia ; Elizabeth of Russia had stipulated for East Prussia, which she proposed to exchange with Poland for the Duchy of Courland ; France demanded that he should give up Magdeburg and Halberstadt (presumably in favour of Saxony). He would no longer have been a king, and Brandenburg would have been little if at all more important than in 1648. He saved himself by the amazing rapidity and decisiveness of his strategy in 1756–8, before the Russians appeared on the Oder. In 1756 he carried the war into the enemy's quarters by occupying Saxony and entering Bohemia. In 1757 he defeated the mixed army of Marshal Soubise at Rossbach, with the result that the French henceforward kept at a respectful distance from him, confining themselves to operations against Hanover. He made frantic efforts to keep the Russians out of his territory, and fought two desperate battles against armies of equal or superior strength to his own. Zorndorf was a Pyrrhic victory, Kunersdorf a defeat which would have crushed the spirit of any ordinary commander. After Kunersdorf (12 August, 1759) Frederic could only assemble 20,000 of the 48,000 men whom he had led into action. If the Russians and Austrians had advanced on Berlin immediately, nothing could have saved the city. Frederic was prepared in that event to evacuate the country between the Oder and the Elbe, and to take poison after the evacuation had been arranged. It did not come to that. The Russians and Austrians were still afraid of him, especially after he defeated in quick succession two of the best Austrian generals—Laudon at Liegnitz (August, 1760) and Daun at Torgau (November, 1760). Still in 1761 both the Russians and the Austrians were closing in on Brandenburg. In England Pitt had fallen from power and Bute and Newcastle were urgently requiring Frederic to make peace at the expense of

any territorial concessions that might be necessary. From this situation he was saved by the accession of Tsar Peter III (1762).

Frederic's Administration

Frederic followed the Hohenzollern tradition of personal rule and treated his ministers as clerks. In this he resembled Louis XIV. But he appears to have worked much harder than Louis—about eight or nine hours a day—and he had a swifter, more penetrating intellect. He had a passion for administrative detail, but appears to have considered larger questions at the times when he was supposed to be practising the flute, an instrument on which he was proficient. Everything for the People, Nothing by the People, was his motto ; he had not the slightest desire to fit his subjects for self-government, to fetter himself with a parliament or to give guarantees of personal liberty. The great majority of his subjects were illiterate peasants liable to many of the incidents of serfdom. He had no desire to emancipate them. They would probably have been less useful as soldiers in that case ; and anyhow to emancipate them would have meant quarrelling *à l'outrance* with the landowners. He did wish in later years to commute labour services, and also to abolish the open-field system of husbandry. But on the first subject he yielded to the conservatism of the nobles ; on the second to that of the peasants. He believed in the old class-organization and desired that the functions of the several classes should be perfectly distinct. The duty of the nobility was to administer their estates and to provide officers for the army. Only the citizens of the chartered towns were to be allowed to engage in trade or manufacture. No peasant might presume to buy 'noble land' ; no Junker might degrade himself by buying servile land. Such transactions would alter the balance of classes. But Frederic was very willing in later years to expropriate Polish landowners and to use their lands for the purpose of founding new peasant colonies. He did not alter the old, bad anomalies of taxation. Nobles were exempt from direct taxation because they served in the army as officers. But the peasant who served in the army as a private had to bear the main burden of taxation. Frederic had not invented

this system, but he accepted it and supported it with all his might. The most considerable reforms for which he was responsible were concerned with the law-courts and the law of the land. In 1747–8 he abolished a number of superfluous courts, and prohibited any one from acting either as judge or as advocate who had not passed a test of proficiency. He caused a code of laws, the *Codex Fredericlianus*, to be compiled. But he had an unfortunate mania for interfering with the course of justice, and when he did so proceeded on the assumption that his judges were either knaves or fools.

Economic Policy

In economic policy Frederic desired to emulate Colbert, and introduced a new tariff on manufactured goods in order to stimulate the growth of new industries (e.g. porcelain and silk) and the development of old. After 1763 his policy of home development was dictated by dire necessity. The agriculture and industries of Prussia-Brandenburg had to be reconstructed. The population had diminished and so immigrants were introduced on a great scale. As private capital was scarce the Crown undertook great schemes, founding colonies, reclaiming marshes and afforesting the poorer soils. In order to secure his hold on West Prussia after 1772 he introduced into that province large numbers of German settlers, thereby creating a serious racial problem. He provided for the settlers by expropriating Polish landowners.

Frederic had no intention that Prussia should cease to be a military state. He maintained an army of 150,000 men equipped and fit to take the field at a moment's notice. He was always apprehensive of a new war with Austria and actually took the field against her in 1778 in the War of the Bavarian Succession to prevent Austria from dismembering that Electorate. In 1785, thinking himself endangered by the *rapprochement* of Joseph II to Catherine II, he organized the Fürstenbund or League of Princes to protect the lands and rights of the princes of the Empire. This Bund at all events prevented Joseph from compelling the new Elector of Bavaria to accept the Austrian Netherlands in exchange for the Electorate.

The next great incident in Frederic's policy was the First

Partition of Poland (1772), and before estimating his part in it, we must briefly describe the act itself and the events which led up to it. We have dealt with the affairs of Poland down to the Great Northern War. King Augustus, who saw the end of that war in 1721 and survived till 1733, was practically a Russian vassal; but at his death the continuance of Russian influence was challenged in the War of the Polish Succession (1733–5). The national party elected Stanislaus I Leszczinski, who had been the nominee of Charles XII in 1704, and was backed by France because his daughter was the Queen of Louis XV. But the Tsarina Anne was not prepared to let the work of Peter the Great be cancelled. She sent Russian forces to put down the nationalist rising and to place Augustus II of Saxony on the throne. Stanislas was pensioned off with the Duchy of Lorraine, and the Polish question slumbered until the death of Augustus II in 1763.

War of the Polish Succession, 1733–5

The diseases of the Polish state at this point in its history have been often described, but may be briefly catalogued. The state has been called a republic, and the King's power was in fact almost nothing. But it was an oligarchical republic of the worst kind. The nobles had the *jus necis vitaeque* over their peasants, who were tied to the soil. Tenurial dues and services were assessed at the lord's discretions. The peasants were so discontented that they were rigorously forbidden to possess arms. They were miserably poor, although much of the soil of Poland is very rich. The nobles had the *jus confederationis*, which meant that civil war was endemic. The King purchased his election, as the Emperors had done in medieval Germany, by *pacta conventa* which made over the most valuable of royal prerogatives into private hands. All the great offices of state were held for life by their occupants, unless the Diet passed a sentence of deprivation against an individual. This hardly ever occurred since no decision of the Diet was valid unless it was passed unanimously by the lower House of the Diet. The constitution of this House reduced the possibility of any useful reform to a minimum. Its members were representatives of the lesser nobility, the most lawless

The State of Poland

class in the kingdom, and it was always easy for a discontented faction or an interested foreign power to secure a veto in this House.

The ascendancy of the nobles was complete in the state because there was no middle class of Polish blood. The citizens of the towns were either Germans or Jews, without any political rights. The nobles could only have been held in check by a strong ruler at the head of a strong standing army. But the Polish army was a wretchedly equipped body of 8,000 men, destitute of artillery and led by officers who were grossly inefficient.

To complete the disorder of the kingdom there were religious dissensions of an acute kind, the result and the evidence of racial divisions. The German element in Poland was largely Protestant. The Poles of Poland proper were Catholics and fanatically attached to their religion because it differentiated them from the Russians and stamped them as Occidentals. In Lithuania and other eastern provinces there was a strong body of Orthodox Greeks. The Poles of Poland were bent on persecuting both Greeks and Protestants in order to promote national unity. The religious persecutions gave to Prussia and to Russia a plausible excuse for intervention in the name of toleration and also to protect persecuted Germans and Russians.

The right of these two powers to intervene in Polish affairs was formally asserted on the occasion of the appointment of Stanislas Poniatowski as King in 1764. A Pole by birth, a Russian by career, and a favourite of Catherine II, he was nominated as the result of an agreement between Frederic the Great and Catherine II, the Russian Empress. These two signed a treaty guaranteeing the Polish Constitution. The object was to thwart the nationalist reformers who hoped to abolish the Liberum Veto and to increase the power of the Crown at the expense of the Diet. Catherine II was not content with this precaution. She maintained in Poland a Russian army of occupation, and also a Resident who interfered in every branch of the government and even issued orders to the King himself. Finally Catherine secured by bribes the support of a Russian party in the Diet.

Intervention of Prussia and Russia

By such means she was able to prevent the abolition of the Liberum Veto (1766); and in 1767 she carried through the Diet a measure granting toleration, which she wanted especially for the Orthodox Greeks. The law was carried by the simple expedient of arresting and imprisoning all members of the Diet who were expected to vote against it.

This question of toleration provoked a civil war, 1768–72, in which the King and the Russian army of occupation were opposed by the Catholic Confederation of Bar. The rebels were helped directly by the King of France and indirectly by the Sultan. Louis XV supplied them with arms and with French military officers, including the celebrated Dumouriez, who was commissioned to organize the rebel army. The Sultan appealed to the Treaty of the Pruth (1711), which bound him to defend the integrity of Poland; he declared war on Catherine and invaded South Russia. The Turkish war dragged on till 1774. Meanwhile Maria Theresa and her son Joseph encouraged the Confederation, and sometimes allowed Polish rebels to use military bases in Hungary and in Teschen.

THE FIRST PARTITION OF POLAND

Out of this imbroglio, which threatened to set the whole of Eastern Europe by the ears, Frederic the Great found a way of escape. He suggested to Russia and Austria the First Partition of Poland (1772). It was not an arrangement which entirely suited either of these powers. Catherine would have preferred to

The First Partition of Poland, 1772

keep her protectorate over an undivided Poland. Austria would gladly have left the whole of Poland to Catherine, if Austria might be allowed to annex lands in the Balkans (Serbia, Wallachia, Moldavia). But Frederic was entirely suited by the Partition. For he obtained West Prussia, a bridge to connect East Prussia with Brandenburg. Frederic defended this partition as a 'good thing for Poland and a good thing for Europe'. It was certainly more justifiable than either the Second or Third Partition. What is to be said of Frederic's share in it? He may fairly be called its author, as Austria and Russia were both rather reluctant. The excuse is that the Partition diverted the attention of Catherine II from her enterprises against Turkey, and so averted a war between Austria and Russia. Another is that Poland would be swallowed whole by Russia in a few years' time if nothing was done by other powers; and then Russia would have become a most dangerous neighbour for all the German powers. But the Partition was generally condemned at the time—not as a crime against nationality, but as a crime against the Law of Nations.

Carlyle's Defence of Frederic

Carlyle undertakes to defend Frederic. He evidently thinks that the best thing which could have happened to Poland would be to be governed by Russia. Poland had no right to a separate existence, as every vacancy in the throne of Poland was apt to produce the danger of European war. The Poles too would have been lucky to fall under Russian rule, because, although the Russians could not compete with the Poles in writing poetry, they were morally superior 'in respect that they have, to a singular degree among Nations, the gift of obeying, of being commanded'. Carlyle further reproaches the Poles with their fanatical persecution of the Orthodox Greeks of Lithuania. He thinks also (but erroneously) that when Catherine put Stanislaus Poniatowski on the throne she gave Poland a real opportunity of reformation—an opportunity which the Poles shamefully neglected.

But this theory will not hold water. When Catherine and Frederic signed their treaty guaranteeing the Polish Constitution and when, with Frederic's entire sympathy, Catherine

intervened to get the Diet to maintain the *liberum veto*, they made it clear that it was their interest that the Polish anarchy should be prolonged and the Polish kingdom broken up. Even before Frederic came to the throne he was convinced that Polish Prussia was 'necessary' to the Hohenzollern, and he reiterated that conviction in his political testament of 1768. He knew that Prussia was not strong enough to annex any part of Poland against the will of Catherine. But he hoped that the time would come when she would have to buy his active support by making over Polish Prussia.

Opinions on the Partition of Poland

As for Catherine, the probability is that she would have been quite content to keep Poland as a Russian Protectorate, ruled by a king on whom she could count, and kept in order by a Russian army of occupation. But though she was on the whole successful both in Poland and in her Turkish war, she found her position uncomfortable in 1772, as Austria was inclined to make common cause with the Turk. To guard against this danger she needed the support of Frederic. That support was granted, but only on condition that he should be rewarded with Polish Prussia, and that Austria should be bought off with another slice. Catherine accepted this solution as a *pis aller*. Carlyle strenuously defends Frederic's conduct. 'Poor Poland . . . by this time sunk in pestilence . . . pigs and dogs devouring the dead bodies; not a loaf to be had for 100 ducats.' Frederic, he says, had no feeling whatever about Poland 'except it might be that Deliverance from Anarchy, Pestilence, Famine and Pigs eating your dead bodies, would be a manifest advantage for Poland, while it was the one way of saving Europe from War'. Specious, no doubt, and the way in which Frederic would have put the case. But it was not necessary for the peace of Europe that he should have Polish Prussia. Carlyle's defence is that he took in square miles very much less than was taken by Russia or by Austria. Maria Theresa, an old-fashioned lady, was heartily ashamed. 'Not only Public Law cries against us to Heaven, but also all natural justice and sound reason.' When she assented finally, she wrote: '*Placet*

since so many great and learned men will have it so; but long after I am dead it will appear what are the consequences of violating all that was hitherto held just and sacred.' Frederic certainly does not trouble to allege fine motives in his Memoirs: 'I seized by the forelock this unexpected opportunity; and by dint of negotiating and intriguing I succeeded in compensating our Kingdom for its past losses by incorporating Polish Prussia with my old Provinces. This acquisition was one of the most important that we could make because it linked up Pomerania to East Prussia; rendering us masters of the Vistula it gave us the double advantage of being able to defend East Prussia and to derive considerable tolls from the Vistula, as all the trade of Poland goes up that river.'

At all events he greatly improved the material condition of Polish Prussia. Here only the larger towns, inhabited by Germans, were tolerably well off. The smaller towns and many villages were in ruins. The population had shrunk to 55,000 (just before 1914 it was about 2,000,000). There was no law, no government; the peasants were in a state of abject destitution. Frederic devoted himself to the work of organizing a government, providing a system of education, reclaiming marsh lands, and building a canal to connect the Vistula with the Oder and the Elbe.

We must now turn to Russia and briefly trace the history of its development as a great power in Europe. Russia falls naturally into two great regions corresponding to the two great river systems which drain into the Baltic and the Black Sea. Historically the southern region is associated with the Principality of Kief, the northern with the Principality of Moscow. The Kief country is 'Little Russia'; the Moscow country is Great Russia. The rivers of the southern system flow in their middle and lower courses through a flat and fertile steppe—the Black Earth country—which extends from the Black Sea northwards as far as Kief on the Dniepr and Nijni Novgorod and Kazan on the Volga. This is the best agricultural land in Eastern Europe, one of the natural granaries of the world. The Varangians, who invaded Russia at the

Russia

Kief

end of the ninth century, established themselves at Kief after a long and toilsome journey through North Russia. Though they did much harm as pirates to Greek shipping, they opened commercial relations with Constantinople, and the Greek Orthodox Church obtained a footing at Kief in 988 as the result of a treaty between the ruling prince of Kief and the Emperor Basil II. But the Black Earth country was a highway for Tartar and Turkish nomads marching eastward, and the power of Kief declined in the twelfth century because these nomads were closing round the city from the south and south-east. In 1169 the power of the prince of Kief was ruined in civil war; the population began to migrate northwards. In 1240 Kief was taken by the Tartars and destroyed. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century large tracts of South Russia were ruled by the Tartars, who established Khanates at Kazan, Astrakhan and in the Crimea. Even the princes of Moscow paid tribute to the Tartars up to 1487.

In this period of Tartar domination the one thriving state on Russian soil was the trading city of Novgorod (*c.* 1070–1471). It was ruled by elected princes with the help of a general assembly of the citizen body. It was as great a city as any in the Netherlands and a centre of international trade, greatly patronized by the merchants of the Hanse towns. It paid tribute to the Tartars in the thirteenth century, but otherwise escaped from interference. It explored Northern Siberia and established colonies there for trade. It was subdued by Ivan the Great of Moscow in 1471.

Novgorod, 1070–1471

The State of Moscow is first heard of in 1147, and the foundations of the city were laid in 1156. It seems to have been populated by fugitives from Kief, and to have thriven through trade (with the Volga region) as well as agriculture. Its history is obscure until the period of Ivan III the Great (1462–1505), the conqueror of Novgorod. In his time the Tartar yoke was shaken off and Moscow became the leading state of Great Russia. On the west her power extended to the borders of Smolensk. Ivan IV the Terrible (1533–83) was the first Russian prince

Moscow, 1147–1598

who challenged Sweden and Poland. He was unsuccessful in his Baltic policy. From 1558 to 1583 he was engaged in a fruitless struggle to wrest the provinces of Livonia and Esthonia from the Knights of the Order of the Sword who held them under Poland. But in 1552 he destroyed the neighbouring Tartar state of Kazan and in 1556 that of Astrakhan. As a defence against the Tartars of the Black Sea coast he established the military republic of the Don Cossacks, who were a *colluvies gentium* with no patriotism and no respect for the Russian Church, but excellent frontier police. He also sanctioned the beginnings of the eastward advance across the Urals into Siberia. This movement was inaugurated between 1558 and 1582, the lead being taken by the clan of the Stroganoffs.

The old Moscow dynasty died out in 1598, and up to 1613 there was civil war and anarchy in Russia. A party of the boyars or nobles elected in 1610 a son of Sigismund Vasa as king; but he was expelled in 1612 by a popular party which set up Michael Romanoff. From 1613 to 1689 the Romanoffs ruled as constitutional sovereigns with the help of a representative assembly, holding in check the old Duma composed exclusively of boyars. The representative body (*Zemski Sobor*) was allowed to make laws and to control taxation, and to sanction declarations of war and treaties of peace. It left behind it one fairly durable monument in the Code of 1649 which was not superseded until 1833. But constitutionalism was not a success in Russia; and the country was really ruled, under the Crown, by provincial governors (Voivodes) whose powers were as extensive as those of the French *intendants*, but whose office tended to become hereditary. In this period too were passed some laws which depressed the condition of the Russian peasant. For instance, a law of 1628 made it illegal for the peasant to migrate from one village to another. The old custom had permitted him to migrate if he was not in debt either to the King or to his landlord. Another law, of 1649, made all peasants liable to royal taxation, whereas formerly those who held their land by labour service had been exempt from taxation. This was certainly not a golden age for the peasant. The

law of 1628 is supposed to have completed their enslavement to their landlords.

In foreign policy the chief object of the early Romanoffs was to recover Little Russia from Poland. In this struggle the Romanoffs were assisted by the Ukraine Cossacks, who had been settled in the Ukraine by the Polish Crown to act as frontier guards. The Polish War ended in 1667 with a treaty which gave the Romanoffs only a part of what they had tried to recover. But this treaty marks the point at which Russia began to get the upper hand in her long struggle with the Poles. Russia recovered the eastern half of White Russia, the town of Kief and so much of Little Russia as lay to the east of the Dniepr.

Peter the Great, 1689–1725

We have now reached a position in which we are able to deal with the work of the creator of Modern Russia, Peter the Great. We can briefly summarize his territorial gains:

1696 Capture of Azof, rendered useless by the Treaty of Pruth (1711) and only effectively occupied in 1739 by the Empress Anne.

1709 Reduction of the Ukraine Cossacks, who had offered help to Charles XII.

1717 Protectorate over Poland.

1721 Acquisition of Esthonia, Livonia, Ingria and Carelia (i.e. the south coast of the Gulf of Finland) which were ceded to him at the Peace of Nystad.

Quite as important, however, as this extension of territory, was Peter's far-reaching reorganization of the government.

He grouped the old small jurisdictions of the Voivodes in eight large provinces, each under a Governor-General.

Peter's Reforms

The provincial government of Russia as it was before the Bolshevik revolution was gradually built up by successive generations, but we may say roughly that it was first designed and created by Peter the Great. Peter's work was a failure in his lifetime; for his scheme was utterly foreign to the traditional ideas and customs of the people; but his successors realized that a return to the rough and ready methods of the Voivodes was impossible. His provinces were much too large, and in the nineteenth

century European Russia was divided into forty-six provinces, the smallest of which was as large as Belgium. In the eighteenth century, when the difficulties of communication were great, most of the governors ruled liked 'satraps', and even influenced the administration of civil and criminal justice which was supposed to be outside their control. In each province Peter established three sets of officials (tax-collectors, administrators, judges). He provided that there should be in each province a Provincial Council, representing the landowners, to advise the Governor-General. Peter dealt also with the towns. These were now organized on the model of the free cities of Germany, which he had the opportunity of studying in the Baltic provinces. Each town was governed by an elective corporation which controlled the law-courts as well as the executive government. The trades of the towns were organized in guilds on the German pattern, and the town-corporation was required to consult the heads of the guilds in all important matters. A central Board was established at Moscow to superintend all the municipal corporations. But towns have never thriven in Russia. Wallace says that however imposing they appear from the outside, they will generally be found to be villages in disguise Catherine II made an heroic effort to increase the number of towns, building no less than 216 in the course of her reign. The municipal form of government was standardized by Catherine, being made the same for towns of every size and importance. This form of government remained in force down to the reign of Alexander II (1855–81), but it never worked well. The municipal corporations extorted so unblushingly that it was necessary to keep them under the strictest government control.

Peter reorganized the central government by creating a number of Boards or Colleges (on the German model) to manage special departments of public business, e.g. Navy, Ordnance, Foreign Affairs, Justice. But being unable to find enough educated Russians to staff the offices of the central Government he was obliged to make large use of Austrian subjects and even of Swedish prisoners of war. The whole of his higher educational system was framed for the purpose of

training bureaucrats and soldiers. He was also the founder of a centralized police-system; and of the separate system of secret police whose special business was to hunt out political offenders.

Rule of Service for the Nobility

He attempted to bring into the imperial service every land-owner of noble birth. The rule which he established for this class was either seven years in the army, or ten years in the civil service, or fifteen years in commerce. These who evaded this obligation were to forfeit their rank.[1] *Per contra* any man who rose to one of the higher posts in the civil service received a patent of hereditary nobility, and some of the inferior office-holders were permitted to rank as nobles for life. One of the *parvenus* who rose to nobility in his service was the field-marshal Prince Menchikoff, who was the son of a non-commissioned officer and had begun life as a pastry-cook. Hannibal, who became Commander-in-Chief, was a negro bought in Constantinople. Peter spent large sums on educating young Russians of promise for his service, and he chose young men for this purpose with more regard for their promise than for their birth.

Military Organization

Peter created the Russian standing army—a much more formidable instrument than the praetorian guard of the Streltsi, which he suppressed in 1698. The army at his death included 210,000 men trained and under arms; it was supplemented by the irregular Cossack cavalry, numbering 109,000 men. The regular army was at first largely commanded by foreigners, but these were replaced by young Russian nobles as fast as the training colleges could supply them. By 1725 the navy also had

[1] The nobles complained bitterly of this rule. 'We are compelled to contract debts and to entrust our estates to thieving overseers, who commonly reduce them to such a condition that, when we are allowed to retire from the service . . . we cannot to the end of our lives retrieve our prosperity.' After Peter's death the obligation of service was much relaxed; it was abolished by Peter III. The policy of Catherine II was to gain the voluntary service of the nobles by means of honours and rewards. In her reign the public service came to be regarded by the nobles as a privilege, and the whole class took to place-hunting.

reached imposing dimensions; it included forty-eight ships of the line and 787 vessels of other classes. But the ships had to be built by English shipwrights imported for the purpose; many of the naval officers and the common sailors were Englishmen or Dutchmen. As late as 1790 the Russian fleet was decisively beaten by that of Sweden. Its only victories under Catherine and her successors were gained at the expense of the Turk in the Black Sea. But as this much was achieved Peter's naval policy was at least half-successful.

The next ruler of Russia to whom we need give separate attention is Catherine II, who reigned during a generation in which the territorial power of the Empire increased enormously. In the years 1774–96 the following acquisitions were made:

Catherine II, 1762–96

(1) On the Black Sea littoral the entrance to the Sea of Azof (1774), the Crimea and Kaban (1783), Odessa and Ocsakoff (1792).

(2) On the Caspian, the strategic points of Baku and Derbent (1796).

(3) In Poland, the eastern half of the old kingdom.

These successes fell rather easily into her lap, for the record of the Russian army was not brilliant in her time, and Austria and Prussia were both of them more formidable as military powers than Russia. Catherine's wars with the Turks ended in advantageous treaties, but they did not promise well for the issue of any war conducted with a first-rate power.

Catherine's contribution to the successes of the period is difficult to estimate. She was a woman of great astuteness and will-power. Her origin was German. Her father served in the Prussian army and belonged to the princely house of Anhalt-Zerbst. The German side of her character was never entirely obliterated, though her policy became Russian. She was raised to the throne in place of her husband by a small court-cabal, but she succeeded in attaching the official classes and the whole of the nobility to herself. She was infinitely more popular than Peter the Great with those who were concerned in the government of the country. She had the good sense to adopt in the end the traditional methods of Russian government and the traditional aims of Russian

The Empire House of Habsburg Ottoman Empire

THE TURKISH POSSESSIONS IN EUROPE IN THE 17TH AND 18TH CENTURIES

policy. But when she came to the throne she was bitten with the newest political theories, an ardent admirer of Montesquieu, whose *Esprit des Lois* was, she said, a ' breviary for sovereigns ', and also a diligent reader of the *Encyclopédie* (1751–65). She was a well-read woman and inclined to think herself omniscient ; but there were limits to her knowledge. In the first year of her reign, at a naval review, she disputed with the English Ambassador ' which end of a man-of-war went first '. Fired with the ambition to codify the laws of Russia and to draft a liberal constitution, she convened in 1768 an assembly of elected representatives from the whole of her dominions. It appeared that no less than 559 races were represented. To this body Catherine presented a set of instructions founded upon the writings of Montesquieu and Rousseau, which it had taken her three years to compile. But, after two hundred sessions had been held without any decisions of importance, Catherine decided to dispense with the advice of the deputies, and to govern like her predecessors. Before she came to this decision she had already renounced her dream of abolishing serfdom. Indeed, in 1767 she took from the serfs the right of complaining to the law-courts when they were ill-treated by their masters. In 1783 she reduced to serfdom a large number of her own free tenants on the imperial demesnes in Little Russia, where agrarian outrages and insurrections had been much too common. She had good reason to be afraid of a peasant rising. In the year 1771 the Ural Cossacks were raised in revolt by an impostor Pougatcheff, who gave himself out to be the Emperor Peter III, and for a short time made himself master of the Ural Provinces. This insurrection was stamped out in 1775, but there were later risings in the governments of Moscow and Nijni-Novgorod. Probably the chief reason for which Catherine opposed the French Revolution was a fear that the Russian peasants might rise against the privileged aristocracy and the Crown, if once they became acquainted with the new French principles.

Catherine's ablest adviser was Gregory Potemkin, who had been one of the conspirators against her husband in 1762, and lived until 1791. Potemkin distinguished himself as a

general in the Turkish war of 1769–73. In 1774 he became General Aide-de-Camp with control of the Ministry of War. In the years 1782–8 he was also active in the management of foreign relations. But he made his mark more especially as the governor of South Russia from 1775. Here his mission was to make conquests at the expense of the Turk and to settle the conquered country. He and the Empress gathered together thousands of immigrants from Western Europe and settled them in village communities in the Crimea, Kherson and the lower valley of the Dniepr. To this day Southern Russia 'contains such a variety of races as is to be found, perhaps, nowhere else in Europe'.[1] Many of these immigrant communities received valuable special privileges, such as immunity from conscription.

[1] Sir Donald Mackenzie Wallace, *Modern Russia*, II, 96.

CHAPTER XIV

INTELLECTUAL MOVEMENTS, 1560–1789

CARDINAL EVENTS

1596 Bodin's *République.*
1620 Bacon's *Novum Organum.*
1625 Grotius's *De Jure Belli et Pacis.*
1637 Descartes' *Discours de la Méthode.*
1687 Newton's *Principia.*
1751 The *Encyclopédie.*
1762 Rousseau's *Contrat Social.*
1776 American Declaration of Independence.

THE Renaissance of classical learning is generally supposed to have been complete about 1520. But classical learning did not become the common property of the educated classes until the end of the sixteenth century. Even then Greek was rarely taught in English schools. At Eton the Greek Grammar was learned; but Greek authors only appear to have been read at Winchester, Westminster and Harrow. Greek was studied at the Universities, more particularly at Cambridge. But the great works of Greek literature became known to Englishmen chiefly through translations; and it is significant that many of the English translators worked from French translations (e.g. North's *Plutarch*, 1579, was based on Amyot's version). England produced no scholars to compare with Stephanus, the publisher humanist (d. 1598), who compiled and printed the great Greek dictionary, *Thesaurus Graecae Linguae* (1572); or the Frenchman Joseph Scaliger (d. 1609), who settled at Leyden in his later years and founded the great Dutch school of classical scholarship; or Isaac

Study of the Classics

Casaubon (d. 1614), successively professor of Greek at Geneva, and Montpellier, librarian to Henry IV and a prebendary of Canterbury (1610–14). These were the pioneers of the modern scientific editor; and they were at far more pains than the early humanists to acquire an exact knowledge of ancient history and civilization.

Influence of the Classics

The value of these studies was partly that they gave to literary men and critics new ideas of literary form and of the objects of literary effort. To illustrate from the case of history—William Camden, who wrote the Annals of the Reign of Elizabeth (1615–27) largely from the original sources, took as his model the Greek historian Polybius and Jacques Auguste de Thou, in his great history of the Wars of Religion (published 1604–21) also followed classical models. The Elizabethan poets found in Seneca a model of stately rhetoric and a source of moral reflections; and some of the leading characteristics of their dramatic technique (the Ghost, the Chorus, the horrors committed on the stage) were due to his influence. It is perhaps more important that classical traditions gave a new dignity to the profession of the poet (*vates sacer*) and a formal defence for the cult of the beautiful, which was one of the chief influences hostile to Protestantism in the seventeenth century. Thirdly, and most important of all, there were the sharp contrasts between the pagan and Christian systems of ethics—Plutarch became the rival of the New Testament; between pagan and Christian philosophy—Plato's system seemed to some better than those of Calvin or of the Roman Catholic theologians; between the Greek spirit of free scientific inquiry and the medieval fear that such inquiries might unsettle the religious conviction of the inquirer or weaken his interest in studies which made for edification. We can see glimpses of this spiritual conflict in the poetry of Edmund Spenser—a Puritan civil servant, learned in Latin and Greek, well read in the Platonic philosophy, an admirer of the 'Arcadian School' of Italian poetry. The models that he acknowledges for the *Faerie Queene* are Homer, Vergil, Ariosto and Tasso; but perhaps Tasso's influence was the most potent so far as his method of treating his subject was concerned.

Political Philosophy

The development of a new philosophy proceeded faster than that of the new natural science. The wars of religion raised in an acute shape, on the side of the minority, the question whether absolute obedience is due to the ruler even when his commands appear to be unjust. The Huguenots in France and the constitutional party in England would not allow this question to be decided against them on the strength of a few texts of Scripture. Hotman, in his *Franco-Gallia* (1573), argues that in every state the ancient usage was that the supreme power should be lodged in a national assembly. This ancient usage, having once prevailed universally, was a law of nature. Absolute sovereignty resided, if anywhere, in the people whom the assembly represented. The author of the *Vindiciae contra Tyrannos* (1575) went a stage further. For he argued that the will of the majority of the States-General, or of the people itself, ought not to prevail if the majority commands what is against the law of God. 'Where there is no justice there is no commonwealth and resistance to what is unlawful is no rebellion.' The contract between the ruler and his subjects promises that the subjects will obey so long as the King rules justly. If he infringes their personal liberties as defined by the law, he acts unjustly; so too if he takes their property without their consent.

Jean Bodin

These writers were answered by Jean Bodin (d. 1596), a lawyer who was a Leaguer, 1584–9, and a supporter of Henri IV, 1579–96. In 1596 he wrote his *République*, in which he argues that when once the people have created a government of a particular form—monarchy, aristocracy, democracy—that government has an absolute authority which cannot be revoked. If an attempt were made to divide the sovereignty, e.g. by making the States-General a check upon the King, civil war would inevitably break out and would continue until the power either of the King or of the States-General had been destroyed. The government is morally bound to respect the natural rights of its subjects; but any attempt to place legal restrictions on the power of the government would only lead to anarchy, a much worse evil than the oppression of a despot. It is

characteristic of the age that Bodin prefers a monarchy to any other form of government, though he thinks that the monarch will be wise to take the advice of a national assembly.

Hobbes and Locke

The great questions raised by these French thinkers continued to arouse debate through the century, but especially in England. Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) stated the case for absolute sovereignty against the critics of Charles I and Cromwell. But he made out a better case, in more trenchant language, with a wealth of epigrams which help us to forget the real difficulties of his position. He did not convince Englishmen that kings ought to be absolute. But he persuaded many that the King in Parliament ought to be omnipotent. John Locke (1632–1704), in his *Second Treatise on Government*, justified the Revolution of 1688 by reviving the Huguenot theory of natural rights. He says that the supreme authority in the state is that body of men who have the power of making laws. But there are limits to the power of the legislature:

(1) It may not violate the inherent natural rights of the individual—the rights of life, liberty and property.
(2) It may not pass laws against individuals.
(3) It must leave the laws to be interpreted and applied by the judges.
(4) The legislature owes its power to the will of the people, who may take that power back if they find that it is abused.

By recognizing large and loose natural rights and by sanctioning rebellion against misgovernment, Locke opened a wide door for Revolutions. He was invoked by all the revolutionary parties of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in America, in France, in England and in Germany. But he protested that there was little real danger of revolution, which would never become legitimate until the majority of the subjects of any government were convinced that the government was intolerable. He does not seem to have realized the dangers that might be created by a resolute minority, well organized and prepared to impose its will on the majority. The preamble to the American Declaration of Independence (1776) is almost pure Locke: 'That all men

are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it.' It is notable, however, that the Declaration explicitly states the doctrine of Equality, and this sounds like a startling innovation. What did this Equality mean? The Americans were not agreed. Many of them held that it meant manhood suffrage and the eligibility of the poorest man for the highest offices. In many of the states a property qualification was a condition of the suffrage. In most states no one was eligible for the lower or popular house of the state legislature unless he owned a really considerable property. Probably the draftsmen meant that all men should be subject to the same laws—that there should be no privileged *noblesse* or clergy; and that no man should be disqualified for the suffrage or for holding office except under some general rule applicable to all citizens alike. Hobbes rather cynically and Rousseau rather sentimentally affirmed that by nature men are practically equal, the differences of intellect, character and physical strength among men being too small to call for special attention from the legislator. But the common explanation of the doctrine of equality was simply that all men have an equal right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; and it was only the extremists who held that there could be no liberty in a state which did not allow equal political power or opportunities of power to all men.

The Dogma of Equality

We have next to notice the development of a science of international law, that is to say, of the rights and duties of sovereign states considered as members of the Commonwealth of Nations. Hugo Grotius (d. 1645), though not the first writer on international law, was the first writer who analysed the presuppositions which lay behind the established rules and customs of international intercourse. Further, he attempted, like most codifiers, to

International Law

induce the states of his time to reform the current custom where it seemed contrary to natural justice or the general convenience. Grotius' great book is his *De Jure Belli et Pacis*. His main purpose in this is to emphasize the element of law in international relations. He says: 'If no community can subsist without observing some standard of justice . . . the human race or a number of peoples cannot dispense with it.' This is so even in war. Again, 'In war . . . laws must indeed be silent, but only civil laws, not those eternal laws inherent in the nature of man as man; these even in war can never cease to possess authority.' Under what circumstances may war be justly waged? Grotius answers that Self-preservation is, according to Cicero, a First Principle of Natural Law. Also all animals are provided by nature with the means of self-defence; therefore the use of force in self-defence is clearly natural. Right reason only condemns the employment of force when it is used to deprive others of their rights. The *Lex Talionis* (an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth) is another First Principle and still holds good as between man and communities who are subject to no common superior. Grotius argues at great length to show that wars waged in self-defence are expressly permitted by the Old Testament and are not prohibited by the New.

Hugo Grotius

That power is called Sovereign whose acts are not subject to the control of another. A people which has put itself in subjection to another is not to be considered a sovereign state (*civitas*). But several states may be combined in a close federation without ceasing to be sovereign states. [In these two cases he is probably thinking of the Spanish Netherlands as compared with the United Provinces.] It is not true that in every state the sovereignty (*summa potestas*) belongs to the people in the sense that the people may coerce and even punish the rulers. Each nation is free to choose what form of government it pleases. Whether the people voluntarily set up a government or whether that government is imposed upon them by force (e.g. by a conqueror), it is legitimate when once it is set up. It is not always easy to see what is the sovereign power in any state. For instance, in some republics (e.g. Venice) the

Conception of a Sovereign State

leading magistrate has the trappings of a sovereign without the power. But a ruler does not cease to be sovereign because he has made a contract with his subjects, even though it be a contract to give up part of his power. There may, however, be a partition of sovereignty, thinks Grotius, between a ruler and an assembly; though he admits that this is an inconvenient plan.

Treaties

Treaties are agreements made between the sovereigns of states. It used to be questioned, says Grotius, whether one state could lawfully make a treaty with another state having a different religion. But, he says, the Law of Nature is common to all men without distinction of religion.

Ambassadors

The persons of ambassadors, when they are sent by one sovereign to another, are inviolable by the Law of Nature, as Cicero recognizes. The Law of Nations also requires that no ambassador is to be sent away unheard without just cause. But no sovereign is bound by the Law of Nature to receive a resident ambassador, though these are now common. It is an open question whether an ambassador's person remains sacrosanct even when he himself has violated the Law of Nations, as by stirring up treason in the state to which he is accredited. But Grotius argues that in such a case they ought to be punished only by their own sovereign. Ambassadors are reckoned, by a legal fiction, to be *extra territorium*. The movable property of an ambassador ought to be sacred even against the law-courts of the country to which he is sent.

Freedom of the Sea

The great subject of the Freedom of the Sea he approaches in this way. Property is acquired by ' occupation ', or taking possession of it, in some cases, i.e. when it is *res nullius*. Vacant land may be thus acquired in lordship (*imperium*) or in ownership (*dominium*), or both. Rivers may be occupied by those who possess the banks, and so may bays and straits of the sea, unless they are very large. By Roman law the sea is common to all and no man's private property. By the modern Law of Nations, says Grotius, any portion of the sea, however small and landlocked, cannot be claimed as the private property of any people unless there

is a general agreement to permit this *communi consensu*. Even he who holds a portion of the sea by occupation (? under such an agreement) may not prevent unarmed and harmless navigation.

Metaphysics

We now come to the history of metaphysics. This indirectly has some importance because the general effect of the philosophic movement in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was to assert the existence of Natural as opposed to Revealed Religion; and the natural tendency of the philosophers was to attempt to solve *per viam rationis*, by way of reason, a number of ultimate questions on which the theologians had hitherto claimed the last word. Some of the great philosophers, we may say, simply ignored revealed religion; others, especially in France, frankly attacked revealed religion; others, again, took a middle position, claiming that the theologians of all the Churches had attempted to dogmatize too rashly on matters which lay beyond their proper province; but that philosophy could partly interpret and partly supplement the truths of revealed religion which were recorded in the Scriptures.

Natural Science

The study of metaphysics was intimately connected with that of the natural sciences and that of mathematics, both of which made considerable progress in the sixteenth century. The aspirations of the scientists and some of their views about scientific method were expressed with extraordinary power by Lord Bacon in his *Novum Organum*. Bacon himself was no more than a brilliant amateur in science [1]; and he failed to appreciate some of the greatest discoveries made in his time (e.g. those of Harvey, Galileo and Kepler). But his prediction of the 'Regnum Hominis in Natura' captivated some of the best intellects of his own age and the next. His inductive method is not that by which the most far-reaching discoveries have been made, but he gave a much-needed stimulus to the patient observation of nature and to experiment.

[1] Brewster says: 'Had Bacon never lived the student of nature would have found in the writings and works of Galileo not only the principles of inductive philosophy but also its practical application to the noblest efforts of invention and discovery.'

Descartes was strong in the mathematical sciences, precisely those in which Bacon was weak. In his *Discours de la Méthode* (1637) he upheld the mathematical method of arguing—by deduction from self-evident principles—as that by which alone any knowledge of real value could be obtained. This was the more remarkable because he had distinguished himself in anatomy, one of the thoroughly inductive sciences. Like Bacon, he made war upon all so-called knowledge which was accepted purely on the strength of tradition and authority. 'When I set forth in the pursuit of truth, I found that the best way was to reject everything that I had hitherto received, and pluck out all my old opinions in order that I might lay the foundations of them afresh.' 'We must derive our opinions not from tradition but from ourselves', i.e. by studying the operations of our own minds. 'We must separate ourselves from the delusions of nature and reject the evidence presented to our senses. For nothing is certain but thought.' Descartes was the founder of modern metaphysics; he also did much to create that unbounded confidence in human reason which characterizes the eighteenth century. He said of religion that it should not be acquired from the teaching of others, but should be discovered by each man's mind. Unlike most philosophers, Descartes became the fashion even in his own times, largely because he explained them in vigorous and idiomatic French. He even influenced polite literature. A French critic says that the literary ideal of Boileau was simply the application to literature of the ideas of Descartes—the universality of human reason, the contempt for mere learning and mere imagination, the belief that Truth and Beauty are identical. Descartes, he says, raised to the rank of a system the aspirations which had been confusedly felt or expressed by many of his contemporaries. But this great man attempted to construct a whole system of natural philosophy covering both organic and inorganic nature. His gigantic edifice rested, however, upon slender foundations, which so far as physics were concerned, were criticized and corrected by Sir Isaac Newton.

Mathematics and Physics

In the midst of the debates between the Baconians and

Cartesians the natural sciences developed rapidly. It would seem that all the imagination which had flowed into literary channels during the wars of religion was now devoted to the formulation of scientific hypotheses. The advance was particularly great in mathematics which are the indispensable tool of all the sciences dealing with inanimate forces and with matter. 'In the second half of the seventeenth century', says M. Tannery, 'four great scientific theories were reared on unshakable foundations. The first, purely abstract, is that of the Infinitesimal Calculus, which was to double the efficiency of mathematics by permitting the advance to problems which hitherto had seemed to lie outside the mathematical domain. The three others supply a brilliant example of physical knowledge reduced to mathematical form.' The Infinitesimal Calculus was the discovery of the German philosopher Leibnitz, and his theory was published in 1684. Newton's greatest achievement was the discovery, not of gravitation itself, but of the law of gravitation, which, he was able to show, accounted for the motion of the planets round the sun. In proving his discovery he put the whole science of mechanics on a new basis (the *Principia*, published in 1687). Huyghens, the Dutch mathematician, built up the theory of dynamics by formulating the law of the conservation of force, and the theory of the pendulum; he also propounded the undulatory theory of light. To this triad may be added the English chemist Charles Boyle (d. 1691) and the Italian physiologist Malpighi (d. 1694), two incomparable observers of the Baconian type; and the English physician Sydenham (d. 1689), who first scientifically investigated the causes of epidemics. The mathematical school had not extinguished the Baconians, but it undoubtedly eclipsed them for a time. The mathematical spirit and the mathematical method had an extraordinary influence upon the thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Note, for example, the attempt of Hobbes to deduce a science of politics from the simple conception of man as a creature who pursues his own personal interest with unwavering intensity. Very similar was the science of Political Economy, as developed at the end of the eighteenth

Development of Mathematical Sciences

century; and the utilitarian theory of ethics, founded upon the simple hypothesis that the *summum bonum* for every human being is the enjoyment of pleasure and the avoidance of pain. In each of these cases a so-called science is built up which consists of deductions from an initial hypothesis which is regarded as self-evident. Knock away this hypothesis and the whole fabric falls to the ground.

Characteristics of the Eighteenth Century

On the whole, however, the eighteenth century was an age of revolt against the system-makers. In philosophy it is characterized by an audacious scepticism. We find David Hume (b. 1711) perfecting a sceptical philosophy by the age of thirty. Hume disposed of the claims of natural science and of philosophy in one scornful epigram. 'The most perfect philosophy of the natural kind only staves off our ignorance a little longer' (because in tracing back the sequence of cause and effect we never arrive at a First Cause which is self-subsistent); 'the most perfect philosophy of the moral or metaphysical kind serves only to discover larger portions of our ignorance'. 'Thus the observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy and meets us at every turn in spite of our endeavours to elude or avoid it.' We know nothing except what we learn from experience. From this we learn that a particular cause has always produced the same effect. Why this should be so we do not know; our knowledge is experimental. Other thinkers of the age were less sceptical than Hume in that they attached more importance than Hume to the results of experience. They harked back to Bacon and made light of Descartes. But having done so they claimed the right to test revealed religion in the light of the results of experience. Voltaire entirely and passionately denied the intervention of any supernatural power in the government of the world, because he found no warrant for such a power in experience. The great intellectual manifesto of this school was the *Encyclopédie, Dictionnaire raisonné des sciences, des arts et des métiers*. Although this contained many articles on literary and philosophic subjects, its purpose was to excite interest in the experimental sciences. For Voltaire the two most significant figures of the seventeenth

century were Galileo and Torricelli; and it was the foundation of the Royal Society which made him doubt whether the Age of Louis XIV should not with equal justice be called 'the age of the English'.

One naturally asks: Why this fervour of anti-religious philosophy? It was not Christianity that Voltaire hated so much as the clergy of the French state Church. He blamed them for keeping alive the spirit of bigotry, which would otherwise have died a natural death. His long chapter in his *Siècle de Louis XIV*, on the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes, is in effect an indictment of the French clergy, the Jesuits, and the Court of Rome who urged Louis to this step. Voltaire's policy towards the Church was epitomized in the phrase 'Écrasez l'infâme'. He rejoiced when Choiseul, a minister imbued with the new Liberalism, obtained from Louis XV a decree (1764) abolishing the Order of the Jesuits in France, and only allowing individual Jesuits to remain in the country on condition that they submitted to the ecclesiastical authority of the bishops. Rougher measures of the same kind had been taken already in Portugal (1759); Spain (1767) and Naples (1767) followed the example of France. In 1773 the order was dissolved by Pope Clement XIV at the instance of the Catholic Powers of France and Spain. After the suppression in France Voltaire expressed to a friend the hope that men would now realize how ridiculous it was to maintain the Papacy.

Voltaire

The truth is that the Church was still intolerant in the eighteenth century, where it had the opportunity. Huguenots were still sent to the galleys for attending conventicles, and Huguenot pastors were liable to the death penalty, and it was sometimes inflicted (e.g. the Pastor Rochette was hanged by the Parlement of Toulouse in 1762). In many cases the daughters of Huguenots were forcibly put into convents in dioceses of the South. Voltaire interested himself in two trials in which Huguenots were wrongfully accused of terrible crimes—the Calas affair and the Sirven affair. In the first case he intervened too late to save the accused (1765), and was only able to vindicate his memory. But he was able to procure the acquittal of Sirven. A smaller

Intolerance of the Church

grievance, but one which came home to the philosopher, was the Censorship of the Press which was enforced by the law-courts, which often ordered that works appearing to reflect upon the Church should be burned. In 1752 the Conseil ordered the destruction of the first two volumes of the *Encyclopédie* as being of an irreligious tendency and detrimental to the royal dignity. In 1758 was condemned the treatise of Helvetius on *The Mind*. In 1759 the whole of the *Encyclopédie* was condemned so far as already published. But through the intervention of Madame de Pompadour and other influential persons, this order was allowed to remain a dead letter, and publication was completed in 1772.

Rousseau

The last great French thinker we have to consider is Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–78). In his *Discourse on the Sciences and Arts* (1750) he maintained the paradox that the arts and sciences have exercised a corrupting influence. He attributed to them the sharp division between rich and poor, and the consequent waste of wealth upon luxurious expenditure. He said rhetorically: 'Because we need powder for our periwigs, therefore so many of the peasants go without bread.' He commended to his contemporaries the frugality of the ancient Romans as an example. In another *Discourse, on Human Inequality* (1755) he argued that the institution of private property had been the beginning of evil, though he admitted that from the first men had been unequal in their capabilities and in their needs. Voltaire was shocked by this production; he said that it was written 'against the human race'. In 1762 appeared the *Contrat Social*, a book which was novel, not because it preached the doctrine of popular sovereignty, but because it gave to the fictitious Volonté Générale a sort of religious authority. Apart from this idea—it is a large exception—Mme de Stael was right in saying 'Rousseau n'a rien découvert, mais tout enflammé'.

EPILOGUE

PROGRESS SINCE 800

HISTORIANS generally compare Modern Europe with Periclean Athens or with the Rome of the Antonines, with the result that they are sceptical as to the progress of the human species. We are less æsthetic than the old Athenians, and no better philosophers ; we have failed to make one commonwealth of the whole civilized world like the Romans, and in the eighteenth century it could plausibly be argued that modern statesmanship had much to learn from that of Rome. But a comparison between Europe in 800 and Europe in 1800 shows at least that there had been an enormous recovery since the Dark Ages. The Mediterranean races had proved unequal to the burden of maintaining Roman civilization. But the Teutons who overthrew the Empire began at once to build up a new society which was to a considerable extent based on Roman religion and Roman law, and animated by the Roman Idea of Peace in Unity. The ideals of the Universal Church and the Universal Empire were Roman.

The invaders also brought in Feudalism, which at all events supplied the want of a better government in large parts of Europe throughout the Middle Ages, gave a rough training in the art of government to a large aristocracy, and provided for the defence of Europe against new hordes of barbarians. The first national monarchies of Europe were based on feudalism and could not do without it. The weak point of feudalism was that it left the masses very largely at the mercy of feudal lords. Serfdom became universal, but serf-

dom was more tolerable than Roman slavery. The serf had customary rights, and moreover his services could not be dispensed with easily.

The next great revolution was the establishment of monarchies strong enough to do without feudal viceroys and feudal armies, and enlightened enough to see that their interest lay in protecting the weak against the strong, because the weak collectively were stronger than the strongest aristocracy. Such monarchies were made possible by the growth of commerce, bringing with it the possibility of indirect taxation on a great scale, and by the growth of an educated class—clergy, lawyers, traders—who were able to serve the state efficiently as civil servants and had no natural sympathy with the feudal aristocracies. The evil of the New Monarchy was its militarist character, owing to which European politics became a struggle for survival. The advantage which compensated for this evil was the growth of large states which offered a more secure existence to the common man. But between 800 and 1789 there was never any serious prospect of all Europe being united in one state. The ideal aimed at was an equilibrium, a balance of contending forces; and to the international lawyers we owe the first efforts at making the relations between rival states more humane, more rational, more moral.

But the greatest change between 800 and 1789 was a change which emerged after the Wars of Religion—a definite abandonment of the attempt to base political ideals and political conduct upon the precepts of revealed religion, and in its place a sustained effort to work out a new system of statecraft on the basis of natural reason. This new movement was not altogether admirable or successful. It produced, for instance, Machiavelli; it produced Hobbes. It led to a most unfortunate feud between Enlightenment and Religion, in which each side did less than justice to the doctrine of the other. But it produced some important theories and principles:

(*a*) Government rests on the consent of the governed—an idea which is expressed in the theory of the Social Contract, and the theory of Popular Sovereignty.

(*b*) The rights of government are limited by the Rights of Man.

(*c*) Government in itself is an evil, though a necessary evil; therefore government must not interfere unnecessarily with the individual's freedom of action.

(*d*) Toleration must be granted, because a man has a right to think as he pleases and must be guided by his conscience in matters of religion.

In these new political doctrines of the Rights of Man, the General Will, the Right of Revolution, there were revolutionary possibilities. These were partly responsible for the French Revolution; they were largely responsible for the sympathy which the Revolution excited in Europe. This was the third time in European history when men were killing one another in the name of ideas. These ideas have been severely criticized; but in each of them was a seed of truth, and each of them has influenced political theory.

Turning now to Social Progress, we must note the growth of 'Gold Economy' in place of 'Natural Economy', the increasing part played by money in its various forms in economic organization. This was fostered by improvements in agriculture, improvements in handicrafts, improvements of communications by land and sea, the opening up of overseas markets in the Far East and Far West. Among evidences of the improvement the first is the growth of town life—the towns are laboratories of social experiment. There was a very great improvement in domestic architecture. There was improvement in the standard of living amongst the poor; but this was checked abruptly towards the end of the period.

Finally we must remember intellectual progress, the growth of intelligence. We may infer from the growth of literary languages and of national literatures that, for the inhabitants of Europe in general, there was a progress in the direction of clearer thinking and wider interests. Unquestionably the advances of mathematics, astronomy, chemistry and physics meant a great increase of man's power over nature. Thus the question we asked at the outset—how far are we wiser, better, happier than our remote forefathers of the Dark Ages?—can receive at any rate a partial answer from the historian.

The modern historian, giving his comparisons a broader basis than the great historians of the eighteenth century were apt to provide, will give a more hopeful answer than theirs. He will conclude that in many departments there has been, and still is, progress.

LISTS OF SOVEREIGNS[1]

I. THE BYZANTINE EMPERORS

Nicephorus I	802–811
Stauracius	811
Michael I, Rhangabe	811–813
Leo V, the Armenian	813–820
Michael II, the Amorian	820–829
Theophilus	829–842
Michael III	842–867
Basil I, the Macedonian	867–886
Leo VI, the Wise	886–911
Constantine VII, Porphyrogenitus	911–958
[Co-regent Emperors—	
Alexander	912–913
Romanus I, Lecapenus	920–945]
Romanus II	958–963
Basil II, Bulgaroktonos	963–1025
[Co-regent Emperors—	
Nicephorus II, Phocas	963–969
John I, Zimisces	969–976]
Constantine IX	1025–28
Romanus III, Argyrus	1028–34
Michael IV, the Paphlagonian	1034–41
Michael V	1041
Constantine IX, Monomachus	1042–55
Theodora	1054–56
Michael VI, Stratioticus	1056–57
Isaac I, Comnenus	1057–59
Constantine X, Ducas	1059–67
Michael VII, Ducas	1067–78
[Co-regent Emperor—	
Romanus IV, Diogenes	1067–71]
Nicephorus III, Botaniates	1078–81
Alexius I, Comnenus	1081–1118
John II, Comnenus	1118–43
Manuel I, Comnenus	1143–80
Alexius II, Comnenus	1180–83
Andronicus I, Comnenus	1183–85
Isaac II, Angelus	1185–95
Alexius III, Angelus	1195–1203
Isaac II (restored) with Alexius IV	1203–4
Alexius V, Ducas	1204

The Latin Emperors.

Baldwin I	1204–5
Henry	1205–16
Peter	1217–19

[1] In these lists the dates belonging to the earlier Middle Ages are often conjectural. For fuller lists see Mas Latrie, *Trésor de Chronologie*, 1889.

Robert 1219–28
Baldwin II 1228–61

The Nicaean Emperors

Theodore I, Lascaris . 1204–22
John III, Ducas . . 1222–54
Theodore II, Ducas . 1254–59
John IV, Ducas . . 1259–60

The Empire Restored

Michael VIII, Palaeologus 1260–82
Andronicus II, Palaeologus 1282–1328
Andronicus III, Palaeologus . . . 1328–41
John V, Palaeologus . 1341–91
[Co-regent—John VI, Cantacuzenus . . 1347–54]
Manuel II 1391–1425
John VII 1425–48
Constantine XI . . . 1448–53

II. THE EMPERORS OF THE WEST

The Frankish Emperors, 800–918

Charles the Great . 768–814
Lewis the Pious . . 814–840
The later Carolings . 843–911
Conrad I 911–918

The Saxon Emperors, 919–1024

Henry I 919–936
Otto I 936–973
Otto II 973–983
Otto III 983–1002
Henry II 1002–24

The Franconian Emperors, 1024–1125

Conrad II 1024–39
Henry III 1039–56
Henry IV 1056–1106
Henry V 1106–25
[Lothaire II . . . . 1125–37]

The Hohenstauffen Emperors, 1138–1254

Conrad III 1138–52
Frederic Barbarossa . 1152–90
Henry VI 1190–97
{Philip 1198–1208
{Otto IV 1198–1215
Frederick II 1215–50
[Conrad . . . . . 1250–54]

The Interregnum, 1256–73

Rudolf of Hapsburg . 1273–91
Adolf of Nassau . . 1292–98
Albert of Austria . . 1298–1308
Henry VII of Luxemburg 1308–13
{Lewis IV of Bavaria 1314–47
{Frederic the Fair . 1314–30

The Luxemburg Emperors, 1347–1437

Charles IV 1347–78
Wenzel 1378–1400
[Rupert of the Palatinate . . . . . 1400–10]
Sigismund 1410–37

The Hapsburg Emperors

Albert II 1438–39
Frederic III 1440–93
Maximilian I 1493–1519
Charles V 1519–56
Ferdinand I 1556–64
Maximilian II . . . 1564–76
Rudolf II 1576–1612
Matthias 1612–19
Ferdinand II 1619–37
Ferdinand III . . . 1637–57
Leopold I 1658–1705
Joseph I 1705–11
Charles VI 1711–40
[Charles VII of Bavaria . . . . . 1742–45]
Francis I 1745–65
Joseph II 1765–90

III. FRANCE

The Caroling Kings

Charlemagne or Charles the Great, King of Neustria	768
King of all the Franks	771
King of Franks and Lombards	774
Emperor	800–814
Louis I, King of Aquitaine and Emperor	814–840
Charles the Bald, King of Neustria and Burgundy	843–877
Louis II, King of France	877–879
Louis III, King of Northern France	879–882
Charles the Simple, King of Northern France	898–923
Louis IV	936–954
Lothaire	954–986
Louis V	986–987

The Capetian Line, 987–1328

Hugh Capet	987–996
Robert II	996–1031
Henry I	1031–60
Philip I	1060–1108
Louis VI	1108–37
Louis VII	1137–80
Philip II (Augustus)	1180–1223
Louis VIII	1223–26
Louis IX	1226–70
Philip III	1270–85
Philip IV	1285–1314
Louis X	1314–16
Philip V	1316–22
Charles IV	1322–28

The Valois Line, 1328–1589

Philip VI	1328–50
John II	1350–64
Charles V	1364–80
Charles VI	1380–1422
Charles VII	1422–61
Louis XI	1461–83
Charles VIII	1483–98
Louis XII	1498–1515
Francis I	1515–47
Henry II	1547–59
Francis II	1559–60
Charles IX	1560–74
Henry III	1574–89

The Bourbon Line, 1589–1792

Henry IV	1589–1610
Louis XIII	1610–43
Louis XIV	1643–1715
Louis XV	1715–74
Louis XVI	1774–92

IV. ENGLAND

Edgar	959–975
Edward the Martyr	975–978
Ethelred	978–1016
Edmund Ironside	1016
Cnut	1017–35
[Disputed succession.]	
Harold	1035–40
Hardicanute	1040–42
Edward the Confessor	1042–66
William I	1066–87
William II	1087–1100
Henry I	1100–35
Stephen	1135–54
Henry II	1154–89
Richard I	1189–99
John	1199–1216
Henry III	1216–72
Edward I	1272–1307
Edward II	1307–27
Edward III	1327–77
Richard II	1377–99
Henry IV	1399–1413

Henry V 1413–22
Henry VI 1422–61
Edward IV . . . 1461–83
Edward V 1483
Richard III . . . 1483–85
Henry VII . . . 1485–1509
Henry VIII . . . 1509–47
Edward VI . . . 1547–53
Mary 1553–8
Elizabeth 1558–1603
Personal Union with Scotland . . . 1603
James I 1603–25
Charles I 1625–49
[Commonwealth . . 1649–53
Protectorate . . . 1653–60]
Charles II 1660–85
James II 1685–8
William and Mary . 1689–94
William III . . . 1694–1702
Anne 1702–14
George I 1714–27
George II 1727–60
George III . . . 1760–1820

V. SPAIN

Ferdinand and Isabella 1479–1504
Ferdinand 1504–16
Charles I 1516–56
Philip II 1556–98
Philip III 1598–1621
Philip IV 1621–65
Charles II 1665–1700
Philip V 1700–46
[Luis I, six months . 1724]
Ferdinand VI . . . 1746–59
Charles III . . . 1759–88
Charles IV . . . 1788–1808

VI. PORTUGAL

Alfonso I 1139–85
Sancho I 1185–1212
Alfonso II 1212–23
Sancho II 1223–48
Alfonso III . . . 1248–79
Denis 1279–1325
Alfonso IV . . . 1325–57
Peter 1357–67
Ferdinand I . . . 1367–85
John I 1385–1433
Edward 1433–38
Alfonso V 1438–81
John II 1481–95
Emmanuel . . . 1495–1521
John III 1521–57
Sebastian 1557–78
Henry 1578–80
Antony 1580
[Portugal united with Spain till 1640]
John IV 1640–56
Alfonso VI . . . 1656–83
Peter II 1683–1706
John V 1706–50
Joseph Emmanuel . 1750–77
Maria I } jointly . . 1777–86
Peter III }
Maria alone . . . 1786–1816

VII. DENMARK

Gorm the Old . . . 883–941
Harold Blue-Tooth . 941–991
Harold 1014–8
Sweyn 991–1014
Cnut II, King of England . . . 1014–35
Hardicanute or Cnut III 1035–42
Magnus 1042–7
Sweyn 1047–73
Interregnum . . . 1073–76
Harold 1077–80
Cnut IV 1080–6
Olaf 1086–95
Eric I 1095–1103
Interregnum . . . 1103–5

Nicholas I	1105–35
Eric II	1135–7
Eric III	1137–47
Sweyn } Cnut V } [Civil War]	1147–57
Waldemar	1157–82
Cnut VI	1182–1202
Waldemar II	1202–41
Eric IV	1241–50
Abel	1250–2
Christopher I	1252–9
Eric V	1259–86
Eric VI	1286–1320
Christopher II	1320–34
Interregnum	1334–40
Waldemar III	1340–75
Interregnum	1375–6
Olaf	1376–87
Margaret, Queen of Sweden and Norway	1387–97
Union of Calmar (Union of Denmark, Sweden, and Norway)	1397
Margaret and Eric VII [Eric XIII of Sweden]	1397–1412
Eric VII (alone)	1412–38
Interregnum	1438–40
Christopher III	1440–8
Christian I	1448–81
John	1481–1513
Christian II	1513–23
[Denmark and Sweden are separated.]	

Denmark and Norway.

Frederic I	1523–33
Christian III	1533–59
Frederic II	1559–88
Christian IV	1588–1648
Frederic III	1648–70
Christian V	1670–99
Frederic IV	1699–1730
Christian VI	1730–46
Frederic V	1746–66
Christian VII	1766–84

VIII. NORWAY

Halfdan III	
Harold Harfager	
Eric I, Bloody Axe	
Hako the Good	940–63
Harold II	963–77
Hako Jarl	977–95
Olaf I	995–1000
[Norway is divided between Sweden and Denmark.]	
Olaf II	1012–30
[Cnut of England in 1028 invaded and conquered Sweden.]	
Magnus I	1035–47
Harold Hardrada	1047–66
Olaf III Magnus II Magnus III Sigurd I Eystein II Olaf IV Magnus IV Harold IV	1066–1263
Sigurd II (followed by civil wars) Inge I Eystein III Hako III Magnus V Swerro Hako Guthrum Inge II Hako IV	1066–1263
Magnus VI (the Legislator)	1263–80
Eric II	1280–99
Hako V	1299–1319
Magnus VII	1319–43
Hako VI	1343–80
Olaf V (II of Denmark)	1380–87
Norway united with Sweden and Denmark under Margaret	1389
Denmark and Norway sep. from Sweden	1523

IX. SWEDEN

Eric IX 1155–61
Charles VII . . . 1161–7
Canute 1167–99
Swerker II 1199–1210
Eric X 1210–16
John I 1216–22
Eric XI 1222–50
Birger Jarl (Regent) } 1250–75
Waldemar I . . }
Magnus I 1275–90
Birger II 1290–1321
Magnus II 1321–50
Eric XII 1350–59
Magnus (restored) 1359–63 (dep.)
Albert of Mecklenburg 1363–89
Margaret 1389
Eric XIII (rules alone) 1412–40 (dep.)
Christopher III . . 1440–8
Charles VIII . . . 1448–71
Sten Sture, Protector 1471–83
John II 1483–1502
Swante Sture, Protector 1503–12
Sten Sture, Protector. 1512–20
Christian II . . . 1520–3
Gustavus I, Vasa . . 1523–60
Eric XIV 1560–9
John III 1569–92
Sigismund III . . . 1592–1604
Charles IX . . . 1604–11
Gustavus Adolphus . 1611–32
Christina . . . 1633–54 (res.)
Charles X 1654–60
Charles XI . . . 1660–97
Charles XII . . . 1697–1718
{Ulrica Eleanora . . 1719–20
{Frederick I . . . 1720–51
Adolphus Frederic . 1751–71
Gustavus III . . . 1771–92

X. THE OTTOMAN SULTANS

Othman 1307–25
Orchan 1326–60
Murad I 1360–89
Bajazet I 1389–1402
Interregnum and Civil War 1402–13
Mohammed I . . . 1413–21
Murad II 1421–51
Mohammed II. . . 1451–81
Bajazet II 1481–1512
Selim I 1512–20
Suleiman I . . . 1520–66
Selim II 1566–74
Murad III 1574–95
Mohammed III . . 1595–1603
Achmet I 1603–17
Mustapha I . . . 1617–18
Othman II. . . . 1618–22
Murad IV 1623–40
Ibrahim . . . 1640–49 (dep.)
Mohammed IV . 1649–87 (dep.)
Suleiman II . . . 1687–91
Achmet II 1691–95
Mustapha II . 1695–1703 (dep.)
Achmet III . 1703–30 (dep.)
Mahmoud I . . . 1730–54
Othman III . . . 1754–57
Mustapha III . . . 1757–74
Abdul Hamid I . . 1774–89

XI. THE KINGS OF PRUSSIA

Frederic I 1701–13
Frederic William I . 1713–40
Frederic II, the Great 1740–86
Frederic William II . 1786–97

XII. THE DUKES AND KINGS OF POLAND

The Piast dynasty, 842–1370

Mieczyslaus I . . . 962–92
Boleslaus the Great . 992–1025
Mieczyslaus II . . 1025–34
[Period of anarchy . 1034–41]
Casimir I 1041–58
Boleslaus II . . . 1058–81
Wladislaus I . . . 1081–1102
Boleslaus III . . . 1102–38
Wladislaus II . . . 1138–46
Boleslaus IV . . . 1146–73
Mieczyslaus III 1173–7 (dep.)
Casimir II 1177–94
Lesko V (the White) . 1194–1201
Mieczyslaus III (rest.) 1201–2
Lesko V (rest.) . . 1202–27
Boleslaus V . . . 1227–79
Lesko VI (the Black) . 1279–89
[Period of anarchy . 1289–95]
Premislaus II . . . 1295–6
Wladislaus III, Loketek 1296–1300 (dep.)
Wenceslaus I . . . 1300–4
Wladislaus III (rest.) . 1305–33
Casimir III, the Great 1333–70

End of the Piast dynasty.

Lewis 1370–82
[Interregnum . . . 1382–5]
Hedwiga 1385–6

The Jagellon dynasty, 1386–1572

Hedwiga and Wladislaus V . . 1386–99
Wladislaus V, alone . 1399–1434
Wladislaus VI . . 1434
Casimir IV . . . 1445–92
John Albert . . . 1492–1501
Alexander 1501–6
Sigismund I . . . 1506–48
Sigismund II . . . 1548–72

End of the Jagellon dynasty.

Henry of Valois . . 1573–5
Stephen Bathori . . 1575–86
Sigismund III . . 1587–1632
Wladislaus VII . . 1632–48
John Casimir V . . 1648–69
Michael Wiesnowiesçki 1669–73
John Sobieski . . . 1674–96
Frederic Augustus I, Elector of Saxony 1697–1704 (dep.)
Stanislaus I, Leszczynski 1704–9
Frederic Augustus I (rest.) 1709–33
Frederic Augustus II 1734–63
Stanislaus II, Augustus, Poniatowski 1764–95 (res.)

XIII. THE TSARS OF RUSSIA

Ivan III, the Great . 1462–1505
Vassili Ivanovitch . 1505–33
Ivan IV, the Terrible 1533–84
Feodor Ivanovitch . 1584–98
Boris Godunov . . 1598–1605
[The Troubled Times . 1605–13]

Tsars and Emperors of the House of Romanov

Michael Romanov . 1613–45
Alexis 1645–76
Feodor Alexiévitch . 1676–82
Ivan V and Peter the Great 1682–9
Peter the Great (alone) 1689–1725
Catherine I . . . 1725–7
Peter II 1727–30
Anna Ivanovna . . 1730–40
Ivan VI . . . 1740–1 (dep.)
Elizabeth 1741–62
Peter III . Jan. 5–July 19, 1762
Catherine II . . . 1762–96

XIV. THE POPES

Leo III, Dec. 795–June 816.
Stephen IV, June 816–Jan. 817.
Pascal I, Jan. 817–May 824.
Eugenius II, June 824–Aug. 827.
Valentine, Aug.–Dec. 827 ?
Gregory IV, Dec. 827–Jan. 844 ?
Sergius II, Jan. 844–Jan. 847.
Leo IV, April 847–July 855.
Benedict III, Sept. 855–April 858.
Nicholas I, April 858–Nov. 867
Hadrian II, Dec. 867–Nov. 872 ?
John VIII, Dec. 872–Dec. 882.
Marinus, Dec. 882–May 884.
Hadrian III (Agapetus), May 884–Sept. 885.
Stephen V, Sept. 885–Aug. 891.
Formosus, Sept. 891–April 896.
Boniface VI, 896.
Stephen VI, 896–97 ?
Romanus, Aug.–Nov. 897 ?
Theodore II, 898 ?
John IX, July 898–Nov. 900.
Benedict IV, Dec. 900–Oct. 903.
Leo V, Oct.–Nov. 903 (dep.).
Christopher, Nov. 903–June 904 (dep.).
Sergius III, June 904–Aug. 911.
Anastasius III, Aug. 911–Oct. 913.
Lando, Oct. 913–April 914.
John X, April 914–May 928.
Leo VI, June 928–Feb. 929.
Stephen VII, Feb. 929–Mar. 931.
John XI, Mar. 931–Jan. 936.
Leo VII, Jan. 936–July 939.
Stephen VIII, July 939–Nov. 942.
Martin III, Nov. 942–Jan. 946.
Agapetus II, Mar. 946–end of 955
John XII (Octavianus), Jan. 956–Nov. 963 (dep.).
Leo VIII, Nov. 963–Mar. 965.
Benedict V, 964–5.
John XIII, Oct. 965–Sept. 972.
Benedict VI, 972–4.
Boniface VII, 974.
Domnus II, 974 ?
Benedict VII, Mar. 975–July 983 ?
John XIV, Nov. 983–Aug. 984.
Boniface VII again—d. Mar. 985.
John XV, never lawfully consecrated, d. 985.
John XVI, July 985–96.
Gregory V, May 996–Feb. 999.
[John XVII, antipope, May 997–Feb. 998.]
Silvester II (Gerbert, Abp. of Ravenna), April 999–May 1003.
John XVII, June–Oct. 1003.
John XVIII, Dec. 1003–May 1009 (res.).
Sergius IV, 1009–May 1012 ?
Benedict VIII, July 1012–July 1024.
John XIX (brother of Benedict VIII), Aug. 1024–May 1033.
Benedict IX (nephew of John XIX), 1033–July 1048 (res.); deposed 1044, and restored on death of Silvester III; sold the papacy to Gregory VI; restored on death of Clement II.
[Antipopes:
Silvester III, 1044.
Gregory VI, May 1044–Dec. 1046 (dep.).
Clement II, Dec. 1046–Oct. 1047.]
Damasus II, July–Aug. 1048.
Leo IX, Dec. 1048–April 1054.
Victor II, Mar. 1055–July 1057.
Stephen IX, Aug. 1057–Mar. 1058.
[Benedict X, antipope, Mar. 1058–Jan. 1059 (dep.).]
Nicholas II, Dec. 1058–July 1061.
Alexander II, Sept. 1061–April 1073.
Gregory VII (Hildebrand), April 1073–May 1085.
[Clement III, antipope, June 1080–Sept. 1090.]
Victor III, May 1086–Sept. 1087.
Urban II, Mar. 1088–July 1099.

Pascal II, Aug. 1099–Jan. 1118.
Gelasius II, Jan. 1118–Jan. 1119.
Calixtus II, Feb. 1119–Dec. 1124.
Honorius II, Dec. 1124–Feb. 1130.
Innocent II, Feb. 1130–Sept. 1143.
[Anacletus II, antipope, Feb. 1130–Jan. 1138.]
Celestine II, Sept. 1143–Mar. 1144.
Lucius II, Mar. 1144–Feb. 1145.
Eugenius III, Feb. 1145–July 1153.
Anastasius IV, July 1153–Dec. 1154.
Hadrian IV, Dec. 1154–Sept. 1159.
Alexander III, Sept. 1159–Aug. 1181.
[Antipopes:
Victor IV, Sept. 1159–April 1164.
Pascal III, April 1164–Sept. 1167.
Calixtus III, Sept. 1168–Aug. 1178 (res.).]
Lucius III, Sept. 1181–Nov. 1185.
Urban III, Nov. 1185–Oct. 1187.
Gregory VIII, Oct.–Dec. 1187.
Clement III, Dec. 1187–Mar. 1191.
Celestine III, Mar. 1191–Jan. 1198.
Innocent III, Jan. 1198–July 1216.
Honorius III, July 1216–Mar. 1227.
Gregory IX, Mar. 1227–Aug. 1241.
Celestine IV, 1241, died before consecration.
Innocent IV, June 1243–Dec. 1254.
Alexander IV, Dec. 1254–May 1261.
Urban IV, Aug. 1261–Oct. 1264.
Clement IV, Feb. 1265–Nov. 1268.
[Vacancy till election of Gregory X, Sept. 1271.]
Gregory X, Sept. 1271–Jan. 1276.
Innocent V, Feb.–June 1276.
Hadrian V, July 1276, died before consecration.
John XXI, Sept. 1276–May 1277.
Nicholas III, Nov. 1277–Aug. 1280.
Martin IV, Feb. 1281–Mar. 1285.
Honorius IV, April 1285–April 1287.
Nicholas IV, Feb. 1288–April 1292.
Celestine V, July–Dec. 1294 (res.).
Boniface VIII, Dec. 1294–Oct. 1303.
Benedict XI, Oct. 1303–July 1304.
Clement V, June 1305–April 1314.
John XXII, Aug. 1316–Dec. 1334.
Benedict XII, Dec. 1334–April 1342.
Clement VI, May 1342–Dec. 1352.
Innocent VI, Dec. 1352–Sept. 1362.
Urban V, Sept. 1362–Dec. 1370.
Gregory XI, Jan. 1371–Mar. 1378.

In Avignon. 1309–77.

The Great Schism

Rome		Avignon
Urban VI, April 1378–Oct. 1389.		Clement VII, Sept. 1378–Sept. 1394.
Boniface IX, Nov. 1389–Oct. 1404.	In 1409 the Council of Pisa deposed both Gregory XII and Benedict XIII,	Benedict XIII, Sept. 1394–1424.
Innocent VII, Oct. 1404–Nov. 1406.		

Rome	Avignon
Gregory XII, Nov. 1406–July 1415 (res.).	and elected Alexander V, June 1409–May 1410. John XXIII, May 1410–May 1415, dep.; ob. 1419.
In 1415 the Council of Constance deposed John XXIII, persuaded Gregory XII to resign, and elected	
Martin V, Nov. 1417–Feb. 1431.	Clement VIII, 1424–29 (res.).
Eugenius IV, Mar. 1431–Feb. 1447.	Felix V (Amadeus VIII, D. of Savoy), elected Nov. 1439 by Council of Basle, res. April 1449.

Nicholas V (Thomas de Sarzana), Mar. 1447–Mar. 1455.
Calixtus III (Alfonso Borgia), April 1455–Aug. 1458.
Pius II (Æneas Silvius Piccolomini), Aug. 1458–Aug. 1464.
Paul II, Aug. 1464–July 1471.
Sixtus IV (Francis della Rovere), Aug. 1471–Aug. 1484.
Innocent VIII, Aug. 1484–July 1492.
Alexander VI (Rodrigo Borgia), Aug. 1492–Aug. 1503.
Pius III, Sept.–Oct. 1503.
Julius II (Julian della Rovere), Nov. 1503–Feb. 1513.
Leo X (Giovanni de' Medici), Mar. 1513–Dec. 1521.
Hadrian VI, Jan. 1522–Sept. 1523.
Clement VII (Giulio de' Medici), Nov. 1523–Sept. 1534.
Paul III (Alexander Farnese), Oct. 1534–Nov. 1549.
Julius III, Feb. 1550–Mar. 1555.
Marcellus II, April 1555.
Paul IV (Caraffa), May 1555–April 1559.
Pius IV (John Angelo de' Medici), Dec. 1559–Dec. 1565.
Pius V (Michael Ghislieri), Jan. 1566–May 1572.
Gregory XIII, May 1572–April 1585.
Sixtus V, April 1585–Aug. 1590.
Urban VII, Sept. 1590.
Gregory XIV, Dec. 1590–Oct. 1591.
Innocent IX, Oct.–Dec. 1591.
Clement VIII, Jan. 1592–Mar. 1605.
Leo XI (Alexander Octavian de' Medici), April 1605.
Paul V (Camillo Borghese), May 1605–Jan. 1621.
Gregory XV, Feb. 1621–July 1623.
Urban VIII, Aug. 1623–July 1644.
Innocent X, Sept. 1644–Jan. 1655.
Alexander VII, April 1655–May 1667.
Clement IX, June 1667–Dec. 1669.
Clement X, April 1670–July 1676.
Innocent XI, Sept. 1676–Aug. 1689.
Alexander VIII, Oct. 1689–Feb. 1691.

Innocent XII, July 1691–Sept. 1700.
Clement XI, Nov. 1700–Mar. 1721.
Innocent XIII, May 1721–Mar. 1724.
Benedict XIII, May 1724–Feb. 1730.
Clement XII, July 1730–Feb. 1740.
Benedict XIV, Aug. 1740–May 1758.
Clement XIII, July 1758–Feb. 1769.
Clement XIV (Ganganelli), May 1769–Sept. 1774.
Pius VI, Feb. 1775–Aug. 1799.

GENEALOGICAL TABLES

1. THE CAROLINGIAN DYNASTY



2. THE SAXON AND SALIAN EMPERORS



Lothair of Supplinburg, 1125–37. D. of Saxony =Richenza, grand-daughter of Otto of Nordheim.

Gertrude = Henry the Proud.

3. THE HOHENSTAUFFEN



4. THE CAPETIAN KINGS OF FRANCE



5. HOUSES OF VALOIS, ORLEANS, BURGUNDY, BOURBON, AND LORRAINE



6. THE HOUSE OF ORANGE



7. THE HAPSBURG AND JAGELLON FAMILIES



8. THE HOUSE OF VASA



9. HOHENZOLLERN KINGS OF PRUSSIA



10. THE LATER BOURBON KINGS



11. THE HOUSE OF SAVOY



12. THE HAPSBURGS IN AUSTRIA



NOTE ON BOOKS

[By the Editor]

The author has mentioned in the footnotes to this work books of two kinds, some which deal with particular subjects, others which are more general and which he expected his hearers to read. From the note at the end of his own volume *Medieval Europe* in the 'Home University Library' we may with confidence infer what kind of advice for further reading he would have added if he had finished the book. He would first have mentioned the series of text-books published by Messrs. Rivington, of which six volumes cover the period: Sir Charles Oman's *Dark Ages*, Professor Tout's *The Empire and the Papacy*, Sir Richard Lodge's *Close of the Middle Ages*, the late Mr. Johnson's *Europe in the Sixteenth Century*, the late Mr. Wakeman's *Ascendancy of France*, and Mr. Hassall's *Balance of Power*. As a substitute for Wakeman's book Davis, however, mentioned in his lectures a more modern book, Mr. Ogg's *Europe in the Seventeenth Century*. He would also have mentioned the series of shorter text-books published by Messrs. Methuen, of which five volumes cover the period: *The Dawn of Medieval Europe*, by J. H. B. Masterman; *The Central Period of the Middle Age*, by B. A. Lees; *The End of the Middle Ages*, by E. C. Lodge; *Europe in Renaissance and Reform*, by M. A. Hollings; and *The Age of the Enlightened Despot*, by A. H. Johnson. He recommended for the gap between the still unfinished *Cambridge Mediaeval History* (5 vols. published) and the *Cambridge Modern History* (13 vols. and Atlas), the French *Histoire Générale*, edited by Lavisse and Rambaud. Among comprehensive works available in English he would have mentioned Finlay's *History of Greece*, Sir Charles Oman's *Byzantine Empire*, and, in accordance with his principle that the old books are often better reading than the new, Milman's *Latin Christianity*. Gregorovius's *History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages*, Ranke's *History of the Popes* (mainly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) and Creighton's *History of the Papacy during the Reformation*, together with the Roman Catholic Pastor's *History of the Popes from the Close of the Middle Ages* (of which the English translation now reaches the late sixteenth century) would have been named as leading works on ecclesiastical history.

For the history of civilization, besides works mentioned in the footnotes, he recommended on this and other occasions Vinogradoff's *Roman Law in Medieval Europe*, Montalembert's *Monks of the West*, Lea's *History of the Inquisition in the Middle Ages*, Rashdall's *Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, Sir Charles Oman's *Art of War in the Middle Ages*, Buckle's *History of Civilization*, Lecky's *Rise and Progress of the Spirit of Rationalism*, and, for the period of the Renaissance, the edition of the letters of Erasmus in Latin by Dr. P. S. Allen or the English translation of his letters by J. G. Nichols.

For the histories of separate nations other than England he held that it was necessary to have recourse to French and German works, such as the co-operative *Histoire de France*, edited by E. Lavisse, or the series *Handbuch der Mittelalterlichen und Neueren Geschichte*, edited by Below and Meinecke. To enumerate these, or the biographies of the leading historical figures, another form of reading which Davis specially recommended, is impossible here ; but he would almost certainly have referred his readers to the bibliographies of the more general books already mentioned and to those in the forthcoming new edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, to which he was himself a contributor. It may be as well also to mention the useful bibliographies on various historical subjects published from time to time by the Historical Association, 22 Russell Square, London, W.C.1.

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